Callaghan v. Myers/Opinion of the Court

The volumes of law reports of which the plaintiff claims a copyright are in the usual from of such works. Each volume consists of a title-page, of a statement of the entry of copyright, of a list of the judges composing the court, of a table of the cases reported in the volume, in alphabetical order, of a head-note or syllabus to each opinion, with the names of the respective counsel, and their arguments in some cases, and a statement of facts, sometimes embodied in the opinion and sometimes preceding it, and of an index, arranged alphabetically, and consisting substantially stantially of a reproduction of the head-notes. Of this matter, all but the opinions of the court and what is contained in those opinions is the work of the reporter, and the result of intellectual labor on his part.

The broad proposition is contended for by the defendants that these law reports are public property, and are not susceptible of private ownership, and cannot be the subject of copyright under the legislation of congress. It is urged that Mr. Freeman, the reporter, was a public officer, whose office was created by chapter 29 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois of 1845, which enacted as follows, in regard to the supreme court and the reporter.

'Sec. 20. The court shall appoint some person learned in the law to minute down and make report of all the principal matters, drawn out at length, with the opinion of the court, in all such cases as may be tried before the said court; and the said reporter shall have a right to use the original written opinion after it shall have been recorded by the clerk.

'Sec. 21. The reporter, before entering upon his duties, shall be sworn by some one of the justices of the supreme court faithfully to perform the duties of his said office. He may, for misconduct in office, neglect of duty, incompetency, or other cause shown, to be entered of record, be removed from office.

'Sec. 22. It shall be the duty of the reporter to deliver to the secretary of state, as soon as convenient after publication, such number of copies of the respective volumes of the reports of said court as may be necessary to enable the said secretary to distribute the same in the manner provided in the following section, together with one hundred copies in addition, to be deposited in the secretary's office for the use of the state.' Section 23 provided for the distribution of the volumes by the secretary of state, and section 24 provided that, upon the delivery of the requisite number of any volume, the secretary of state should deliver to the reporter a certificate specifying the number of copies which had been so delivered, and that such certificate should entitle the reporter to a warrant drawn by the auditor of public accounts upon the treasury for an amount, for those volumes, at the price for which the books should be sold to individuals, provided, the price should not exceed the ordinary price of law books of the same description, to be determined by the auditor, treasurer, and secretary of state. These statutory provisions were amended in 1863, by making the term of office of the reporter six years, and in 1865 it was enacted that the price of the volumes to be delivered to the secretary of state should be $6 each. The reporter was given a salary, by law, in 1877, of $6,000 a year.

It is further contended that Mr. Freeman, in preparing the official edition of the reports, was not an author, within the meaning of the act of congress, and that it was not intended by that act that he should assert a monopoly in the result of his official labors.

But, although there can be no copyright in the opinions of the judges, or in the work done by them in their official capacity as judges, (Banks v Manchester, ante, 36,) yet there is no ground of public policy on which a reporter who prepares a volume of law reports, of the character of those in this case, can, in the absence of a prohibitory statute, be debarred from obtaining a copyright for the volume which will cover the matter which is the result of his intellectual labor. In the present case there was no legislation of the state of Illinois which forbade the obtaining of such a copyright by Mr. Freeman, or which directed that the proprietary right which would exist in him should pass to the state of Illinois, or that the copyright should be taken out for or in the name of the state, as the assignee of such proprietary right, Even though a reporter may be a sworn public officer, appointed by the authority of the government which creates the court of which he is made the reporter, and even though he may be paid a fixed salary for his labors, yet, in the absence of any inhibition forbidding him to take a copyright for that which is the lawful subject of copyright in him, or reserving a copyright to the government as the assignee of his work, he is not deprived of the privilege of taking out a copyright which would otherwise exist. There is, in such case, a tacit assent by the government to his exercising such privilege. The universal practical construction has been that such right exists unless it is affirmatively forbidden or taken away, and the right has been exercised by numerous reporters, officially appointed, made sworn public officers, and paid a salary, under the governments both of sates and of the United States.

