Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company v. Stude/Dissent Frankfurter

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, dissenting.

Stripped of irrelevant and beclouding elements, this is a suit brought in a federal court for the ascertainment of the value of land, acquired by eminent domain under the prescribed Iowa procedure.

If the Rock Island had decided to initiate this suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, as it was unquestionably entitled to do since there was diversity of citizenship, Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 25 S.Ct. 251, 49 L.Ed. 462, the procedure defined by the Iowa Code would, under Rule 71A(k) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, have had to be followed. For that Rule provides that in an eminent domain proceeding the state procedure for determination of the value of the condemned land by a jury or commission, or both, must be followed. The sole difference, therefore, between the initiation of such an original condemnation proceeding in the federal court, regarding which no jurisdictional question could have been raised, and what was done here is that the railroad went directly to the sheriff's commissioners instead of having the District Court send it there, or itself employ the same kind of fact-finding procedure.

Once the sheriff's commissioners had found the value of the land, there came into operation the Iowa law authorizing reconsideration of the amount by a court. This marks the beginning of the judicial phase of the proceedings, 'appeal' though it loosely be called. One is entitled to ask what considerations bar access at this point to the Federal District Court in Iowa 'sitting * *  * (as) a court of that state', Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., supra, 196 U.S. at page 255, 25 S.Ct. at page 257, when all the statutory requirements for diversity jurisdiction are present. Can it be that there is something inexorable about the Iowa eminent domain procedure whereby it must run its full course in the Iowa courts, thus preventing the railroad from pursuing its first judicial remedy in the federal court of the State? But there is nothing in the Iowa Code or in the United States Judicial Code which ousts the federal court of its statutory jurisdiction simply because the Rock Island complied literally with the Iowa condemnation procedure.

Looked at from another aspect, this case may be seen simply as a suit for a declaration of money owed, satisfying the requirements of diversity jurisdiction. 'The point in issue,' in the language of Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 407, 25 L.Ed. 206, is 'the compensation to be made to the owner of the land; in other words, the value of the property taken. No other question was open to contestation in the District Court.' As is spelled out in Mr. Justice BLACKS'S opinion, with which I substantially agree, this case presents a dispute over some $13,000-only that and nothing more-and as such is within the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332.

I am not astute to find grounds for sustaining diversity jurisdiction. But while exercises in procedural dialectics so rampant in the early nineteenth century still hold for me intellectual interest, I do not think they should determine litigation in the middle of the twentieth, even when based merely on diversity of citizenship. I had supposed that the Rules of Civil Procedure for the district courts were to a considerable degree designed as a liberation from these wasteful and fettering niceties. The history of this litigation and its disposition will hardly be cited as an illustration of the fulfillment of the hope with which Congress allowed these Rules to take effect: 'It is confidently expected that the adoption of the new rules will materially reduce the uncertainty, delay, expense, and the likelihood that cases may be decided on technical points of procedure which had no relation to the just determination of the controversy on its merits.' H.R.Rep. No. 2743, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 3.