Brock v. North Carolina/Dissent Vinson

Mr. Chief Justice VINSON, dissenting.

The petitioner and two others, Cook and Matthews, were indicted for shooting into the home of J. D. Wyatt when Wyatt and four other persons were present therein. After arrest, Cook and Matthews confessed, charging, brock with firing the shots. Brock made no confession.

Cook and Matthews were tried together. Wyatt, Hathaway and Bardin, the sheriff of the county, were the witnesses presented by the State. Bardin, the sheriff, testified as to the confessions of, cook and Matthews. Cook and Matthews did not testify in their own behalf. There was a verdict of guilty of assault with a deadly weapon.

Judgment had not been entered on the verdict when Brock was placed on trial.

The same witnesses used in the foregoing trial, Wyatt, Hathaway and Bardin, testified for the State. The latter witness again testified that Cook and Matthews had stated that Brock fired into the house. The prosecutor offered Cook and Matthews as witnesses. They declined to testify on the ground of self-incrimination, and the court sustained this claim of privilege.

At this point, the Solicitor moved to withdraw a juror and for a mistrial and the continuance of the case pending final judgment against Cook and Matthews. His motion was granted, and a mistrial and continuance of the case ordered.

Thereafter, a judgment of two years' imprisonment was entered on the verdict against Cook and Matthews. Their appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina was affirmed. State v. Matthews, 1950, 231 N.C. 617, 58 S.E.2d 625.

Subsequently, Brock was brought to trial again. He interposed a plea of former jeopardy which the court denied. Proper exceptions were taken and the federal question herein presented and preserved. Then he pleaded not guilty to the indictment. The same three witnesses, Wyatt, Hathaway and Bardin, the sheriff, testified in Brock's second trial to facts substantially similar to their evidence in the first trial. The sheriff reiterated his testimony that Cook and Matthews had stated that Brock fired the rifle into the house. Thereupon, the Solicitor called Cook and Matthews to the stand, and this time they testified to the part that they took in the shooting and that Brock had fired into the Wyatt home. The jury convicted, and Brock was sentenced for a two-year imprisonment.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the judgment, holding that Brock's plea of former jeopardy was properly denied. State v. Brock, 1951, 234 N.C. 390, 67 S.E.2d 282.

The petitioner is here urging that he was placed in jeopardy a second time, and thereby was denied due process of law guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. We granted certiorari. 1952, 343 U.S. 914, 72 S.Ct. 649.

For the first time in the history of this Court, it is urged that a state could grant a mistrial in order that it might present a stronger case at some later trial and, in so doing, avoid a plea of former jeopardy in the second trial.

The Solicitor had convicted two defendants engaged in the same crime, by the testimony of Wyatt, Hathaway and Bardin, the sheriff. Cook and Matthews had refused to testify in their own behalf in that trial. Immediately the first Brock trial followed. The judgment of conviction against Cook and Matthews had not been entered. No motion for a continuance appears in the record. The State willingly entered upon the trial. It had all the witnesses and the evidence which had convicted Cook and Matthews of the same crime. It presented that evidence. Cook and Matthews refused to testify on the ground of self-incrimination, and the court sustained their position. Under the circumstances, the Solicitor either knew or should have known that Cook and Matthews would not testify. After all the State's evidence was in, and after Cook and Matthews refused to testify, the Solicitor moved for a mistrial. The basis for his motion was that the State would, at a later date, be able to present a stronger case against Brock since Cook and Matthews might, at a later date, testify differently or to additional facts, than at the first trial. It must be remembered that they had not testified at any trial. The court sustained the motion that a juror be withdrawn and a mistrial ordered and the case continued pending the final judgment in the case against Matthews and Cook. The court stated it was of the opinion that 'the ends of justice require that the State have available for its testimony of the witnesses Jim Cook and Elmer Matthews when the case is tried and that the State is entitled to have those witnesses to testify after their cases have been disposed of in the Supreme Court.'

The sole question is whether the record in this case presents an offense to fundamental fairness and due process. Under the results reached by the Court, the state is free, if the prosecutor thinks a conviction probably cannot be won from the jury on the testimony at the trial, to stop the trial and insist that it be tried again on another day when it has stronger men on the field.