This question was, it is true, not directly adjudged in Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591. In that case the owners of the copyrights of Wheaton's Reports of the Supreme Court of the United States brought a suit in equity against Mr. Peters for publishing and selling a volume of his Condensed Reports of the Supreme Court. The bill was dismissed by the circuit court. On an appeal by the plaintiffs to this court one of the points urged by the defendants was that reports of the decisions of this court, published by a reporter appointed under the authority of an act of congress, were not within the provisions of the law for the protection of copyrights. This court held (1) that the plaintiffs could assert no common-law right to the exclusive privilege of publishing, but must sustain such right, if at all, under the legislation of congress; (2) that, under such legislation, there must have been, in order to secure the copyright, a compliance with the provisions of the statute in regard to the publication in a newspaper of a copy of the record of the title of the book, and in regard to the delivery of a copy of it, after publication, to the secretary of state. The court remanded the case to the circuit court for a trial by a jury as to whether there had been a compliance with the above-named requisites of the act of congress. In a note by Mr. Peters, at page 618 of the report of the case, he states that he has been informed that the court did not consider the point whether reports of the decisions of the court, published by a reporter appointed under the authority of an act of congress, were within the provisions of the law for the protection of copyrights. When the suit was brought, Mr. Wheaton had published the 12 volumes of his copyrighted reports. The allegation of the bill was that the volume complained of, published by Mr. Peters, contained all the reports of cases found in the first volume of Wheaton's Reports. It appears from the report of the case, and the record in it, that Mr. Wheaton had published his first volume in 1816, and his twelfth volume in 1827. From March 3, 1817, for three years, the reporter had a salary of $1,000 a year, and the same salary from May 15, 1820, to March 3, 1826, and for three years from February 22, 1827. The decree of this court, providing for a trial by a jury, (page 698,) covered the entire 12 volumes of Wheaton's Reports.

If this court had been of opinion that there could not have been a lawful copyright in the volumes of Wheaton's Reports, it would have been useless to send the case back to the circuit court for an inquiry whether the conditions precedent to the obtaining of a lawful copyright, under the act of congress, had been complied with, especially in view of the fact that the opinion of the court concludes (page 668) with this statement: 'It may be proper to remark that the court are unanimously of opinion that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this court, and that the judges thereof cannot confer on any reporter any such right.' Therefore, the only matter in Wheaton's Reports which could have been the subject of the copyrights in regard to which the jury trial was directed was the matter not embracing the written opinions of the court, namely, the title-page, table of cases, head-notes, statements of facts, arguments of counsel, and index. Such work of the reporter, which may be the lawful subject of copyright, comprehends also the order of arrangement of the cases, the division of the reports into volumes, the numbering and paging of the volumes, the table of the cases cited in the opinions, (where such table is made,) and the subdivision of the index into appropriate, condensed titles, involving the distribution of the subjects of the various head-notes, and cross-references, where such exist. A publication of the mere opinions of the court, in a volume, without more, would be comparatively valueless to any one. The case of Wheaton v. Peters was decided at January term, 1834. In Gray v. Russell, 1 Story, 11, in 1839, Mr. Justice STORY, in speaking of the question as to how far a person was at liberty to extract the substance of copyrighted law reports, says, (page20:) 'In the case of Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, the same subject was considered very much at large. It was not doubted by the court that Mr. Peters' Condensed Reports would have been an infringement of Mr. Wheaton's copyright, supposing that copyright properly secured under the act, if the opinions of the court had been or could be the proper subject of the private copyright by Mr. Wheaton. But it was held that the opinions of the court, being published under the authority of congress, were not the proper subject of private copyright. But it was as little doubted by the court that Mr. Wheaton had a copyright in his own marginal notes, and in the arguments of counsel as prepared and arranged in his work. The cause went back to the circuit court for the purpose of further inquiries as to the fact whether the requisites of the act of congress had been complied with or not by Mr. Wheaton. This would have been wholly useless and nugatory unless Mr. Wheaton's marginal notes and abstracts of arguments could have been the subject of a copyright, (for that was the work which could be the subject of a copyright;) so that, if Mr. Peters had violated that right, Mr. Wheaton was entitled to redress.' This seems to us to be a proper view of the decision in Wheaton v. Peters, and that decision is as applicable where a reporter receives a compensation or salary from the government as where he does not, in the absence of any restriction against his obtaining a copyright.

In the present case, although Mr. Freeman, during the period of his preparation of volumes 32 to 46, received no direct salary from the state, it is contended by the defendants that he received from the state compensation for his services, through the purchase by it, under a statute, of copies of his volume at a stated price of $6 per copy for 553 copies of each volume, and that this was substantially the payment of a salary to him by the state. But, as stated before, in the view we take of the case, the question of a salary or no salary has no bearing upon the subject. The general proposition that the reporter of a volume of law reports can obtain a copyright for it as an author, and that such copyright will cover the parts of the book of which he is the author, although he has no exclusive right in the judicial opinions published, is supported by authority. Curt. Copyr. 131, 132; Butterworth v. Robinson, 5 Ves. 709; Cary v. Longman, 1 East, 358, and note, 362; Mawman v. Tegg, 2 Russ. 385, 398, 399; Hodges v. Welsh, 2 Ir. Eq. 266, 287; Lewis v. Fullarton, 2 Beav. 6; Saunders v. Smith, 3 Mylne & C. 711; Sweet v. Benning, 16 C. B. 491; Jarrold v. Houlston, 3 Kay & J. 708, 719, 720.

