Casey v. Schneider/Opinion of the Court

It is obvious that this transaction is free from the objection which applied in the other cases which we have just considered. In this case, there was an actual delivery of the securities pledged, at the time of advancing the certificates given on the faith thereof, and a continued retention of possession of the pledge.

The only objection raised in the case which we deem it necessary to consider is, whether a mere delivery of the securities was sufficient to constitute a pledge; and this depends on the question whether the act of 1855, relating to pledges of negotiable and other securities, was in force in 1873. We think there is no doubt that it was in force. That act was first adopted in 1852, and was re-enacted in 1855. It modified those provisions of the Civil Code, art. 3158, &c., which required a transfer by indorsement and other formalities, in order to make a good pledge. The act in question declared, 'that where a debtor wishes to pawn promissory notes, bills of exchange, stocks, obligations, or claims upon other persons, he shall deliver to the creditor the notes, bills of exchange, certificates of stock, or other evidences of the claims or rights so pawned; and such pawn so made, without further formalities, shall be valid, as well against third persons as against pledgers thereof, if made in good faith.'

Ever since this enactment, its words have been inserted in the Code itself, in every successive edition, in immediate connection with the articles which it modifies. The articles themselves are reproduced, it is true; but it is probable that they cover some cases which are not affected by the statutes, and hence the reproduction of them is proper; but whether so or not, we hold that the insertion of the statute in connection with them continues in effect the modification which it created. Subsequent articles of the Code relating to the registration of all privileges and other formalities, being previous to the statute in point of time, cannot affect its operation, though standing on a later page and in a subsequent place in the body of the Code.

This consideration meets the objection arising from the general repealing section of the Revised Statutes, which repeals all statutes and parts of statutes which are not incorporated into the Code, and are repugnant to its provisions.

We are of opinion that the statute was in force, and that the actual delivery of the securities was sufficient to constitute a pledge.

Decree affirmed.