Dowell v. Applegate/Opinion of the Court

From this history of the litigation between the parties, it appears that Dowell, in his answer in this suit, asserted his right to the 40 acres in dispute under and by virtue of the decree and proceedings in the circuit court of the United States. That right having been denied by the judgment of the supreme court of Oregon, affirming the judgment of the circuit court of Douglas county, it is necessary to inquire:

First. Whether the decree and proceedings in the federal court were, as claimed, void for the want of jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit which was instituted by Dowell in the circuit court of Douglas county, Or., and was subsequently removed into the circuit court of the United States for the district of Oregon.

Secondly. Whether, if such decree and proceedings were not void, the state court gave due effect to them, when adjudging that Dowell took nothing by his purchase of the lands in dispute under that decree.

If these questions be determined in favor of Dowell, then the judgment below was erroneous, in that it denied a right specially set up and claimed by him under the authority of the United States.

1. Dowell, we have been, brought his suit in the circuit court of Douglas county on the 11th day of October, 1879, and his bill in the federal court, which took the place of the bill filed in the state court, was filed April 6, 1881. The present transcript does not contain all the proceedings in the circuit court of Douglas county prior to the removal of the cause into the federal court. Nor does it contain the petition for removal. But the state court below had before it, in the present suit, the bill filed by Dowell in the federal court April 6, 1881, his supplemental bill of September 25, 1881, the answer of Daniel W. Applegate of May 2, 1881, and the final decree of January 5, 1883. It was also informed, by the findings of fact in the circuit court of Douglas county, of the sale made by the master in chancery under that decree, the confirmation of that sale by the court, the execution of the deed to Dowell, and that the tract described in Applegate's complaint in this suit is a part of the premises described in the above decree of sale and in the master's deed to Dowell.

In the bill and supplemental bill of Dowell, he and the defendants to the suit in the federal court are described as citizens of Oregon. But there is no finding, nor anything in the present transcript, showing the citizenship of the parties at the time Dowell brought his suit in the state court, nor at the time of the filing of the petition for removal. It is therefore contended that this court cannot assume that the parties to the suit in the federal court were all citizens of Oregon at the time that suit was brought, or when it was removed from the state court. Stevens v. Nichols, 130 U.S. 230, 9 Sup. Ct. 518; Crehore v. Railway Co., 131 U.S. 240, 9 Sup. Ct. 692; La Confiance v. Hall, 137 U.S. 61, 11 Sup. Ct. 5.

If it be assumed that all the parties to Dowell's suit were citizens of Oregon when it was commenced, as well as when it was removed into the federal court,-and such, probably, was the case, it is yet quite apparent that jurisdiction was taken by that court on the ground that the deeds by Jesse Applegate and wife which obstructed Dowell in his efforts to reach the lands described in them were charged to have been insufficiently stamped, under the acts of congress then in force, providing internal revenue for the support of the government, and to pay the interest on the public debt, and that the failure to put sufficient stamps on those deeds, and to properly cancel them, was with the intent to evade such acts. We may so interpret the record, because, in the opinion of Judge Deady in Dowell v. Applegate, 7 Sawy. 232, 239, 7 Fed. 881, when that case was before the federal court upon demurrer interposed by some of the original defendants, he stated that the removal to the federal court was 'on the ground that its determination involved the construction of certain provisions of the internal revenue act of June 30, 1864, (13 Stat. 223,) and the amendments thereto.'

It thus appears, upon the face of the record of the suit in the federal court, that the case depended, in part, upon the construction of certain acts of congress, and upon the effect of the alleged fraudulent omissions of the grantors in the deeds attacked to conform to those acts. If all those deeds were void, by reason of such omissions, then the difficulties in the way of Dowell's reaching the lands embraced by them would probably have disappeared.

If the federal court erred in assuming or retaining jurisdiction of Dowell's suit,-a question not necessary to be examined,-would it follow that its final decree, being unmodified and unreversed, can be treated as a nullity when assailed collaterally by one who was a party to the suit in which it was rendered?

In Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy, 5 Cranch, 173, 185, it was said by Chief Justice Marshall that 'all courts are inferior courts in relation to the appellate courts before which their judgments may be carried, but they are not, therefore, inferior courts, in the technical sense of those words. They Apply to courts of a special and limited jurisdiction, which are erected on such principles that their judgments, taken alone, are entirely disregarded, and the proceedings must show their jurisdiction. The courts of the United States are all of limited jurisdiction, and their proceedings are erroneous, if the jurisdiction be not shown upon them. Judgments rendered in such cases may certainly be reversed, but this court is not prepared to say that they are absolute nullities, which may be totally disregarded.'