It is further contended by the defendants that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief in respect to volumes 32 to 46, because he did not comply with the conditions of the statute concerning copyrights. Those volumes were all of them published while the act of congress of February 3, 1831, c. 16, (4 St. 436,) was in force. The fourth section of that act provided that no person should be entitled to the benefit of the act unless he should, before publication, deposit a printed copy of the title of the book intended to be copyrighted in the clerk's office of the district court of the district wherein the author or proprietor should reside. The section also required that the clerk should record such title forthwith, in a book, in words prescribed in the section, giving a copy of the title, under the seal of the court, to the author or proprietor, whenever he should require the same. It also provided that the author or proprietor should, within three months from the publication of the book, deliver, or cause to be delivered, a copy of the same to the clerk of the district court, and that it should be the duty of the clerk, at least once in every year, to transmit a certified list of all such records of copyright, including the titles so recorded, and the dates of record, and also all the copies of books deposited in his office, to the secretary of state, to be deposited in his office.

Although, under section 6 of the same act, the exclusive right to the copyright vests upon the recording of the title of the book, and runs for the prescribed period from that date, and although the right of action for infringement, under section 6, also accrues at that time, yet it is quite clear that, under section 4, in respect, at least, to suits brought after three months from the publication of the book, it must be shown, as a condition precedent to the right to maintain the suit, that a copy of the book was delivered to the clerk of the district court within three months from the pablication. Section 5 of the same act provides that no person shall be entitled to the benefit of the act unless he shall give information of copyright being secured, by causing to be inserted in the published copies, on the title-page of the book, or the page immediately following, the words: 'Entered according to act of congress, in the year _____, by A. B., in the clerk's office of the district court of _____.' Undoubtedly the three conditions prescribed by the statute, namely, the deposit before publication of the printed copy of the title of the book, the giving of information of the copyright by the insertion of the notice on the title-page or the next page, and the depositing of a copy of the book within three months after the publication, are conditions precedent to the perfection of the copyright. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591; Merrell v. Tice, 104 U.S. 557.

It is contended by the defendants that the plaintiff has not proved the date of the publication of any of the volumes in question; that the only proof he has offered is in the form of certificates by the clerk of the district court, showing the dates of the filing of the printed titles of the volumes; and that he has failed to show whether such filing preceded or followed the publication of the volumes. The record shows that the plaintiff, in respect of volumes 32 to 46, offered in evidence 15 certificates made by William H. Bradley, clerk of the district court of the United States for the Northern district of Illinois, each of which was in the following form, except as to the number of the volume, and its contents, and except that, as to volumes 39 to 43, the name 'Eugene B. Myers,' and, as to volumes 44 to 46, the name 'E. B. Myers,' was substituted for the names 'E. B. Myers & Chandler:'

'United States of America, Northern District of Illinois-ss:

'CLERK'S OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES     FOR SAID DISTRICT.

'Be it remembered that on the 12th day of August, A. D. 1865,     E. B. Myers & Chandler, of said district, deposited in this      office the title of a book, as follows, to-wit: Reports of      cases at law and in chancery argued and determined in the      supreme court of Illinois, by Norman L. Freeman, counselor at      law, volume 32, containing the remainder of the cases decided at the April term, and a part of the cases decided at      the November term, 1863,-the right whereof they claim as      proprietors, in conformity with an act of congress entitled      'An act to amend the several acts respecting copyrights.'

'WM. H. BRADLEY, Clerk.'

'Northern District of Illinois-ss:

'I, William H. Bradley, clerk of the district court of the     United States for the Northern district of Illinois, do      hereby certify the foregoing to be a true copy from the      records of said court in the matter of the entry of a      copyright by E. B. Myers & Chandler, as the same appears of      record in said court, and now remaining in my custody. In     testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the      seal of said court, at my office, in Chicago, this 12th day      of August, A. D. 1865, and of our Independence the 90th year.

[L. S.]

'WM. H. BRADLEY, Clerk.

'Work deposited Jan'y 17, 1866.

'WM. H. BRADLEY, Cl'k.'

