City National Bank v. District Court of Plymouth County/Opinion of the Court

In the view we take of the case, the answer to the last question will dispose of the suit, and render it unnecessary to enter upon the consideration and determination of the other propositions of law on which instructions are asked.

By an act of the legislature of the territory, approved March 9, 1883 (chapter 99, Laws 1883), it was provided that all railroad companies, except railroads operated by horse power, owned and operated within the territory, should pay 2 per centum on the gross earnings of their railroads for a period of five years, and thereafter 3 per centum on the gross earnings, in lieu of all other taxes upon said railroads and the capital stock and business thereof. The payment of this percentage was to be made at designated dates in each year, and penalties were imposed upon the companies faling to comply with the provisions of the law as to the making of returns of earnings and paying the percentages imposed by the act. The moneys so received and collected were to be apportioned between the territory and the several counties through which the railroads respectively ran.

This act of 1883 left the railroad companies no choice as to whether they would pay the designated percentage on their gross earnings, or remain subject to taxation upon their property in the ordinary method. It was compulsory upon them. It is not material to the present case to consider whether this act was constitutional or not; it was repealed by the act of legislature approved January 29, 1889. Now, it is shown by the bill that at the time the act of 1883 was repealed the appellant was in default of the payment of the percentages due upon its gross earnings for the years 1886, 1887, and 1888.

On March 7, 1889, the legislature of the territory of Dakota passed an act entitled 'An act providing for the levy and collection of taxes upon property of railroad companies in this territory,' which went into force and effect immediately after its passage.

This act is by its terms nothing but a tax law, and, while it adopted the same rule of percentages on the gross earnings as provided in the act of 1883, it differed from that act, in not being compulsory upon the railroad companies, for it left to them the election as to which of two modes of taxation they should accept or submit to. It practically gave to the railroad companies the choice of having their property taxed as other property in the territory, by assessment and levy, or of taking the benefits of the act upon the terms and conditions provided therein. It was, by section 7, made a condition of the acceptance of the act that 'any railroad company assessed under chapter 99 of the Laws of 1883 shall, within thirty days after the passage of this act, pay into the territorial treasury the full amount of the taxes and interest due under the assessments under said Laws of 1883, including taxes on both territorial and interstate earnings, before they can avail themselves of the provisions of this act.' It was further provided that any company failing to strictly comply with the provisions of the act within the time provided should be immediately subject to assessment and taxation upon its property in the same manner as the property of individuals was assessed and taxed.

The companies accepting the benefits of the act were not only to pay arrearages under the law of 1883, but were also to pay a percentage of gross earnings for the current year of 1889, it being provided that, 'if such acceptance was filed on or before the 15th day of February in any year, such companies should pay one-half of said amount on said 15th day of February and the balance on the 15th day of August next following. Should such acceptance be filed before the 15th day of August and after the 15th day of February in any year, then an amount equal to three per centum of such account shall be paid in full on or before the 15th day of August in each year.'

It is shown by the bill that the appellant accepted the provisions and benefits of the act within 30 days after March 7, 1889, and it thereby became liable to pay the required percentage on its gross earnings on or before the 15th day of August, 1889. It is also shown by the bill that within 30 days after the passage of the act it paid the arrearages of percentages on its gross earnings accruing under the act of 1883 for the years 1886, 1887, and 1888; but it is not alleged that it made payment, or tender of payment, of the percentage on its gross earnings for the year 1889, or any portion thereof, although by the express provisions of the act a percentage on a portion of such gross earnings was due and payable on the 15th day of August, 1889.

The moneys to be received and collected by the territorial treasurer under this act from the railroad companies which accepted its provisions were to be apportioned between the territory and the several counties, respectively, through which the railroads run, or in which the companies had lands subject to taxation, in the manner pointed out in section 6 of the act. The several counties whose auditors are made defendants in the present case were therefore interested in the gross-earnings tax which the appellant was required to pay for the year 1889 in lieu of all other ordinary taxes upon its property.

The gross-earnings act remained in force until November 2, 1889, when it was repealed by the repugnant provisions contained in the constitution of the state of North Dakota, as adopted and approved by congress; and the claim is now made by the appellant that this repeal relieves it from liability to pay any percentage on its gross earnings for the year 1889, or any part thereof, because the same was not payable until after 1890; and that it was not liable to assessment and taxation on its property, because it had accepted the provisions of the gross earnings act of 1889.

