Corbett v. Nutt/Opinion of the Court

Several questions were raised and elaborately examined in this case in the courts of Virginia, both in the lower courts and in the Court of Appeals of the State, which are not open for consideration here. The only questions which we can consider, under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, arise upon the ruling of the court admitting the certificate of redemption issued to McPherson, and the refusal to give certain instructions prayed by the defendant.

The seventh section of the act of June 7th, 1862, for the collection of direct taxes in insurrectionary districts, after directing the advertisement and sale of lands, upon which taxes due the United States remained unpaid, after a designated period, contains two clauses relating to the redemption of the land from such sale. The first clause provides that the owner of the land, or any loyal person of the United States having any valid lieu upon or interest in the land, may at any time, within sixty days after the sale, appear before the board of tax commissioners, in proper person, and redeem the land from sale upon paying the amount of the tax and penalty, with the interest and expenses prescribed, and taking an oath, if a citizen, to support the Constitution of the United States. The second clause provides that if the owner of the land sold be a minor, a non-resident alien, a loyal citizen beyond the seas, a person of unsound mind, or under a legal disability, the guardian, trustee, or other person having charge of the person or estate of such owner, may, in the same manner and with like effect, redeem the land at any time within two years after the sale.

By these provisions persons entitled to make redemption are divided into two classes. The first class embraces persons who are residents in the country, and are not laboring under any legal disability. They may well be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the assessment of the taxes and of the sale made, and for this reason, it may be inferred, their privilege of redemption was limited by Congress within the narrow period prescribed.

The second class embraces loyal citizens beyond the seas, non-resident aliens, and persons laboring under some legal disability, to whom the reason for the limitation prescribed to the first class was not applicable. To those absent from the country, personal knowledge, either of the assessment or sale, could not be justly imputed; and those under disability, if possessed of the knowledge, might reasonably expect that the matter would receive the attention of the parties intrusted with the charge of the property. Congress, therefore, gave to the persons of this class a much more extended period within which to exercise the privilege of redemption, and allowed the redemption to be made by 'the guardian, trustee, or other person having charge of the person or estate' of the owner. The position of the persons composing this class, absent from the country, or under legal disability, was such that their property would, in the ordinary course of things, be in ghe 'charge' of others, but, lest the latter might, from any cause, neglect the interests of the owners, the period of redemption was prolonged to two years. It was for the benfit of the owners of the property, that they might not suffer from the remissness or faithlessness of their guardians, trustees, or agents, that the privilege was thus extended, and to secure that benefit the act should be liberally construed. It is the general rule of courts to give to statutes authorizing redemption from tax sales a construction favorable to owners, particularly when they provide, as in the present case, full indemnity to the purchaser, and impose a penalty upon the delinquent.

In this case it appears to be conceded that the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia exceeded its authority in appointing McPherson trustee, in place of Nutt, of the land in Virginia. That court could not by the mere force of its decree transfer the title to land lying without its jurisdiction from the party in whom it was vested by the will of Mrs. Hunter. A court of equity acting upon the person of a defendant may control the disposition of real property belonging to him situated in another jurisdiction, and even in a foreign country. It may decree a conveyance and enforce its execution by process against the defendant, but neither its decree nor any conveyance under it, except by the party in whom the title is vested, is of any efficacy beyond the jurisdiction of the court. This is familiar law, and was declared by this court in Watkins v. Holman, the court observing that 'no principle was better established than that the disposition of real estate, whether by deed, descent, or by any other mode, must be governed by the law of the state where the land is situated.'

McPherson was not, therefore, legally trustee of the property in Virginia, and if his right to interpose for the redemption depended upon the possession of the legal title, his action might be treated as that of a stranger to the land. But the absolute possession of such title by him was not essential under the circumstances. He regarded himself as trustee of the property. The cestuis que trust so regarded him. He professedly acted in their behalf and for their interests. He was apparently, from the decree of the Supreme Court of the District, clothed with the legal title. The commissioners treated him as a person entitled to make the redemption. They were not obliged to inquire into the validity of the decree. They were not expected to enter upon investigations of title any further than was necessary to prevent the impertinent intermeddling of strangers. It was sufficient for the commissioners to allow the redemption, when they found that the party offering to redeem furnished prim a facie evidence of possessing the character which entitled him under the statute to make the redemption.

