Doctor v. Harrington/Opinion of the Court

To sustain the action of the circuit court in dismissing the bill the argument is as follows: (1) By a conclusive presumption of law the stockholders of a corporation are deemed to be citizens of the state of the corporation's domicil. (2) Granting that the complainants are citizens of New Jersey, yet, as they are suing for the Sol Sayles Company, a New York corporation, that corporation, although in form a defendant, is, in legal effect, on the same side of the controversy as the complainants, and since it is a citizen of the same state as the other defendants, the circuit court had no jurisdiction, as the suit does not involve a controversy between citizens of different states.

1. This is based on the assumption adopted by this court, that stockholders of a corporation are citizens of the state which created the corporation,-an assumption physically possible, but hardly true in a single instance; and appellants here contend that it should be classed with the fictions of the law, and subject to one of their fundamental maxims, and cannot be carried beyond the reasons which caused its adoption necessarily require. It is, however, more of a presumption than a fiction, but whether we regard it as either, it cannot be pushed to the end contended for by appellees.

The reason of the presumption (we will so denominate it) was to establish the citizenship of the legal entity for the purpose of jurisdiction in the Federal courts. Before its adoption difficulties had been encountered on account of the conditions under which jurisdiction was given to those courts. A corporation is constituted, it is true, of all its stockholders; but it has a legal existence separate from them,-rights and obligations separate from them; and may have obligations to them. It can sue and be sued. At first this could be done in the circuit court of the United States only when the corporation was composed of citizens of the state which created it. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch, 61, 3 L. ed. 38; ''Hope Ins. Co. v. Boardman'', 5 Cranch, 57, 3 L. ed. 36. But the limitation came to be seen as almost a denial of jurisdiction to or against corporations in the Federal courts, and in Louisville, C. & C. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 11 L. ed. 353, prior cases were reviewed, and this doctrine laid down:

'That a corporation created by and doing business in a particular state is to be deemed, to all intents and purposes, as a person, although an artificial person,. . . capable of being treated as a citizen of that state, as much as a natural person.' And 'when the corporation exercises its powers in the state which chartered it, that is its residence, and such an averment is sufficient to give the circuit courts jurisdiction.' The presumption that the citizenship of the corporators should be that of the domicil of the corporation was not then formulated. That came afterwards, and overcame the difficulty and objection that the legal creation, the corporation, could not be a citizen within the meaning of the Constitution. Marshall v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 16 How. 314, 14 L. ed. 953. This, then, was its purpose, and to stretch beyond this is to stretch it to wrong. It is one thing to give to a corporation a status, and another thing to take from a citizen the right given him by the Constitution of the United States. Disregarding the purpose of the presumption, it is easy to represent it, as counsel does, as illogical if not extended to every stockholder; but as easy it would be to show its falseness if so applied. But such charges and countercharges are aside from the question. To the fact and place of incorporation the law attaches its presumption for a special purpose. Perhaps, as intimated in St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, 563, 40 L. ed. 802, 808, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621, this 'went to the verge of judicial power.' Against the further step urged by appellees we encounter the Constitution of the United States.

2. The ninety-fourth rule in equity contemplates that there may be, and provides for, a suit brought by a stockholder in a corporation, founded on rights which may properly be asserted by the corporation. And the decisions of this court establish that such a suit, when between citizens of different states, involves a controversy cognizable in a circuit court of the United States. The ultimate interest of the corporation made defendant may be the same as that of the stockholder made plaintiff; but the corporation may be under a control antagonistic to him, and made to act in a way detrimental to his rights. In other words, his interests and the interests of the corporation may be made subservient to some illegal purpose. If a controversy hence arise, and the other conditions of jurisdiction exist, it can be litigated in a Federal court.

In Detroit v. Dean, 106 U.S. 537, 27 L. ed. 300, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 500, Dean, who was a citizen of New York and a stockholder in the Mutual Gaslight Company, a Michigan corporation, in order to protect its right and property against the threatened action of a third party, brought suit against the latter and the corporation in the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Michigan. This court ordered the bill dismissed, not because Dean and the corporation had identical interests, but because the refusal of the directors of the corporation to sue was collusive. The right of a stockholder to sue a corporation for the protection of his rights was recognized, the condition only being the refusal of the directors to act, which refusal, it is said, must be real, not feigned. Hawes v. Oakland (Hawes v. Contra Costa Water Co.) 104 U.S. 450, 26 L. ed. 827, was cited, where a like right was decided to exist. See also Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, 15 L. ed. 401; Davenport v. Dows, 18 Wall. 626, 21 L. ed. 938; Memphis v. Dean, 8 Wall. 73, 19 L. ed. 328; Greenwood v. Union Freight R. Co. 105 U.S. 16, 26 L. ed. 963; Quincy v. Steel, 120 U.S. 241, 30 L. ed. 624, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 520. It was said that in Dodge v. Woolsey, that the refusal of the directors to sue caused them and Woolsey, who was a stockholder in a corporation of which they were directors, 'to occupy antagonistic grounds in respect to the controversy, which their refusal to sue forced him to take in defense of his rights.' Dodge v. Woolsey was modified by Hawes v. Oakland, as to what circumstances would justify a suit by a stockholder if the directors refuse to sue. See also Quincy v. Steel, 120 U.S. 241, 30 L. ed. 624, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 520.

The case at bar is brought within the doctrine of those cases by the allegations of the bill. The defendant corporations are alleged to be under the control of John J. and Dennis A. Harrington, and that complainants are unable to secure any corporate action on the part of the defendant, the Sol Sayles Company, to redress the wrongs complained of. It is also alleged that the Harringtons control the action of the stockholders, and have declined to redress the wrongs complained of or give complainants any opportunity to lay before the board of directors or the stockholders of the Sol Sayles Company the facts alleged. It is also alleged the suit is not collusive. It is manifest that if the matter alleged be true, complainants will suffer irremediable loss if not permitted to sue, and as they had a cause of action they rightly brought it in the circuit court of the United States.

Decree reversed.