In Skillern's Ex'rs v. May's Ex'rs, 6 Cranch, 267, it appears that after the reversal by this court of a decree of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky, and after the cause was remanded to the court below, it was discovered to be one not within the jurisdiction of that court. The question arose whether the court could dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction, after this court had acted thereon. It was held that 'the merits of the cause having been finally decided by it, and its mandate requiring only the execution of its decree, the circuit court was bound to United States was competent to determine in carry that decree into execution, although in the pleadings.'

In Cameron v. McRoberts, 3 Wheat. 591, a suit brought in the district court of Kentucky, then having the jurisdiction of a circuit court, the pleadings stated that McRoberts, the plaintiff, was a citizen of Kentucky, and that the defendant Cameron was a citizen of Virginia. The citizenship of other defendants was not stated. The defendants all appeared and answered, and a decree was pronounced for McRoberts. Subsequently, Cameron filed a bill of review, and moved to set aside the decree and to dismiss the suit 'because the want of jurisdiction appeared on the record,' and upon the allegation that the parties to the bill were all citizens of Kentucky. It was held that the court below had not power over its decree, so as to set the same aside, on motion, after the expiration of the term at which it was rendered, and that, if a joint interest vested in Cameron and the other defendants, the court had no jurisdiction over the cause, although jurisdiction could be exercised as to Cameron, if a distinct interest vested in him, so that substantial justice, so far as he was interested, could be done, without affecting the other defendants.

In McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192, 199, certain defendants filed a plea in bar to a suit brought against them, setting up the proceedings and decree in a former suit brought by the plaintiffs in the district court of Ohio, exercising the powers and jurisdiction of a circuit court. A special replication to this plea was filed, setting forth the record of the former suit, and alleging that the proceedings in that suit were coram non judice, the record not showing that the complainants and defendants in that suit were citizens of different states. This court said that the reason assigned in the replication why the former decree could not operate as a bar 'proceeds upon an incorrect view of the character and jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States. They are all of limited jurisdiction, but they are not, on that account, inferior courts, in the technical sense of those words, whose judgments, taken alone, are to be disregarded. If the jurisdiction be not alleged in the proceedings, their judgments and decrees are erroneous, and may, upon a writ of error or appeal, be reversed for that cause. But they are not absolute nullities.' It was therefore held that the decree in the first suit, while it remained unreversed, was a bar to the last suit, as to the defendants who were also parties to the first suit.

In Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, Chief Justice Marshall said that 'it is universally understood that the judgments of the courts of the United States, although their jurisdiction be not shown in the pleadings, are yet binding on all the world,' and that an 'apparent want of jurisdiction can avail the party only on a writ of error.'

Similar views were expressed in Bank v. Moss, 6 How. 31, 39, and Des Moines Nav. & R. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U.S. 552, 557, 8 Sup. Ct. 217, in the latter of which cases it was said that 'although the judgments and decrees of the circuit courts might be erroneous, if the records failed to show the facts on which the jurisdiction of the court exists, such as the plaintiffs were citizens of different states from the defendant, yet they were not nullities, and would bind the parties until reversed or otherwise set aside.'

These cases establish the doctrine that, although the presumption in every stage of a cause in a circuit court of the United States is that the court is without jurisdiction unless the contrary affirmatively appears from the record, (Bors v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252, 255, 4 Sup. Ct. 407, and the authorities there cited,) yet, if such jurisdiction does not so appear, the judgment or final decree cannot for that reason be collaterally attacked, or treated as a nullity.

These authorities above cited, it is said, do not meet the present case, because the ground on which it is claimed the federal court assumed jurisdiction was insufficient in law to make this case one arising under the laws of the United States. But that was a question which the circuit court of the United States was competent to determine in the first instance. Its determination of it was the exercise of jurisdiction. Even if that court erred in entertaining jurisdiction, its determination of that matter was conclusive upon the parties before it, and could not be questioned by them, or either of them, collaterally, or otherwise than on writ of error or appeal to this court. As said in Des Moines Nav. & R. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., above cited, if the circuit court 'kept the case when it ought to have been remanded, or if it proceeded to adjudicate upon matters in dispute between two citizens of Iowa, when it ought to have confined itself to those between the citizens of Iowa and the citizens of New York, its final decree in the suit coult have been reversed on appeal as erroneous, but the decree would not have been a nullity. To determine whether the suit was removable in whole or in part, or not, was certainly within the power of the circuit court. The decision of that question was the exercise, and the rightful exercise, of jurisdiction, no matter whether in favor of or against taking the cause. Whether its decision was right, in this or any other respect, was to be finally determined by this court on appeal.'

This disposes of the first objection urged against the decree in the federal court, under which Dowell purchased. That decree cannot be treated, in this suit, as void for want of jurisdiction.

