Ceballos v. Shaughnessy/Opinion of the Court

This declaratory judgment action was brought by petitioner, in March 1955 in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, to obtain a judgment against the District Director of Immigration declaring that petitioner was eligible for suspension of deportation and restraining the Director from taking him into custody for deportation. The District Court dismissed the complaint, without reaching the merits, upon the procedural ground 'that the Attorney General (of the United States) and/or the Commissioner (of Immigration) are indispensable parties to the instant action.' The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, not only for the reason given by the District Court, but also upon the ground that, because the petitioner is 'an alien who 'has made application' to be relieved from military service,' he is debarred from citizenship as a matter of law and 'hence is not eligible for an order suspending deportation.' This Court granted certiorari.

Deportation proceedings had been instituted because petitioner had entered the United States on April 2, 1951, on a temporary visa and remained beyond the period for which he was admitted. Petitioner was found deportable but was given permission to depart voluntarily, in lieu of deportation. Petitioner's timely application for suspension of deportation under § 19(c) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended, was denied by the Immigration and Naturalization Service because it found that petitioner did not satisfy a prerequisite for the application of that section-eligibility for naturalization. His ineligibility was based on a finding that in August 1943 petitioner, as a citizen and subject of Colombia, then a World War II neutral, applied under § 3(a) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, for relief from service with the United States armed forces. Section 3(a) provided that 'any person who makes such application shall thereafter be debarred from becoming a citizen of the United States.'

The petitioner was admitted to the United States for permanent residence in February 1942, during World War II. On June 16, 1943, he executed Selective Service System Form DSS 304, 'Alien's Personal History and Statement,' which gave the alien a choice of inserting 'do' or 'do not' in the statement: 'I * *  * object to service in the land or naval forces of the United States.' The petitioner inserted the word 'do.' The form contained this notice:

' * *  * If you are a citizen or subject of a neutral country,      and you do not wish to serve in the land or naval forces of      the United States, you may apply to your local board for      Application by Alien for Relief from Military Service (Form      301) which, when executed by you and filed with the local      board, will relieve you from the obligation to serve in the      land or naval forces of the United States, but will also      debar you from thereafter becoming a citizen of the United      States.'

On August 26, 1943, the petitioner executed Form DSS 301, 'Application by Alien for Relief from Military Service.' The form contained the following paragraph:

'I do hereby make application to be relieved from liability     for training and service in the land or naval forces of the      United States, under the Selective Training and Service Act      of 1940, as amended, in accordance with the act of Congress,      approved December 20, 1941. I understand that the making of     this application to be relieved from such liability will debar me from becoming a citizen of the United States. *     *  * '

Selective Service Regulations required the local board to follow prescribed formalities to place a neutral applying for relief from service in Class IV-C and to notify the alien of the classification. The board did not comply with these regulations in petitioner's case. Its first formal action was taken after the Selective Service System notified the board, on December 20, 1943, that Colombia, on November 26, 1943, had changed its neutral status to that of a cobelligerent with the United States. On January 27, 1944, five months after the petitioner filed the Form DSS 301, the board notified the petitioner that he was classified I-A, available for military service, and ordered him to report for preinduction physical examination. He reported as ordered, but failed to pass the physical examination and, on March 2, 1944, was reclassified IV-F, physically defective.

The petitioner argues that neither the Attorney General nor the Commissioner of Immigration is a necessary party to this action. The respondent offers no argument in opposition. We hold that neither the Attorney General nor the Commissioner is a necessary party. This Court in Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 75 S.Ct. 591, 99 L.Ed. 868, held that determination of the question of indispensability of parties is dependent, not on the nature of the decision attacked, but on the ability and authority of the defendant before the court to effectuate the relief which the alien seeks. In this case the petitioner asks to have the order of deportation suspended and to restrain the District Director from deporting him. Because the District Director is the official who would execute the deportation, he is a sufficient party. It is not a basis for distinction of Pedreiro that suspension of deportation, rather than deportation itself, is involved in this action.

The petitioner's argument on the merits challenges the holding of the Court of Appeals that the execution and filing of Form DSS 301 had the effect as a matter of law of debarring him from becoming a citizen of the United States. He contends that debarment could result only if the local board affirmatively granted the relief applied for by classifying him IV-C on its records and giving him notice of its action. We hold that the petitioner's voluntary act of executing and filing, and allowing to remain on file, the legally sufficient application Form DSS 301 effected his debarment from citizenship under § 3(a). The explicit terms of the section debar the neutral alien 'who makes such application' for immunity from military service.

Legislative history shows this to be the effect contemplated by Congress. This same construction has been adopted in the few court decisions which refer to the section, and administrative construction has consistently given the section this meaning. The neutral alien in this country during the war was at liberty to refuse to bear arms to help us win the struggle, but the price he paid for his unwillingness was permanent debarment from United States citizenship.

The petitioner argues that in any event § 315 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, and not s 3(a) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, governs this case. Section 315 of the 1952 Act enacts a two-pronged requirement for the determination of permanent ineligibility for citizenship: the alien must be one 'who applies or has applied for exemption,' and also one who 'is or was relieved or discharged from such training or service on such ground.' That section has no application here. The 1952 law had not been enacted when the petitioner applied for relief from deportation in 1951 and by its terms is expressly made inapplicable to proceedings for suspension of deportation under § 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917 pending, as here, on the effective date of the 1952 law.

Affirmed.