Burrows v. The Marshal/Opinion of the Court

Two judgments, as the appellant represents, were rendered in the Circuit Court, at Raleigh, November Term, 1869, against one Taylor, in favor of the creditors therein named, for certain specified amounts, and that the same were placed in the hands of a deputy marshal for collection; that the marshal having levied the executions upon a certain described parcel of land, advertised the same for sale according to law, and that the petitioner became the purchaser thereof, being the highest bidder at the sale, for the sum of one hundred and ten dollars, which, as he alleges, he paid to the deputy marshal; that at the ensuing term of the court he applied to the marshal to execute to him as the purchaser a deed of the interest so purchased and paid for as aforesaid; that the marshal having refused to comply with the request, he then prepared and tendered to the marshal a proper draft for a deed, and requested him to execute the same, which he refused and still refuses to do, and has given notice that he will sell the premises upon other executions in his hands. Wherefore the petitioner prayed the Circuit Court to lay a rule upon the appellee, as such marshal, to show cause at the next term of the court why he should not make to him as the purchaser a good and sufficient deed in fee simple of the described tract, and he also prayed for an order staying all further proceedings under the said other executions in his hands towards a resale of the premises which he purchased.

Subsequently the appellee appeared and filed an answer, and the record shows that the court, at the succeeding November Term, rendered judgment for the appellee, directing that the rule be discharged and that the petitioner pay all costs. Whereupon the petitioner appealed to this court.

Such a motion as the one first described and the rule granted under it were proceedings at law, and so also were the judgment and the order of the court directing that the petitioner should pay all costs, and the court is of the opinion that the judgment could not be removed into this court in any other way than by a writ of error; that an appeal will not lie to this court in such a case under the twenty-second section of the Judiciary Act, and that the appeal must be

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION.