County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Company/Dissent Clark

Mr. Justice CLARK, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK, Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, and Mr. Justice HARLAN join, dissenting.

The Court says that under the peculiar facts of this case the trial judge has abused his discretion in abstaining from trying the issue involved here, which is presently pending in a previously filed state case between the same parties. I see nothing in the facts that reveals any clear abuse of discretion. In fact, the disruption of the State's processes by the refusal of the Court in the circumstances of this case to permit the application of modern businesslike procedures in the administration of the federal diversity jurisdiction requires my dissent.

Allegheny County, a subdivision of the State of Pennsylvania, took action under its state law to acquire property owned by respondents which was allegedly necessary for the enlargement of its greater Pittsburgh Airport. The respondents made no effort to remove that action to the federal court. If that had been done, the entire case would have been subject to trial in the federal court. Instead, however, the respondents appeared in the state case and contested the issue of damages for the taking, but raised no objection whatever to its validity. Both parties appealed from anaward of $52,644 in damages and demanded a trial de novo in the State's Court of Common Pleas. The County thereupon entered upon the property and began its improvement. A year later respondents filed this suit in the federal court attacking the validity of the County's taking in the state suit. The Court requires the County to litigate that sole issue in the federal court while the state court holds in abeyance the original case involving the taking as well as the damages therefor.

Thus the state suit is split; the validity of the taking being involved in the federal court as well as the state proceeding, while the amount of damages remains for the state court alone. Admittedly the federal court cannot obtain jurisdiction over the latter. As a result, the County now has two lawsuits on its hands, one involving half of its state case, will be tried in the federal court, while the remainder pends in the state court. If it finally prevails in the federal court, after two or three more years of delay incident to trial and appeal, still it must go back to its state case and try the issue of damages. If the County loses in the federal court, it must nevertheless go back to the state court and start all over again with a new action or an amendment of the old one. This is true because the plans, as shown in the record, indicate clearly that the County will be obliged to take respondents' property because it is situated adjacent to the old entrance to the airport and would be necessary for the proposed enlargement. The latter course would inevitably lead to greater damages, as well as additional years of delay, all of which would be occasioned by the action today.

The Court describes this needless merry-go-round of technical procedures as preventing 'added expense (and) * *  * further prolonged unlawful denial of the possession of their (respondents') property *  *  * .' Obviously just the opposite is true. The respondents, by not removing the case to the federal court, but rather by waiting a year before filing the present suit, have now delayed the County for over three years, and bid fair to extend that period for at least two more under the ruling of this Court. On the other hand, if the Court required respondents to proceed in the state suit, all of the issues between the parties would be settled in the one suit, even if respondents persisted-as the Court holds is their right-in filing a separate suit in the state court over the validity of the taking. That suit could easily be consolidated with the original case, and the validity of the taking as well as the damages therefor could be settled at one trial. This, of course, cannot be done when one of the cases is in the federal court and the other in the state. This points up the fallacy of the Court's conclusion that 'considerations of comity are satisfied if the (Federal) District Court acts toward the pending state damage proceeding in the same manner as would a state court.' It is, indeed, a poor way to administer justice, especially where a subdivision of the State is involved.

In short, I say that under the peculiar facts of this case the 'exceptional circumstances' of which the majority speaks are present. An 'order to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest,' namely, the orderly and businesslike administration of justice, as well as the comity due Pennsylvania's courts.

As to the latter consideration, the Court bottoms its decision to make the County split its case between the two jurisdictions on the proposition that respondents 'abandoned the claim for an injunction against the state court and against the County.' But the reality of the situation is that the state court, which has already abstained for three years at the urging of respondents may now decide that it should proceed to hear and determine both the issues of validity and damages which are and have been pending in the state case. If it did so, there would result an unseemly race between the forums and a head-on collision between the state and federal courts. The latter would be moving by way of ejectment and the former by way of condemnation over the same property and involving the same parties. Still, since, as the majority says, 'the plain wording of § 2283 * *  * bars *  *  * injunctions,' this unseemly spectacle could not be stopped and would result in 'needless friction with state policies.' Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 1941, 312 U.S. 496, 500, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971. In view of these circumstances, peculiar to this case, there is nothing here to show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and I would therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial judge.