The trustee named in the will not having accepted the trust reposed in him when the decree of the Supreme Court of the District was made, it is reasonable to suppose from the subsequent conduct of McPherson that he immediately took actual charge of the estate for the cestuis que trust, and was in such charge when the redemption was made. If such were the case, and we think there is little doubt of it, McPherson was by the very words of the statute authorized, without regard to the validity of the decree, as a person 'having charge' of the estate of the owners, who were laboring under disability by reason of their coverture, to make the redemption; although from the ineffectual parol disclaimer of his trust by Nutt, the legal title may have remained in the latter, which required the present action for the recovery of the property to be brought in his name.

It is further objected that, assuming that McPherson was entitled to redeem, the redemption was ineffectual because he did not take the oath required by the seventh section of the amendatory act of March 3d, 1865, which declares 'that no owner shall be entitled to redeem unless, in addition to the oath prescribed by existing laws, he shall swear that he has not taken part with the insurgents in the present rebellion, or any way given them aid or comfort, and shall satisfy the board of commissioners that the said oath is true.'

But the objection is untenable. McPherson did not redeem as owner, but as trustee of the owners, or as a person 'having charge' of their property. The act of 1862 distinguishes between owners appearing in their proper persons and redeeming, and owners beyond the seas or laboring under some legal disability and redeeming through trustees, guardians, or persons having charge of the property. It requires both of the owners redeeming in person, and of the trustees, guardians, and agents redeeming for others, an oath to support the Constitution of the United States. It specifies the taking of the oath as one of the terms on which the redemption can be made by owners and loyal persons having a lien upon or interest in the property sold, when appearing in person before the commissioners. And it subsequently authorizes a redemption by trustees, guardians, and parties acting for others, 'in the manner above provided;' that is, by making the like payments and taking a similar oath. But the additional oath imposed by the act of 1865 is, in our judgment, required only of owners seeking in person to redeem. It declares that 'no owner shall be entitled to redeem' unless he take the additional oath. If the requirement extended also to owners beyond the seas or laboring under legal disability, it could not in many cases be complied with, and the beneficial object of the act, which was to secure to them the right of redemption, would be defeated.

We have not overlooked the fact that, in the present case, the certificate of redemption states that the additional oath was taken by the owners. This circumstance is not entitled to weight because the owners do not themselves make the redemption; and if they could be themselves considered as redemptions, they failed to take the oath to support the Constitution required by the act of 1862.

We proceed to consider the prayers for instructions presented by the defendant and refused by the court. By the first of these prayers the court was requested to declare, in effect, that the voluntary residence of the testatrix within the Confederate lines incapacitated her from making a last will and testament; and the resignation by the plaintiff of an office under the United States, and acceptance of an office under the Confederate government incapacitated him from acting as trustee under her will, and taking the devise in that capacity.

The object of the instruction prayed, says the defendant in his petition to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, was to raise the question as to the effect and meaning of the sixth section of the act of Congress, passed on the 17th of July, 1862, entitled 'An act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes.'

The previous section of the act provides that, 'to insure the speedy termination of the present rebellion, it shall be the duty of the President of the United States to cause the seizure of all the estate and property, money, stocks, credits, and effects of the persons' thereinafter named, 'and to apply and use the same, and the proceeds thereof, for the support of the army of the United States.'

The section then enumerates six classes of persons whose property is thus made subject to seizure. The fourth class embraces persons 'who, having held an office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States, shall thereafter hold office in the so-called Confederate States.' The section concludes by declaring that 'all sales, transfers, or conveyances of any such property shall be null and void.'

The sixth section provides that if any person within any State or Territory of the United States, other than those named in the previous section, 'being engaged in armed rebellion against the United States, or aiding or abetting such rebellion, shall not, within sixty days after public warning and proclamation duly given and made by the President of the United States, cease to aid, countenance, and abet such rebellion, and return to his allegiance to the United States, all the estate and property, moneys, stocks, and credits of such person shall be liable to seizure as aforesaid, and it shall be the duty of the President to seize and use them as aforesaid, or the proceeds thereof.

'And all sales, transfers, or conveyances of any such property, after the expiration of the said sixty days from the date of such warning and proclamation, shall be null and void; and it shall be a sufficient bar to any suit brought by such person for the possession or the use of such property, or any of it, to allege and prove that he is one of the persons described in this section.'