The certificates show that the dates of the several deposits of the titles and of the works were as hereinbefore stated. The certificate to the copy of the title bears date in each case the same day as the deposit of the title. In each case the memorandum of the deposit of the work was in the same form as that in regard to volume 32, with the necessary change of date, except that in regard to volumes 35, 36, 42, 43, and 44, the memorandum was, 'Work deposited in my office,' with the date. When the certificates were offered in evidence, the defendants objected to the introduction of that portion of each of the papers, at the bottom thereof, which purported to show the date when the volume was deposited, on the ground that the same constituted no part of the certificate, but was a mere anonymous statement; that it did not appear when or by whom the same was made; and that the evidence was incompetent to show the date of the deposit. The objection was overruled by the court, and the defendants excepted.

They also objected to the introduction of the paper pertaining to volume 34, on the ground that, even if the memorandum at the bottom of the paper was competent evidence of the date when the volume was deposited, the deposit was made at the same time with the deposit of the printed title-page, namely, October 23, 1866; that it did not appear that the title-page was filed in advance of the publication, and the work deposited after publication; and that the paper was therefore incompetent as evidence. The objection was overruled by the court, and the defendants excepted to such ruling. The defendants also objected to the introduction of the paper as to volume 35, for the reason that it purported to show that the title of the volume was deposited on the 28th of January, 1867, while the printed notice on the back of the title-page of that volume stated that the copyright was entered 'in the year 1866;' and that, because of such variance, the paper was incompetent as evidence. The objection was overruled by the court, and the defendants excepted to the ruling. These various objections are now urged by the defendants, and it is contended that the memorandum of the date of the deposit of the work, written on the certificate, and purporting to be signed by the clerk, is not in the form of a certificate by the clerk of the fact and the date of the deposit of the book, and is not competent proof of such fact or date, and is not attested by the official seal of the clerk; and that no proof was offered as to the genuineness of the signature purporting to be that of the clerk.

The statute makes no provision for the keeping by the clerk of a record of the deposit of the book with him after publication. The memorandum of the deposit of the book, signed in each case by the clerk, appears to have been written, in each case, on the certified copy, furnished to the proprietor, by the clerk, of the record of the deposit of the title of the book. The two things were thus connected together by the act of the officer whose duty it was to receive both the deposit of the title and the deposit of the book. The paper amounts to a sufficient certificate by him of the fact and the date of the deposit of the book. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, which it was open to the defendants to introduce, it must be presumed that the deposit of the title was made in each case before publication, and also that in every instance where the work purports to have been deposited within three months after the date of the deposit of the title, it was deposited within three months after publication. So, also, in the case of volume 34, it must be equally presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the deposit of the title was made before publication, and that the deposit of the work, though made on the same day with the deposit of the title, was not made prior to publication.

In the case of volume 32, however, although it is to be presumed that the title was deposited before publication, yet, as the work was deposited five months and five days after the deposit of the title, it cannot be presumed that such deposit of the work was made within three months after publication. The evidence, therefore, fails as to volume 32; but it is sufficient, prima facie, as to all the other volumes. Section 4 of the act of 1831 requires the clerk to give a copy of the title as deposited and recorded, under the seal of the court, to the author or proprietor who deposits it, whenever he shall require the same. Necessarily such copy is sufficient prima facie evidence of the deposit of the title. Such a copy was given in regard to each of the volumes in question here. On each of these papers the memorandum of the fact and of the date of the deposit of the work, signed by the clerk, was written. The clerk was the officer required to receive the deposit of the work. He was not required to keep a record of such deposit, and he was required to transmit the works so deposited to the secretary of state at least once a year. The memorandum in the present case of the fact and date of the deposit, purporting to be signed by the clerk, must be regarded as a sufficient prima facie certificate of such deposit, and as competent evidence of the fact and of the date, without further proof of the signature of the clerk, that being on the same paper with his signature as clerk to the certificate of the copy of the record of the deposit of the title, and it being open to the defendants to show that his signature to the memorandum was not genuine. We do not think the present case is governed by the decision in Merrell v. Tice, 104 U.S. 557. In that case the librarian of congress had given a certificate to a copy of the record of the deposit of the title of the book. On that paper was written a memorandum in these words: 'Two copies of the above publication deposited' on a date given. This memorandum was not signed by the librarian of congress. This court held the memorandum not to be competent as proof of the deposit of the two copies of the book, on the ground that it was not a certificate of that fact. We are of opinion that the memorandum in the present case, purporting to be signed by the same clerk, is substantially a certificate of the fact and date of the deposit of the work, written by him on the same paper with the other certificate, and that it is not open to the objection which obtained in the case of Merrell v. Tice.

