Buzard v. Houston/Opinion of the Court

In the judiciary act of 1789, by which the first congress established the judicial courts of the United States, and defined their jurisdiction, it is enacted that 'suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law.' Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, § 16, (1 St. 82; Rev. St. § 723.) Five days later, on September 29, 1789, the same congress proposed to the legislatures of the several states the article afterwards ratified as the seventh amendment of the constitution, which declares that 'in suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.' 1 St. 21, 98.

The effect of the provision of the judiciary act, as often stated by this court, is that 'whenever a court of law is competent to take cognizance of a right, and has power to proceed to a judgment which affords a plain, adequate, and complete remedy, without the aid of a court of equity, the plaintiff must proceed at law, because the defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by jury.' Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 271, 278; Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616, 621; Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 373, 375; Lewis v. Cocks, 23 Wall. 466, 470; Root v. Railway Co., 105 U.S. 189, 212; Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U.S. 568, 573; S.C.. 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232. In a very recent case the court said: 'This enactment certainly means something; and, if only declaratory of what was always the law, it must, at least, have been intended to emphasize the rule, and to impress it upon the attention of the courts.' New York Guaranty Co. v. Memphis Water Co., 107 U.S. 205, 214; S.C.. 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 279.

Accordingly a suit in equity to enforce a legal right can be brought only when the court can give more complete and effectual relief, in kind or in degree, on the equity side, than on the common-law side; as for instance, by compelling a specific performance, or the removal of a cloud on the title to real estate; or preventing an injury for which damages are not recoverable at law, as in Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74; or where an agreement procured by fraud is of a continuing nature, and its rescission will prevent a multiplicity of suits, as in Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210, 215, and in Jones v. Bolles, 9 Wall. 364, 369. In cases of fraud or mistake, as under any other head of chancery jurisdiction, a court of the United States will not sustain a bill in equity to obtain only a decree for the payment of money by way of damages, when the like amount can be recovered at law in an action sounding in tort or for money had and received. Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U.S. 487, 500; S.C.. 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 442; Ambler v. Choteau, 1 7 U.S. 586; S.C.. 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 556; Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U.S. 190; S.C.. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 820.

In England, indeed, the court of chancery, in cases of fraud, has sometimes maintained bills in equity to recover the same damages which might be recovered in an action for money had and received. But the reason for this, as clearly brought out by Lords Justices Knight BRUCE and TURNER, in Slim v. Croucher, 1 De Gex, F. & J. 518, 527, 528, was that such cases were within the ancient and original jurisdiction in chancery before any court of law had acquired jurisdiction of them, and that the assumption of jurisdiction by the courts of law, by gradually extending their powers, did not displace the earlier jurisdiction of the court of chancery. Upon any other ground, such bills could not be maintained. Clifford v. Brooke, 13 Ves. 131; Thompson v. Barclay, 9 Law J. Ch. 215, 218. And we have not been referred to any instance in which an English court of equity has maintained a bill in such a case as that now before us. In Newham v. May, 13 Price, 749, Chief Baron ALEXANDER said: 'It is not in every case of fraud that relief is to be administered by a court of equity. In the case, for instance, of a fraudulent warranty on the sale of a horse, or any fraud upon the sale of a chattel, no one, I apprehend, ever thought of filing a bill in equity.'

The present bill states a case for which an action of deceit could be maintained at law, and would afford full, adequate, and complete remedy. The original agreement for the sale of a number of cattle, and not of any cattle in particular, does not belong to the class of contracts of which equity would decree specific performance. If the plaintiffs should be ordered to be reinstated in all their rights under that agreement, and permitted now to tender performance thereof on their part, the only relief which they could have in this suit would be a decree for damages, to be assessed by the same rules as in an action at law. The similar contract with Mosty, and the assignment thereof to the plaintiffs, are in the plaintiff's own possession, and no judicial rescission of the assignment is needed. If the exchange of the contract was procured by the fraud alleged, it would be no more binding upon the plaintiffs at law than in equity; and in an action of deceit the plaintiffs might treat the assignment of the contract with Mosty as void, and, upon delivering up that contract to the defendant, recover full damages for the non-performance of the original agreement. No relief is sought against Mosty, and he is not made a party to the bill. The obligation executed by the plaintiffs to the defendant is not negotiable, so that there is no need of an injunction. A judgment for pecuniary damages would adjust and determine all the rights of the parties, and is the only redress to which the plaintiffs, if they prove their allegations, are entitled. There is therefore no ground upon which the bill can be maintained. Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616, and other cases above cited.

The comparative weight due to conflicting testimony such as was introduced in this case can be much better determined by seeing and hearing the witnesses than upon written depositions or a printed record.

This case does not require us to enter upon a consideration of the question under what circumstances a bill showing no ground for equitable relief, and praying for discovery as incidental only to the relief sought, is open to a demurrer to the whole bill, or may, if discovery is obtained, be retained for the purposes of granting full relief, within the rule often stated in the books, but as to the proper limits of which the authorities are conflicting. It is enough to say that the case clearly falls within the statement of Chief Justice MARSHALL: 'But this rule cannot be abused by being employed as a mere pretext for bringing causes, proper for a court of law, into a court of equity. If the answe of the defendant discloses nothing, and the plaintiff supports his claim by evidence in his own possession, unaided by the confessions of the defendant, the established rules, limiting the jurisdiction of courts, require that he should be dismissed from the court of chancery, and permitted to assert his rights in a court of law.' Russell v. Clark, 7 Cranch, 69, 89. See, also, Horsburg v. Baker, 1 Pet. 232, 236; Brown v. Swann, 10 Pet. 497, 503.

The decree of the circuit court, dismissing the bill generally, might be considered a bar to an action at law, and it is therefore, in accordance with the precedents in Rogers v. Durant, 106 U.S. 644, S.C.. 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 623, and the cases there cited, ordered that the decree be reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to enter a decree dismissing the bill for want of jurisdiction, and without prejudice to an action at law.