Dandridge v. Williams/Concurrence Harlan

Mr. Justice HARLAN, concurring.

I join the Court's opinion, with one reservation which I deem called for by certain implications that might be drawn from the opinion.

As I stated in dissent in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658-663, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1344-1347, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), I find no solid basis for the doctrine there expounded that certain statutory classifications will be held to deny equal protection unless justified by a 'compelling' governmental interest, while others will pass muster if they meet traditional equal protection standards. See also my dissenting opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 660-661, 86 S.Ct. 1731, 1732-1733, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966). Except with respect to racial classifications, to which unique historical considerations apply, see Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 659, 89 S.Ct. at 1344, I believe the constitutional provisions assuring equal protection of the laws impose a standard of rationality of classification, long applied in the decisions of this Court, that does not depend upon the nature of the classification or interest involved.

It is on this basis, and not because this case involves only interests in 'the area of economics and social welfare,' at 485, that I join the Court's constitutional holding.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.