The defendants offered in evidence certificates made by the auditor of public accounts and by the secretary of state of the state of Illinois, showing that, on the 2d of October, 1865, Mr. Freeman delivered to the secretary of state, for the use of the state, 553 copies of volume 32, required by law to be furnished by the reporter, and on the 23d of October, 1866, 553 copies of volume 34. The introduction of this evidence was objected to by the plaintiff on the ground that the papers constituted no evidence of the publication of either of the volumes, and were incompetent. The objection was sustained by the court, and the defendants excepted to the ruling. The exclusion of these papers is assigned as error. The papers also show the payment by the state, for each set of the copies, at the rate of six dollars per volume. As the delivery of the copies of volume 32 to the secretary of state, for the use of the state, took place on the 2d of October, 1865, and the work was not deposited in the clerk's office until the 17th of January, 1866, it is contended that such delivery of the copies to the state was a publication of the volume, and that the deposit of it did not take place until 3 months and 15 days after publication. We think this assignment of error must prevail; that the evidence offered was competent; that the delivery of the copies for the use of the state was a publication of the volume; that the deposit of the work was not made in time; and that the copyright of volume 32, therefore, fails. But we do not think the same objection is tenable as to volume 34, although the 553 copies of that volume were delivered on October 23, 1866, and the title and the work were both of them deposited on that day. It must be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the deposit of the title preceded the publication, and that the delivery of the copies to the secretary of state preceded the deposit of the work in the clerk's office. Where the three things are prescribed by the statute to be done in consecutive order, and all three appear to have been done on the same day, it will be presumed that the statute was complied with, leaving the prima facie evidence open to be rebutted.

In regard to volume 35, the title was deposited January 28, 1867, and the notice printed in the volume purports to show that the copyright was entered in 1866. The statute required that each copy of the book should have inserted in it a statement of the year the copyright was entered. It is sufficient to say, in answer to this objection, that the variance must be regarded as immaterial, inasmuch as the statement that the title was recorded in an earlier year than the actual year, being conclusive on the person taking the copyright, could cause no injury to any other person or to the public, because the copyright would expire in 28 years from the expiration of the year stated in the notice in the book, and not in 28 years from the time of the recording of the title. In regard to volume 36 it is objected that the certificate of the clerk shows that the printed title was deposited by 'E. B. Myers & Chandler,' and that the printed notice of the entry of copyright in the volume, as published, purports to show that the copyright was entered by E. B. Myers alone. We think that, under the circumstances of the case, as the printed notice contained the name of E. B. Myers, the variance was immaterial, and that the statute was substantially complied with, particularly as it is not shown that the defendants were misled by the variance, or induced to do or omit anything because of it.

It is also urged by the defendants that the court erred in finding the title to the volumes to be in the plaintiff because he failed to prove any written assignment or transfer to him from Mr. Freeman as to any of the volumes, or from Chandler as to his alleged interest in volumes 32 to 38, or to prove any means through which he derived title to any of the volumes. By section 4 of the act of 1831 the proprietor of a book, as well as its author, could obtain a copyright, and provision was made, in the form of record given in that section, for a claim by the depositor of the title of the book as its proprietor, and for the deposit of the copy of the book by the proprietor. While, after the obtaining of a copyright, a written assignment may be necessary to convey title to it, or a written license to give a right to reproduce copies of the copyrighted book, we perceive no reason why Myers or Myers & Chandler could not become the owners by a parol transfer of whatever right Mr. Freeman, prior to the taking of the copyright, had to convey. While the work was in manuscript no written transfer of such manuscript from Mr. Freeman was necessary, because the copyright had not yet been taken. Moreover, the defendants, in all their transactions with the plaintiff, recognized his title to the copyrights of volumes 32 to 38, as to which the titles had been deposited by E. B. Myers & Chandler, and parol evidence that the plaintiff owned the copyrights of volumes 32 to 46, at the time the infringements were committed, was introduced without objection, and was sufficient prima facie evidence until rebutted. If the defendants had objected to this parol evidence, the production of the written assignment from Chandler, set up in the bill, could have been required.

It is also objected that the plaintiff acquiesced in, consented to, and ratified the publication of the volumes by the defendants, and was guilty of laches in bringing his suit. The evidence on this subject is voluminous, and it would not be profitable, either for the purposes of this case or as a guide for any other case, to discuss it at length. We are of opinion that neither of these defenses is established, that the plaintiff did not consent to the republication of the volumes by the defendants; that he never abandoned his copyrights, or consented to surrender them without consideration, or gave the defendants cause to understand that he did so or would do so; that he never acquiesced in any infringement of his copyrights by the defendants; and that he was not guilty of laches in seeking relief. The defendants recognized his copyrights in volumes 32 to 38 by offering to purchase them, and there was considerable negotiation on that subject. This fact is inconsistent with consent and abandonment, and the other evidence in the case is inconsistent with any abandonment.