Orderly justice could not be secured if the rules allowed the defendant to ask for a mistrial at the conclusion of testimony just because the state had done well and the defense poorly. The same limitation applies to the prosecution if the scales of justice are to be kept in equal balance. This Court recently has said that, in applying the concept of due process of law, judges are not at large to apply their own personal standards. Rochin v. People of California, 1952, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205. Thus, the considered views of many other jurisdictions may be utilized in determining the basic requirements of orderly justice and hence due process. Wolf v. People of State of Colorado, 1949, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782.

I grant that North Carolina contends that its present procedure does not violate fundamental fairness. It was not always so. In State v. Garrigues, 1795, 2 N.C. 276, 278, the Supreme Court of North Carolina adopted the contrary rule in the following strong language:

' * *  * in the reigns of the latter sovereigns of the Stuart      family, a different rule prevailed, that a jury in such case      might be discharged for the purpose of having better evidence      against him at a future day; and this power was exercised for      the benefit of the crown only: but it is a doctrine so abhorrent to every      principle of safety and security, that it ought not to      receive the least countenance in the courts of this country. In the time of James the second, and since the Revolution,     this doctrine came under examination, and the rule as laid      down by L. Coke was revived. * *  * In the present case, the      jury were suffered by the court's officer to separate without      giving a verdict; as they could not agree to convict, it is      strong evidence of the party's innocence; and perhaps he      could not be tried again with the same advantage to himself      as then. Perhaps his witnesses are dead, or gone away, or     their attendance not to be procured, or some accident may      prevent their attendance. We will not again put his life in     jeopardy, more especially as it is very improbable we shall      be able to possess him in of the same advantages-So he was      discharged.' (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case of In re Speir, 1828, 12 N.C. 491, 493, 494, 498, 499, 502, the court pointed out-

Hall Judge.-'In this case, the guilt or innocence of the     prisoner is as little the subject of enquiry, as the merits      of any case can be, when it is brought before this Court on a      collateral question of law. Although the prisoner, if     unfortunately guilty, may escape punishment, in consequence      of the decision this day made in his favor, yet it should be      remembered, that the same decision may be a bulwark of safety      to those, who, more innocent, may become the subjects of      persecution, and whose conviction, if not procured on one      trial, might be secured on a second or third, whether they      were guilty or not.'

Taylor, Chief-Justice.-'In the remarkable case of the     Kenlocks, reported by Foster *  *  *. A majority of the Judges     *  *  * rejected with just animadversion the authority of those cases, which had occurred in that      period of misrule and persecution, preceding the revolution. In one of these, the Court discharged a Jury in a capital     case after evidence given on the part of the Crown, merely      for want of sufficient evidence to convict, and in order to      bring the prisoner to a second trial, when the Crown should      be better prepared!

'These stains upon the administration of justice show to what     extremes, in a state of civil discord, the passions of men      urge them to trample upon the most salutary principles of      law; and in what degree Judges, holding their office at the      will of the sovereign, were eager to pander to his appetite      for blood and forfeitures.

' * *  * as the common law of every state already protects the      accused against a second trial, not only in crimes of all      descriptions, but in questions of civil right, it is to be      inferred that the Constitutions meant much more, and that      their design was to protect the accused against a trial,      where the first Jury had been discharged without due cause.'      (Emphasis supplied.)

But, we are told that in a later day, the North Carolina court departed from its earlier rule. We are directed to State v. Dove, 1942, 222 N.C. 162, 22 S.E.2d 231; State v. Guice, 1931, 201 N.C. 761, 161 S.E. 533; State v. Bass, 1880, 82 N.C. 570; State v. Andrews, 1914, 166 N.C. 349, 81 S.E. 416; and State v. Ellis, 1930, 200 N.C. 77, 156 S.E. 157.

In the Guice case, the State introduced its evidence and rested its case. Counsel for the defendant made a motion for judgment as of nonsuit. The court withdrew a juror and ordered a mistrial, and the authority of the court to take this course was the question presented on appeal. The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in disposing of the matter, said:

In misdemeanors, and all cases of felonies not capital, the     court below has the discretion to order a mistrial and      discharge a jury before verdict in furtherance of justice,      and the court need not find facts constituting the necessity      for such discharge, and ordinarily the action is not      reviewable. In capital felonies the facts must be found and     the necessity for such discharge is subject to review.'

In the Bass case, supra, the court held that the judge 'had the discretion to dissolve the jury and hold the defendants for a new jury, and that the security for the proper exercise of his discretion rests not on the power of this court to review and reverse the judge, but on his responsibility under his oath of office.'