The seventh section of the act directs the proceedings to be instituted for the condemniation and sale of the property seized.

If the devise of Mrs. Hunter can be brought within the language of this last section, it must be because a devise is embraced within the terms 'sales, transfers, and conveyances;' and because her 'aiding and abetting' the rebellion, and her refusal to return to her allegiance to the United States, are legitimate and necessary inferences from her voluntary and continued residence within the Confederate lines, for there is no direct evidence on either of these latter points, nor any evidence tending to establish either of them except such voluntary residence. Assuming, however, that a devise is within the 'sales, transfers, and conveyances' invalidated by the act, and that Mrs. Hunter is within the category of persons for whom the warning and proclamation of the President were intended, we are of the opinion that the invalidity declared is limited and not absolute; that it is only as against the United States that the 'sales, transfers, and conveyances' of property liable to seizure are null and void; and that they are not void as between private persons, or against any other party than the United States.

The object of the provisions cited is manifest. It is declared, in express terms, to insure the speedy termination of the existing rebellion. The confiscation of the property of persons engaged in the rebellion, and the appropriation of it, or its proceeds, to the support of the army of the United States, were supposed to have a tendency to advance that object. The seizure of the property of particularly designated classes, and of others engaged in the rebellion, or aiding and abetting it, who should not heed the public warning and proclamation of the President, was therefore directed, as also the institution of proceedings required in the courts of the United States for its condemnation and sale.

It was to prevent these provisions from being evaded by the parties whose property was liable to seizure that 'sales, transfers, and conveyances' of the property were declared invalid. They were null and void as against the belligerent or sovereign right of the United States to appropriate and use the property for the purpose designated, but in no other respect, and not as against any other party. Neither the object sought, nor the language of the act, requires any greater extension of the terms used. The United States were the only party who could institute the proceedings for condemnation; the offence for which such condemnation was decreed was against the United States, and the property condemned, or its proceeds, went to their sole use. They alone could, therefore, be affected by the sales.

Any other construction would impute to the United States a severity in their legislation entirely foreign to their history. No people can exist without exchanging commodities. There must be buying and selling and exchanging in every community, or the greater part of its inhabitants would have neither food nor raiment. And yet the argument of the defendant, if good for anything, goes to this extent, that by the act of Congress 'all sales, transfers, and conveyances' of property of the vast numbers engaged in the late rebellion against the United States, constituting the great majority of many towns, and cities, and even of several states, were utterly null and void; that even the commonest transactions of exchange in the daily life of these people were tainted with invalidity. It is difficult to conceive the misery which would follow from a legislative decree of this wide-sweeping character in any community, where its execution was conceived to be possible, or confidence was reposed in its validity.

We do not notice that part of the instruction prayed which relates to the status of the plaintiff as an office-holder under the United States just previous to the commencement of the war, and subsequently taking office under the Confederate government, as it was not his property, the sale of which is assailed. If he was incapable of taking the devise, it was not from his participation in the rebellion, but because the testatrix was incapable of passing her property by will under the act of Congress, a position which we have already shown to be untenable.

The second, and the only other prayer for instruction presented by the defendant, and refused by the court, which we can take notice of, is this: 'That to enable the plaintiff to recover he must show that the certificate of redemption was forwarded to the Secretary of the Treasury, and the defendant repaid his purchase-money by a draft drawn or the Treasury of the United States.' This prayer was based upon a misapprehension of the seventh section of the act of Congress of March 3d, 1865, which provides that when a redemption is made the board of tax commissioners shall certify the fact to the Secretary of the Treasury, and the secretary shall repay the purchaser, by draft on the treasury, the principal and interest of the purchase-money; and that the purchaser shall deliver possession to the owner redeeming. These provisions only prescribe the duty both of the secretary and purchaser when the redemption is made, but they do not make the performance of the duty of the purchaser dependent upon the previous performance of the duty resting on the secretary. The act was intended for the benefit of the purchaser, to enable him to obtain the repayment of the purchase-money and interest thereon; but the validity of the redemption does not depend upon such repayment. That is a matter between the purchaser and the secretary, with which the owner or redemptioner has no concern.

We find no error in the record, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia must be, therefore,

AFFIRMED.