It is also contended by the defendants that each of the volumes as published by them was a new and independent work, not copied from that of the plaintiff, but prepared by the original labor of the editors employed by the defendants. While it is admitted that volumes 32 to 38, as published by the defendants, were, with the exception of the footnotes, prepared entirely from the plaintiff's volumes, it is contended that volumes 39 and 41 to 46 were, with the exception of the opinions of the judges, prepared from the records and files of the supreme court of Illinois. The evidence on the subject of infringement is very full and minute. It is impossible for us to discuss it at length, and we must content ourselves with stating, as a general result, that we concur in the views stated by Judge DRUMMOND, in his decision in the circuit court, in regard to volumes 32 to 38. He says, (10 Biss. 139, 147, 5 Fed. Rep. 726:)

'In considering the question of infringement of the copyright by the defendants, it must be borne in mind what is the character of the work. They are reports of the decisions of the supreme court of this state, to which no one can have a copyright; but he may have to the head-notes and statements of each case, and of the arguments of counsel. These head-notes and statements which have been made are in themselves an abridgment; the one of the opinions of the court, consisting of the principles of law decided, and the other an abstract of the facts and of the arguments. It should also be stated that the volumes of the defendants, as edited by those employed by them, are very much condensed, as compared with Mr. Freeman's reports, and yet the paging of the volumes is substantially the same throughout, so that the cases in the corresponding volumes appear on the same page. The list of cases which precedes each report is the same.

'The defendants Ewell and Denslow, who were employed by the other defendants to annotate these decisions or reports, both state, upon examination, that their work was independent of that of Mr. Freeman; but it appears from the evidence that all the volumes of Mr. Freeman were used in thus editing or annotating; and although it may have been their intention to make an independent work, it is apparent, from a comparison of the Freeman volumes and those of the defendants that the former were used throughout by the editors employed by the defendants. It is true that in each volume, perhaps in the majority of cases, there is the appearance of independent labor performed by them, without regard to the volumes of Mr. Freeman; but yet, in every volume, it is also apparent that Mr. Freeman's volumes were used,-in some instances words and sentences copied without change, in others, changed only in form,-and the conclusion is irresistible that for a large portion of the work performed in behalf of the defendants the editors did not resort to original sources of information, but obtained that information from the volumes of Mr. Freeman. Undoubtedly it was competent for an editor to take the opinions of the supreme court, and, possibly, from the volumes of Mr. Freeman, and make an independent work; but it is always attended with great risk for a person to sit down, and, with the copyrighted volume of law reports before him, undertake to make an independent report of a case. It is not difficult to do this, going to the original sources of information, to the decisions of the court, the briefs of counsel, the records on file in the clerk's office, without regard to the regular volumes of reports. Any one who has tried it can easily understand the difference between the head-notes of two persons, equally good lawyers, and equally critical in the examination of an opinion, where they are made up independent of each other; and, bearing in mind this fact, it seems to be beyond controversy that, although in many, and perhaps most, instances there is a very considerable difference between the head-notes of the defendants' volumes and those of the plaintiff, the latter have been freely used in the preparation of the former. I conclude, therefore, that the defendants have, in the preparation of those volumes, from 32 to 38 inclusive, of the Illinois Reports, used the volumes of the plaintiff so as to interfere with his copyright.'

So, also, we concur with the conclusions of Judge DRUMMOND in regard to volumes 39 to 46. He says (20 Fed. Rep. 441:) 'The present inquiry is limited to what is alleged to be an infringement by the defendants of volumes 39 to 46, inclusive, of Mr. Freeman's Illinois Reports. Volume 40 seems never to have been regularly published like the other volumes, although the evidence of the infringement of the plaintiff's copyright in that volume is perhaps stronger than that applicable to any of the other volumes named. Upon comparing parts of each of the volumes, those of the complainant and of the defendants, one with the other, I think there can be no doubt that in some respects, in each case, the Freeman volume has been used by the defendants in the head-notes, the statements of facts, and the arguments of counsel; that is, there are certain unmistakable indicia that in every volume prepared by the defendants they have not confined themselves solely to the original sources of information, namely, the opinions of the judges, the records, and the arguments of counsel.' He also says (page 442:) 'The fact appears to be, and, indeed, it is not a subject of controversy, that in arranging the order of cases, and in the paging of the different volumes, the Freeman edition has been followed by the defendants; but, while this is so, I should not feel inclined, merely on that account, and independent of other matters, to give a decree to the plaintiff, although it is claimed that the arrangement of the cases and the paging of the volumes are protected by a copyright. Undoubtedly, in some cases, where are involved labor, talent, judgment, the classification and disposition of subjects in a book entitle it to a copyright. But the arrangement of law cases and the paging of the book may depend simply on the will of the printer, of the reporter, or publisher, or the order in which the cases have been decided, or upon other accidental circumstances. Here the object on the part of the defendants seems to have been that there should not be confusion in the references and examination of cases; but the arrangement of cases and the paging of the volumes is a labor inconsiderable in itself, and I regard it, not as an independent matter, but in connection with other similarities existing between the two editions, when I say, taking the whole together, the Freeman volumes have been used in editing and publishing the defendants' volumes.' It may be added that one of the most significant evidences of infringement exists frequently in the defendants' volumes, namely, the copying of errors made by Mr. Freeman.

