Chaloner v. Sherman/Opinion of the Court

This is an action in which the plaintiff seeks damages for withholding his securities and moneys. The defendant sets up as justification that he received and held the property by virtue of two orders of the supreme court of New York, appointing him committee of the person and estate of the plaintiff as one 'incompetent to manage himself and his affairs.' The validity and alleged effect of these orders were denied by plaintiff. The action was brought in 1904 in the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York; was transferred to the district court January, 1912, by virtue of Judicial Code, § 290 [36 Stat. at L. 1167, chap. 231, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 1267], and was tried before a jury in that year. A verdict was directed for the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's case; and the judgment entered thereon was affirmed by the circuit court of appels. The case comes here upon writ of error.

The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is a citizen and resident of Virginia and the defendant a citizen and resident of New York; but Federal jurisdiction was not rested solely on diversity of citizenship. The complaint alleged also that the orders of the supreme court of New York upon which defendant relies are void as having been entered without due process of law, in violation of the Federal Constitution. The contention was insisted upon in both the lower courts. This court has, therefore, jurisdiction to review the whole case. Howard v. United States, 184 U.S. 676, 681, 46 L. ed. 754, 757, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 543.

The orders under which defendant justifies were that of June 23, 1899, adjudging plaintiff incompetent, appointing a committee of his person and estate, and naming one Butler as such; and that of November 19, 1901, appointing defendant as his successor. These orders were made under statutes of New York, the material portions of which are set forth in the margin. The proceedings were held in New York city, where much of plaintiff's property was located. For over two years prior to the entry of the earlier order plaintiff had been an inmate of Bloomingdele, a private hospital near that city. At each stage in the proceeding leading up to the order of June 23, he was personally served there with notice and was given an opportunity to be heard. Thus he had notice of the motion, on May 19, to appoint the commission de lunatico inquirendo; of the inquisition on June 12; and of the motion to confirm the inquisition and for appointment of a committee on June 23. Such notice and opportunity to be heard at the inquisition was required by the law of New York, though not expressly recited in the statute; Re Blewitt, 131 N. Y. 541, 30 N. E. 587; Gridley v. College of St. Francis Xavier, 137 N. Y. 327, 33 N. E. 321; Re Fox, 138 App. Div. 43, 122 N. Y. Supp. 889. Plaintiff was physically able to be rpesent at this hearing. But he did not appear, did not send anyone to represent him, nor ask for all adjournment. At the inquisition the commission and the jury, after hearing witnesses, concluded that his attendance was unnecessary, and did not require him to attend. There was evidence that his enforced attendance would be detrimental to his mental health.

As the plaintiff had notice and opportunity to be hered at each stage of these proceedings, the essential elements of dus process of law were fully met, and the court had jurisdiction to enter that order. It is not open to collateral attack, although plaintiff was then under commitment at Bloomingdale. See Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 45 L. ed. 1165, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 836. The order of November 19, 1901, accepting Butler's resignation as committee and appointing defendant in his place, was made by the court without notice either to the plaintiff or to the other parties to the original proceedings. But this was a mere substitution of one offcer of the court for another. No substantial right of the plaintiff was affected. Due process does not require notice and opportunity to be heard in such a proceeding; and the irregularity, if any, was not such as to prevent the court from exercising jurisdiction to determine the matter.

The validity of the orders was assailed and their effect contested also on other grounds. It was contended that plaintiff had been corruptly lured from his home in Virginia to New York in March, 1897, and then illegally committed to Bloomingdale, and that he could not otherwise have been served in New York at all in the 1899 proceedings; that in 1899 plaintiff was a resident of Virginia; that the adjudication of incompetency in 1899 was made on perjured evidence; and that the plaintiff was then of sound mind and competent to manage his affairs. It was also contended that about November 6, 1901, the plaintiff, being a citizen and resident of Albemarle county, Virginia, was adjudged by its county court to be of sound mind and capable of managing his person and estate; that he was such at the time of the commencement of this action and has been since. Much evidence was offered to support these contentions; but the facts, if established, could not overcome the defense presented by the orders of the supreme court of New York. That court had jurisdiction because the plaintiff and his property were in New York; and the essentials of due process of law were met. The orders, consequently, are not void; and they are not subject to this collateral attack. If it be true that the orders ought to be set aside, either because they were, as alleged, entered corruptly, irregularly, or inadvertently (see United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 25 L. ed. 93; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 207, 40 L. ed. 95, 123, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 139), or because, owing to a change in plaintiff's condition, a committee is no longer required, the remedy must be sought by a direct proceeding to that end (Re Curtiss, 137 App. Div. 584, 122 N. Y. Supp. 468, 199 N. Y. 36, 92 N. E. 396). No evidence was introduced to prove that even an attempt was made to vacate or modify the orders. In this action of trover, which seeks merely damages for alleged wrongful withholding of plaintiff's property, the existing orders constitute a complete defrnse. The evidence offered was properly excluded, and there was no error in directing a verdict for the defendant.

Judgment affirmed.