Dispatch to Sir James Hudson on Italian Unification

Foreign-office, October 27.

Sir—It appears that the late proceedings of the King of Sardinia have been strongly disapproved of by several of the Courts of Europe.

The Emperor of the French, on hearing of the invasion of the Papal States by the army of General Cialdini, withdrew his Minister from Turin, expressing at the same time the opinion of the Imperial Government in condemnation of the invasion of the Roman territory. The Emperor of Russia has, we are told, declared in strong terms his indignation at the entrance  of the army of the King of Sardinia into the Neapolitan territory, and has withdrawn his entire mission from Turin. The Prince Regent of Prussia has also thought it necessary to convey to Sardinia a sense of his displeasure, but he has net thought it necessary to remove the Prussian Minister from Turin.

After these diplomatic acts, it would scarcely be just to Italy, or respectful to the other Great Powers of Europe, were the Government of her Majesty any longer to withhold the expression of their opinion.

In so doing, however, Her Majesty's Government have no intention to raise a dispute upon the reasons which have been given in the name of the King of Sardinia for the invasion of the Roman and Neapolitan States. Whether or no the Pope was justified in defending his authority by means of foreign levies; whether the King of the Two Sicilies, while still maintaining his flag at Capua and Gaeta, can be said to have abdicated, are not the arguments upon which her Majesty's Government propose to dilate.

The large questions which appear to them to be at issue are these:— Were the people of Italy justified in asking the assistance of the King of Sardinia to relieve them from Governments with which they were discontented? —and was the King of Sardinia justified in furnishing the assistance of his arms to the people of the Roman and Neapolitan States? There appear to have been two motives which have induced the people of the Roman and Neapolitan States to join willingly in the subversion of their Governments. The first of these was that the Government of the Pope and the King of the Two Sicilies provided so ill for the administration of justice, the protection of personal liberty, and the general welfare of their people, that their subjects looked forward to the overthrow of their rulers as a necessary preliminary to all improvement in their condition.

The second motive was that a conviction had spread since the year 1849, that the only manner in which Italians could secure their independence of foreign control was by forming one strong government for the whole of Italy. The struggle of Charles Albert, in 1848, and the sympathy which the present King of Sardinia has shown for the Italian cause, have naturally caused the association of the name of Victor Emmanuel with the single authority under which the Italians aspire to live.

Looking at the question in this view, Her Majesty's Government must admit that the Italians themselves are the best judges of their own interests.

That eminent jurist Vattel, when discussing the lawfulness of the assistance given by the United Provinces to the Prince of Orange when he invaded England and overturned the throne of James II., says:— 'The authority of the Prince of Orange had doubtless an influence on the deliberations of the States General; but it did not lead them to the commission of an act of injustice, for when a people for good reasons take up arms against an oppressor, it is but an act of justice and generosity to assist brave men in the defence of their liberties.'

Therefore, according to Vattel, the question resolves itself into this—Did the people of Naples and of the Roman States take up arms against their governments for good reasons?

Upon this grave matter Her Majesty's Government hold that the people in question are themselves the best judges of their own  affairs. Her Majesty's Government do not feel justified in declaring that the people of Southern Italy had not good reasons for throwing off their allegiance to their former Governments; Her Majesty's Government cannot, therefore, pretend to blame the King of Sardinia for assisting them. There remains, however, a question of fact. It is asserted by the partisans or the fallen Governments, that the people of the Roman States were attached to the Pope, and that the people of the kingdom of Naples to the dynasty of Francis II; but that Sardinian agents and foreign adventurers have by force and intrigue subverted the thrones of those Sovereigns.

It is difficult, however, to believe, after the astonishing events which we have seen, that the Pope and the King of the Two Sicilies possessed the love of their people. How was it, one must ask, that the Pope found it impossible to levy a Roman army, and that he was forced to rely almost entirely upon foreign mercenaries? How did it happen again, that Garibaldi conquered nearly all Sicily with 2,000 men, and marched from Reggio to Naples with 5,000? How but from the universal disaffection of the people of the Two Sicilies? Neither can it be said that this testimony of the popular will was capricious or causeless. Forty years ago the Neapolitan people made an attempt regularly and temperately to reform their Government under the reigning dynasty. The Powers of Europe, assembled at Laybach, resolved, with the exception of England, to put down this attempt by force. It was put down, and a large foreign army was left in the Two Sicilies to maintain social order. In 1848, The Neapolitan people again attempted to secure liberty under the Bourbon dynasty; but their best patriots atoned by an imprisonment of 10 years for the offence of endeavouring to free their country; what wonder, then, that in 1860 the Neopolitans, mistrustful and resentful, should throw of the Bourbons, as in 1688 England had thrown off the Stuarts? It must be admitted, undoubtedly, that the severance of ties which bind together a Sovereign and his subjects is in itself a misfortune. Notions of allegiance become confused, the succession of the throne is disputed, adverse parties threaten the peace of society, rights and pretensions are opposed to each other, and mar the harmony of the State. Yet it must be acknowledged, on the other hand, that the Italian revolution has been conducted with singular temper and forbearance. The subversion of existing power has not been followed, as is too often the case, by an outbreak of popular vengeance. The extreme views of democrats have nowhere prevailed. Public opinion has checked the excesses of the public triumph. The venerated forms of constitutional monarchy have been associated with the name of a Prince who represents an ancient and glorious dynasty.

Such have been the causes and the concomitant circumstances of the revolution of Italy, Her Majesty's Government can see no sufficient ground for the severe censure with which Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia have visited the acts of the King of Sardinia. Her Majesty's Government will turn their eyes rather to the gratifying prospect of a people building up the edifice of their liberties, and consolidating the work of their independence, amid the sympathies and good wishes of Europe.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

P.S.—You are at liberty to give a copy of this despatch to Count Cavour.

To Sir James Hudson, &c.