The next objection urged is that the defendants were compelled to produce their books and papers on the accounting before the master, the plaintiff having sought a forfeiture of the copies of volumes 32 to 38; and that the defendants were thereby compelled to produce evidence against themselves in aid of such forfeiture. The original bill prays for a decree that all of the copies published by the defendants of volumes 32 to 38 be forfeited to the plaintiff, and that the defendants be required to deliver the same to him. The supplemental bill contains no such prayer in regard to volumes 39 and 41 to 46, but contains a prayer for general relief. The cross-bill and the answer to it show that Myers brought an action of replevin against Callaghan & Co. to recover as forfeited the copies of the infringing volumes 32 to 38. The final decree shows that the cross-suit was not brought to a hearing with the original suit. On the contrary, the final decree reserves for consideration and determination, on the hearing of the cross-bill, the rights of the parties thereunder, and their rights in respect to the action of replevin to recover possession of the unsold copies of volumes 32 to 38. Although, under the provisions of the interlocutory decree in respect to volumes 32 to 38, the defendants were required to produce their account-books and papers before the master, and were examined in regard to them, yet the final decree did not award any forfeiture, and so no injury has resulted to the defendants by reason of such provision of the interlocutory decree, or by reason of any action thereunder. Irrespective of this, it is determined by the case of Stevens v. Gladding, 17 How. 447, that the penalties given by section 7 of the copyright act of 1831 cannot be enforced in a suit in equity. The provision of the interlocutory decree for an examination of the defendants in regard to the subject of inquiry, and for the production by them of their account-books and papers, is the usual provision in an interlocutory decree in a suit in equity for the infringement of a copyright. As the forfeiture of the volumes could not be obtained by this suit, although prayed for in the bill, the evidence was admissible.

We now come to the question of damages. It is contended that the circuit court erred in disallowing to the defendants a credit for stereotyping volumes 32 to 46. Both of the masters refused to allow credit for the cost of stereotyping. Stereotyping was not a necessary incident of printing and publishing, as type-setting was. It was resorted to by the defendants to enable them the more successfully and profitably to infringe, by dispensing with the necessity of resetting the type for every new edition, and thus reducing the cost of multiplying copies in the future. The stereotype plates were made without the consent of the plaintiff, and if credit is allowed for them the plaintiff is compelled to buy and pay for them, when they are useless to him, and when he has stereotyped for himself volumes 32 to 46. It is also contended that both of the masters erred in disallowing a credit to the defendants for the amount paid to the different members of their firm for their services, in the way of salaries, as a part of the expense of conducting their business, being the amount of about $12,000 a year during the period in controversy. These amounts were drawn by the defendants under the partnership agreement, as family and personal expenses. We do not think that the value of the time of an infringer, or the expense of the living of himself or his family, while he is engaged in violating the rights of the plaintiff, is to be allowed to him as a credit, and thus the plaintiff be compelled to pay the defendant for his time and expenses while engaged in infringing the copyright. If the defendants, instead of employing others to do the work, had chosen to do it themselves, they might as well have made a charge, and claimed to have been credited for it, of so much a month or a year for their services in preparing the infringing volumes. Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 139. The case stands on a different footing from that of the salaries of the managing officers of a corporation, as in Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788.

The defendants also object that the master, Mr. Bennett, should have found the number of volumes sold by the defendants to have been 103 less, and that the total number of bound volumes on hand found by him was erroneous, as also was the total number of volumes found by him to have been on hand unsold. The exceptions to the master's report in these respects substantially complain that the master found too many volumes to have been sold, by 103. We do not perceive any error in the above particulars. The master, Mr. Bennett, rightfully excluded a credit for the cost of producing copies of the volumes which the defendants did not sell. There were no profits from copies not sold, and therefore there could have been nothing to charge against such profits. In regard to the exceptions to the report of Mr. Bennett, that he found the average selling price of the defendants' volumes to be $4.464 each, instead of $4.34, and that he found their gross receipts from sales of the infringing volumes to have been $10,231.48, instead of $9,459.37, we are of opinion that the selling price found and the gross receipts found were not too high.