This contention, if correct, would relieve the appellant from any burden in the way of taxation for the year 1889, but such a claim as this cannot possibly be sustained. The act of March 7, 1889, clearly intended that the gross-earnings tax therein provided for, as to all companies which would accept its provisions, should supply revenue for the territory and the counties for the year 1889. It is equally clear from the whole act, as a tax law, that the railroad company had to pay the required percentage on its gross earnings for that year, and that such percentage was payable in part on the 15th day of August in that year. It is not, therefore, correct to say that no part of the gross earnings was payable until 1890; but, if that were not the case, having accepted the provisions of that act, and thus becoming liable to pay the designated percentage of its gross earnings in lieu of taxes for the year 1889, that liability would not be discharged by the subsequent repeal of the gross-earnings act of 1889. If the company was released from the gross-earnings tax by the repeal of the act its property immediately became subject to assessment and taxation in the manner provided for the assessment and taxation of property of individuals in the territory, and it would not vitiate any such assessment made on the part of the counties that happened to be made prior to the repeal of the act of 1889. Such assessment would remain in full force and effect after the repeal of the act, and until satisfied.

It is next contended by the appellant that its payment of arrearages, claimed to be due under the act of 1883, was a consideration for the exemption of its property from taxation for the year 1889. This position cannot be sustained, for by the terms of the act of 1889 the payment of those arrearages was simply a condition upon which the railroad company was allowed to accept the benefits of that act, which was not an act exempting the property of the railroad company from taxation, but merely substituted one mode of taxation for another, upon the terms and conditions specified. One of the terms on which the railroad was allowed to accept the gross-earnings tax in lieu of the ordinary tax upon its property was that it should pay the arrearages which the territory claimed under the act of 1883. No exemption from taxation for the year 1889 was contemplated. The railroads accepting the act were required to pay the gross-earnings tax for that year in addition to such arrearages. It cannot, therefore, be properly claimed that the payment of these arrearages constituted a consideration for any exemption from taxation, or that such payment raised any equity on the part of the appellant against the payment of taxes for 1889, whether such taxes were imposed in the shape of a percentage on the gross earnings for that year, or in the shape of the ordinary assessment upon its property.

There is nothing in the allegations of the bill showing affirmatively that the company did not possess the equitable title or ownership in the lands described and assessed. Nor do the averments of the bill negative the fact that the appellant was properly chargeable with taxes on the lands coming within the grant of July 2, 1864, and within the limits of the line of definite location of its road. Payment of the gross-earnings tax imposed by the act of 1889 would have discharged all claims for taxes upon the company's lands for that year, but no ground is shown by the bill for releasing the appellant from the payment of either the percentage tax on its gross earnings or from the payment of the assessments upon its lands made by the county auditors. By section 7 of the act of 1889, its failure to promptly and strictly comply with the provisions thereof, and pay all sums therein provided to be paid, subjected the company to assessment and taxation in the same manner as individuals. It did not comply with the provisions of the act in paying the percentage of gross earnings due on the 15th day of August, 1889, and thereupon its property became liable to assessment and taxation as the property of individuals in the several counties.

Being liable to pay either the percentage on gross earnings in accordance with the provisions of the act of 1889, or the tax upon its lands, as other property of like character was assessed, the appellant was not entitled to any relief in a court of equity by injuction without payment or tender of what was due under one or the other of these modes of taxation.

In State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 616, 617, the rule is established that before an injunction will be granted in such cases as the present, a party must pay or tender what can be seen to be due on the face of the bill, and, speaking for the court in that case, Mr. Justice Miller said that the duty of making such a tender or payment before any injunction will be allowed is laid down 'as a rule to govern the courts of the United States in their action in such cases.' This rule was repeated in Bank v. Kimball, 103 U.S. 732, 733, where it was treated as a fatal objection to the bill that there was no offer to pay any sum as a tax which the party ought to pay, and, again speaking for this court, Mr. Justice Miller there said: 'We have announced more than once that it is the established rule of this court that no one can be permitted to go into a court of equity to enjoin the collection of a tax until he has shown himself entitled to the aid of the court by paying so much of the tax assessed against him as it can be plainly seen he ought to pay,' etc.

Applying this rule to the present case, it is clear that the appellant's bill was properly dismissed for failing to pay, or tender to pay, taxes which it ought to have paid on its property, or, in lieu thereof, a percentage of its gross earnings.

Our response, therefore, to the eighth question certified is that the bill was without equity, because of the failure to aver that the plaintiff had tendered or paid the gross-earnings percentage for the year 1889 (or the tax assessed by the county auditors), and was not entitled to the equitable relief prayed without first tendering or paying such taxes.

The answer of the court to that question will accordingly be certified to the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit.

Mr. Justice BREWER dissented.