Day v. Micou/Opinion of the Court

Most of the questions in this case were settled adversely to the claims of the plaintiff in error by our decision of Bigelow v. Forrest. We then determined that under the act of Congress of July 17, 1862, known as the Confiscation Act, and the Joint Resolution of the same date explanatory thereof, only the life estate of the person for whose offence the land had been seized was subject to condemnation and sale. We also determined that nothing more was within the jurisdiction or judicial power of the District Court, and that consequently a decree condemning the fee could have no greater effect than to subject the life estate to sale. This in effect disposes of the present case.

It is insisted, however, the Supreme Court of Louisiana erred in holding that the property condemned and sold remained in the hands of the purchaser at the sale, subject to the mortgage given in 1858 to the ancestor of the defendants in error. The argument rests upon a misconception of the act of 1862. That act, for the purpose of insuring the speedy termination of the rebellion, authorized the seizure of all the estate and property, money, stocks, credits, and effects of six classes of persons described in the fifth section. The persons designated in those several classes were either officers in the army or navy of the rebels in arms against the government of the United States, or officers of the so-called Confederate States, or agents thereof, or officers or agents of some one of the States of that confederacy, or persons who gave aid and comfort to the rebellion. So the sixth section directed the seizure of all the estate and property of the persons described in that section. It was not any property in which the persons described in these two sections might have an interest that was made subject to seizure, but it was their estate and property, their interest in it, whatever that interest might be. The act manifestly contemplated no seizure of anything more than that which belonged to the offending person, and the thing seized, or its proceeds, was by the fifth section directed to be applied for the use of the army of the United States. If now we proceed to the seventh section, it will appear plainly that only that which was seized, seized lawfully in accordance with the directions of the two preceding sections, was made the subject for condemnation and sale. That section commences thus: 'That to secure the condemnation and sale of any such property, after the same shall have been seized, so that it may be made available for the purpose aforesaid, proceedings in rem shall be instituted in the name of the United States in any District Court thereof, or in any Territorial Court, or in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, within which the property above described or any part thereof may be found,' &c. What property is this thus brought within the jurisdiction of the District Court? Beyond doubt the property which had been seized, that is, the estate and property of the offending person, and no other. If it was a term, or an estate at will, or a life estate, or an estate in joint tenancy, or in common, whatever it was, it was the subject alike of seizure and of condemnation. It is true proceedings in rem were ordered to be instituted in the District Court, but the question remains, what was the res against which the proceedings were directed? The answer must be, that which was seized and brought within the jurisdiction of the court. A condemnation in a proceeding in rem does not necessarily esclude all claim to other interests than those which were seized. In admiralty cases and in revenue cases a condemnation and sale generally pass the entire title to the property condemned and sold. This is because the thing condemned is considered as the offender or the debtor, and is seized in entirety. But such is not the case in many proceedings which are in rem. Decrees of courts of probate or orphans' courts directing sales for the payment of a decedent's debts or for distribution are proceedings in rem. So are sales under attachments or proceedings to foreclose a mortgage, quasi proceedings in rem, at least. But in none of these cases is anything more sold than the estate of the decedent, or of the debtor or the mortgagor in the thing sold. The interests of others are not cut off or affected.

If then, as we hold, the property and estate of J. P. Benjamin was all that was seized, or all that could be seized and condemned in these confiscation proceedings, those who held other interests in the land were not bound to come in and assert their claims. Their interests did not pass to the purchaser at the sale, and they remain unaffected by the decree of condemnation and the sale thereunder.

There is, therefore, no error in the judgment of the Supreme Court, and it is

AFFIRMED.