We do not concur in the view of the defendants that there were no net receipts or profits on the sales of volumes 39 to 46, or in the view that the master, Mr. Bennett, erred in refusing credit to the defendants for the amount paid by them for editorial work in preparing their volumes, or in the view that the circuit court erred in allowing the $340.70 as profits on the resales of the 156 volumes mentioned in the first and second exceptions of the plaintiff to the report of the master, Mr. Bennett. In regard to the 156 copies, they were volumes which had been already sold by the defendants, and which they purchased as second-hand books, and resold. The master had held that, as he had charged the defendants with the profits on the first sale of these volumes, the profits on their resale could not be charged against them. The circuit court overruled this view, and, as we think, properly. The sale of the volume originally prevented the purchase from the plaintiff of a lawful volume, and the sale of the same infringing volume a second time prevented the purchase from the plaintiff of another lawful volume. The plaintiff was thus twice injured by the acts of the defendants, and the sales of the second-hand volumes must be accounted for as if they were first sales. Birdsell v. Shaliol, 112 U.S. 485, 487, 488, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 244. The circuit court held that the master approximated as nearly as could be done to the true amount, in fixing the selling price at $4.464 per volume. We concur in this view. In regard to the eighth exception of the defendants to the report of the master, Mr. Bennett, that he had credited the defendants, in their expense account, with only 12 per cent. on their gross sales, instead of 17 per cent., the circuit court held that, as Mr. Bennett had allowed 12 per cent., and Mr. Bishop had allowed 12 7/8 per cent., for such average expenses, and those conclusions were so nearly alike, the court would allow their findings in this regard to stand. We concur in this view, and also in the conclusion of the circuit court sustaining the findings of the two masters as to the average price per volume at which the defendants sold the volumes.

In regard to the general question of the profits to be accounted for by the defendants, as to the volumes in question, the only proper rule to be adopted is to deduct from the selling price the actual and legitimate manufacturing cost. If the volume contains matter to which a copyright could not properly extend, incorporated with matter proper to be covered by a copyright, the two necessarily going together when the volume is sold, as a unit, and it being impossible to separate the profits on the one from the profits on the other, and the lawful matter being useless without the unlawful, it is the defendants who are responsible for having blended the lawful with the unlawful, and they must abide the consequences, on the same principle that he who has wrongfully produced a confusion of goods must alone suffer. As was said by Lord ELDON, in Mawman v. Tegg, 2 Russ. 385, 391: 'If the parts which have been copied cannot be separated from those which are original, without destroying the use and value of the original matter, he who has made an improper use of that which did not belong to him must suffer the consequences of so doing. If a man mixes what belongs to him with what belongs to me, and the mixture be forbidden by the law, he must again separate them, and he must bear all the mischief and loss which the separation may occasion. If an individual chooses in any work to mix my literary matter with his own, he must be restrained from publishing the literary matter which belongs to me; and if the parts of the work cannot be separated, and if by that means the injunction which restrained the publication of my literary matter prevents, also, the publication of his own literary matter, he has only himself to blame.' The present is one of those cases in which the value of the book depends on its completeness and integrity. It is sold as a book, not as the fragments of a book. In such a case, as the profits result from the sale of the book as a whole, the owner of the copyright will be entitled to recover the entire profits on the sale of the book, if he elects that remedy. Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 139.

In considering the exceptions of the defendants to the masters' reports in matters of fact, questioning the accuracy of their conclusions in respect to the amount of the defendants' profits, we have observed the rule recognized and affirmed in Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 149, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 894, that, in dealing with such exceptions, 'the conclusions of the master, depending upon the weighing of conflicting testimony, have every reasonable presumption in their favor, and are not to be set aside or modified unless there clearly appears to have been error or mistake on his part.' On the whole case we are of opinion that the final decree was correct, except in respect of volume 32. The amount of damages reported by the master, Mr. Bishop, as to that volume, and allowed by the final decree as part of the $6,986.05, was $926.66. That sum is disallowed, and must be deducted. The other items of recovery in the decree were proper. The injunction as to volume 32 must be vacated, and the appellee will recover his costs of this court. The decree of the circuit court is reversed as to volume 32, and is affirmed in all other respects; and the case is remanded to that court, with a direction to correct the decree in the particulars above indicated, and to take such further proceedings as may be according to law, and not inconsistent with this opinion.