2. We now proceed to consider what effect should be given to the decree and proceedings in the suit in the federal court. Although the bill in that suit refers to various deeds executed by Jesse Applegate and wife for lands that Dowell sought to have sold, and charged that they were made with the intent to delay the defraud both the state of Oregon and Dowell, the fundamental question presented was whether the lands themselves, fully identified by the pleadings, could be rightfully sold in satisfaction of Dowell's demands. To that issue, directly made, Daniel W. Applegate was a party. He met all the material allegations of Dowell's bill by denials that put upon the latter the burden of showing that he was entitled to the relief sought by him. The issue thus made was determined adversely to Applegate, as to some of those lands.

The court, as we have seen, adjudged that on and prior to April 19, 1869, Jesse Applegate was the owner in fee of 121.55 acres of the north half of said donation claim, and that the deeds of April 19 and 20, 1869, from Jesse Applegate to W. H. H. Applegate and Daniel W. Applegate, covering said 121.55 acres, were voluntary, without consideration, and in fraud of the rights of Dowell, and therefore, as to him and his assigns, null and void. It was further adjudged that all the interest of Jesse Applegate on the 1st of January, 1869, in that 121.55 acres, (and in other lands referred to in the decree,) be sold by the master commissioner of the court. It cannot be said that this decree was not within the scope of the pleadings in the suit in the federal court. And it certainly covered the lands now in dispute, for it is admitted that the 40 acres described in the deed of October 8, 1874, from W. H. H. Applegate to the present plaintiff, are part of the 121.55 acres directed by the decree of the federal court to be sold, and which were in fact sold, Dowell becoming the purchaser.

Upon what principle can it be held that that decree, being unmodified and unreversed, does not conclude the parties to the suit in which it was rendered, in respect to the liability of the lands described in it for the demands of Dowell, as ascertained and settled by the court? It is said that the deed of October 8, 1874, under which Daniel W. Applegate claims the 40 acres, was not distinctly put in issue by the pleadings, or determined by the decree. But its validity was involved in the larger question presented by the pleadings, as to the right of Dowell to subject to his demands the interest of Jesse Applegate in all the lands referred to,-those covered by donation claim numbered 38, and those not within that claim. The decree directing the sale of all the interest of Jesse Applegate in the 121.55 acres on the 1st of January, 1869, was an adjudication, as between Dowell and the defendants in that suit, who asserted title to those lands, that no claim asserted by either of them could stand against the right of Dowell to have those lands sold.

It is disclosed by the present suit that, when Daniel W. Applegate answered Dowell's bill, he held the deed of October 8, 1874. If Daniel W. Applegate became, when taking that deed, a bona fide purchaser of the 40 acres of land now in dispute, and if the title so acquired was superior to Dowell's right to have that land sold for his demands against Jesse Applegate, it behooved him to assert that title in defense of the suit brought against him. The very nature of that suit required him to assert whatever interest he then had in the lands, or any part of them, that was superior to any claim of Dowell upon them, whether by judgment liens or in any other form. So far from pursuing that course, he forbore purposely, as may now be inferred-to claim anything in virtue of the deed of October 8, 1874, and, long after the decree under which Dowell purchased, he comes forward with a new, independent suit, based alone upon that deed, as giving him a superior title. His object is-certainly, the effect of his suit, if it be sustained, will be-to retry the issues made in Dowell's suit, so far as they involved the latter's claim to have the 40-acre tract subjected to his demands. The decree in the federal court was an adjudication, as between all the parties to the suit in that court, that Dowell was entitled, in satisfaction of his claims against Jesse Applegate, to subject to sale all the lands his bill sought to reach, which the decree directed to be sold. And that decree-never having been modified by the court that rendered it, nor by this court upon appeal-necessarily concludes every matter that Daniel W. Applegate was entitled, under the pleadings, to bring forward in order to prevent the sale of the lands claimed by him, by whatever title. Having remained silent as to the deed of October 8, 1874, and having allowed the suit in the federal court to proceed to final decree upon the question as to whether the lands described in the bill could be subjected to Dowell's demands,-which description included the 40 acres here in dispute,-and having been defeated upon that issue, and the decree having been fully executed, he cannot have the same issue retried in an independent suit based solely upon a title that he was at liberty to set up, but chose not to assert, before the decree was rendered.

