Clifton v. Sheldon

THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

The motion to dismiss the appeal was argued by Mr. Donohue in support of it, and by Mr. Owen against it.

Mr. Donohue's points were the following:

I. The record shows that Mr. Sheldon is ordered and decreed to pay between $1,800 and $1,900, besides costs, and that Mr. Brower does not complain of the decree below.

II. As a matter of law, no appeal lies, unless the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum of $2,000.

Udall v. the Ohio, 17 How., 17.

Olney v. the Falcon, 17 How., 19.

Allen v. Newbury, 21 How., 248.

III. In this case, the amount in dispute is less than $1,900 and costs; the only judgment or decree against Sheldon is that, and Brower not appealing, Sheldon cannot appeal for him.

Where the property is bonded, that bond takes the place of the thing, and the judgment goes against the claimant, there Sheldon's cotton could not be held for Brower's freight.

IV. As a matter of equity, the record shows that the appellant has a judgment against Clifton for the very amount he defends against here.

Mr. Owen opposed the motion, on the following grounds:

The right of appeal is given when the 'matter in dispute' exceeds the sum of $2,000, exclusive of costs.

I. The 'matter in dispute' in this action was the freight upon the entire cargo, and which, according to the decree, amounted to $2,338.06, exclusive of costs. Unless, therefore, the apportionment of this sum between the claimants, which the Circuit Court, by its decree, assumed to make, operates as a severance of the action, giving the libellant independent rights against the respective claimants for their particular portion of freight, and no more, the motion must be denied.

II. But the decree did not so operate, and the respective claimants, as to the libellant, were liable for the entire amount.

1. The stipulation or bond given by the claimants, claiming the property, was joint, and the summary judgment thereon, against the stipulators, must be a joint judgment for the entire amount of freight. The court could not order otherwise; certainly not without the consent of the stipulators and of the libellant.

2. The decree was irregular and erroneous in attempting so to sever the liability of the claimants. There was no allegation in the pleadings upon which to found such a decree. The decree should have been secundum allegata.

III. But if the decree apportioning the liability be regular and proper, still the claimant, Sheldon, has a right of appeal, for, as to him, the matter in dispute exceeds $2,000.

1. The decree of the Circuit Court directs Sheldon to pay $1,754.22, together with the costs, taxed at $586.79, amounting, in the aggregate, to $2,341.01. Even if it be considered that he is not to pay the whole, but only his proportion of the costs, still the amount which he is decreed to pay will exceed $2,000.

2. The 'matter in dispute' on this appeal is therefore the sum so decreed to be paid for damages and costs. The costs are as much a part of the judgment debt as the damages; both are merged in one judgment.

3. The costs referred to in the judiciary act are not those which have entered into and become part of the judgment appealed from, but those which may accrue on the appeal.

Such appears to have been the views of this court in the case of Olney v. the Falcon, (17 How. Rep., 19,) where it is said that 'the defendant can appeal when the judgment or decree against him exceeds the sum or value of $2,000.

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.