The argument to the contrary seems to rest principally, if not altogether, upon the ground that the present suit is upon a cause of action entirely different from that presented in the suit in the federal court. In that view, our attention is called to the cases of Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351; Russell v. Place, Id. 608; and Bissell v. Spring Valley Tp., 124 U.S. 231, 8 Sup. Ct. 495. Those cases hold that a judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction as to parties and subject-matter is a finality in respect to the claim or demand in controversy, 'concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.' 'Thus, for example,' the court said in Cromwell v. County of Sac, 'a judgment rendered upon a promissory note is conclusive as to the validity of the instrument and the amount due upon it, although it is subsequently alleged that perfect defenses actually existed, of which no proof was offered, such as forgery, want of consideration, or payment. If such defenses were not presented in the action, and established by competent evidence, the subsequent allegation of their existence is of no legal consequence. The judgment is as conclusive, so far as future proceedings at law are concerned, as though the defenses never existed.' In that case it was further held-and the same principle was announced in the other cases-that 'where the second action, between the same parties, is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue, or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.' To the same effect were prior decisions of this court. Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109, 113; Smith v. Kernochan, 7 How. 198, 217; Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 65, 77; Parrish v. Ferris, 2 Black, 606, 609. And the same doctrines were subsequently reaffirmed in Lumber Co. v. Buchtel, 101 U.S. 638, 639, and Stout v. Lye, 103 U.S. 66, 71, and, at the present term, in Johnson Steel Street Rail Co. v. Wharton, Jr., & Co., 152 U.S. --, 14 Sup. Ct. 608. To these we may add the case of Stockton v. Ford, 18 How. 418, in which it was said: 'One of the questions now sought to be agitated again is precisely the same as this one in the previous suit, namely, the right of the plaintiff to the judicial mortgage under the execution and sale against Prior. The other is somewhat varied, namely, the equitable right or interest in the mortgage of the plaintiff, as the attorney of Prior, for the fees and costs provided for in the assignment to Jones. But this question was properly involved in the former case, and might have been there raised and determined. The neglect of the plaintiff to avail himself of it, even if it were tenable, furnishes no reason for another litigation. The right of the respective parties to the judicial mortgage was the main question in the former suit. That issue, of course, involved the whole or any partial interest in the mortgage. We are satisfied, therefore, that the former suit constitutes a complete bar to the present.'

So far from the above cases sustaining the decision of the supreme court of Oregon, they support the views we have expressed. The present suit is not a second one between the same parties, upon a different claim or demand. It seeks, by additional evidence, to reopen the controversy that arose and was determined in the suit in the federal court as to the right of Dowell to have all the lands described in his bill subjected to his claims. While the position of the parties is reversed, Daniel W. Applegate, who contested that right in the suit of the federal court,-so far as that suit related to the lands then claimed by him, including the 40 acres here in dispute,-seeks, under the guise of a new suit, to obtain a re-examination of that question. And he seeks such re-examination, not upon any ground of fraud in obtaining that decree, but in the light simply of the conveyance of October 8, 1874, from W. H. H. Applegate, which conveyance, although existing before Dowell commenced his suit, indeed, before Dowell acquired any judgment lien of record, he deliberately refrained from bringing to the attention of the federal court, in some appropriate form, in support of his defense. The presenting in this suit of the fact of that conveyance, for the purpose of showing that the 40 acres in question should not have been subjected to sale for Dowell's demands, does not, within the rule announced in the cases above cited, make a different claim or demand. On the contrary, the matter now presented was embraced by the issues in the suit in the federal court, and was there determined, when that court, upon final hearing, adjudged that the 121.55 acres (which embraced the 40 acres now in dispute) should be sold to pay Dowell's claims. This case, consequently, comes within the rule, that 'a judgment estops not only as to every ground of recovery or defense actually presented in the action, but also as to every ground which might have been presented.'

For the reasons given, we are unable to concur in the views expressed by the state court as to the effect to be given to the decree of the federal court. We are of opinion that due legal effect is not accorded to it, unless it be adjudged, as this court does now adjudge, that, never having been modified, and being in full force and unreversed when the present suit was instituted, that decree conclusively establishes, as between Dowell and Daniel W. Applegate, that the former was entitled to have the lands now in dispute sold for his demands, and, consequently, that the title acquired by Dowell under that decree cannot be here questioned by Applegate.

Under this view, it is immaterial that Dowell did not, in the present case, offer evidence in support of the allegations of fraud against Jesse Applegate in respect to the various deeds made by him, and to which reference was made in the suit and decree in the federal court. That decree being conclusive, as between Dowell and Daniel W. Applegate, of the question now presented, it was not incumbent upon Dowell to introduce any evidence in this case beyond the record of the former suit.

We are of opinion that the supreme court of Oregon failed to give proper effect to the decree and proceedings in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Oregon, and erred in not reversing the final judgment of the circuit court of Douglas county, with directions to dismiss the complaint of Applegate.

The decree is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice FIELD dissents from the judgment in this case.