While the technical ramifications evolved in the many jurisdictions as part of the doctrine of double jeopardy do not fall within the scope of due process, the basic idea is part of our American concept of fundamental fairness. This is shown by the universality of the provision against double jeopardy. The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, inapplicable here, prohibits double jeopardy. The Constitutions of all but five states, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, north Carolina, and Vermont, contain clauses forbidding double jeopardy. And each of those five states has the prohibition against double jeopardy as part of its common law.

No case in any other jurisdiction to support North Carolina's action in this case has been pointed out to us, and my research fails to find a single prop supporting its position. On the other hand, eight states have had occasion to rule on whether there might be a second trial after the prosecutor at a previous trial was unable to present evidence. Six have taken a firm position against allowing a second trial. A seventh, Iowa, is in accord with the above view, for language to the contrary in two other Iowa cases is not in point since the mistrials in those two cases were upon the motion of the defendant. In Alabama, the eighth state, two cases have permitted a second trial. Both of those cases, however, involved facts of such extreme nature that it would have been shocking to the conscience not to permit a second trial. In one of the cases, the Alabama Supreme Court even indicated the result probably would be different if the prosecutor merely had been unprepared at the first trial.

The rule to be gleaned from the cases is that a second trial will be allowed only for extreme circumstances, often contributed to by the defendant and beyond the control of the prosecutor, which prevented the testimony from being available at the first trial. Only North Carolina has clear precedent allowing a second trial when the prosecutor simply failed to have his evidence ready at the first trial.

It may be considered that this being a noncapital felony that the considered action of the judiciary of a state should be followed when it is said it is in the furtherance of justice. It certainly is the easy way out, but in view of the fact that no other state in the Union has gone to this extreme of the North Carolina rule, I must ponder upon it and conclude that the hardwon victory achieved in the field of 'double jeopardy' ought not be lost even in a small part by the affirmance of this case.

The Attorney General of North Carolina relies upon Palko v. State of Connecticut, 1937, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288, in support of his position that the second trial of this defendant did not violate due process. In Palko, there was an appeal by the State, as allowed by statute. The Supreme Court of Connecticut found three errors prejudicial to the State committed by the trial court, and reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial. The second trial then followed. In the case before the Court, no error of law tainted the first trial.

It is apparent that in the Palko case, the Legislature of Connecticut had provided for a review of the trial by appeal. We often have said that the considered action by a state legislature or the Congress of the United States places the issue of constitutionality in a different posture in respect of due process of law. We agree that Palko decided that this Court could consider a particular case of double jeopardy of a defendant as not being within the protective limits of due process of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

Certainly, Palko did not decide the issue in this case. In that case, under a state statute, the State was asking for a second trial to obtain a trial free from error by the court prejudicial to the State. Here, the State asks for its second trial in order to suit the convenience of the Solicitor in an endeavor to strengthen the State's case, when the defendant had done nothing either to bring about trial errors or to inveigle or entrap the Solicitor to proceed to the first trial.

While this case is not controlled by Palko, I am comforted by language found in it which, in my view, envisions this case as one which might well be within the protective embrace of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Speaking for the Court, Justice Cardozo said:

'What the answer would have to be if the state were permitted     after a trial free from error to try the accused over again      or to bring another case against him, we have no occasion to      consider. We deal with the statute before us and no other. The state is not attempting to wear the accused out by a     multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It asks no more     than this, that the case against him shall go on until there      shall be a trial free from the corrosion of substantial legal      error.'

I also receive comfort from the language contained in Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER'S concurring opinion in this case. He says that a state falls short of its obligation 'when it callously subjects an individual to successive retrials on a charge on which he has been acquitted or prevents a trial from proceeding to a termination in favor of the accused merely in order to allow a prosecutor who has been incompetent or casual or even ineffective to see if he cannot do better a second time.' In my view, this case is snugly embraced in his very clear statement of the law as I have always understood it until today.

Wade v. Hunter, 1949, 336 U.S. 684, 69 S.Ct. 834, 93 L.Ed. 974, is cited in support of the discretion of a trial judge 'to declare a mistrial and to require another panel to try the defendant if the ends of justice will be best served.' Thompson v. United States, 1894, 155 U.S. 271, 273-274, 15 S.Ct. 73, 74, 39 L.Ed. 146, is likewise referred to in the majority opinion. I have no quarrel with either of these cases. In the Wade case, with which I agree, the court-martial trial was held in the midst of the campaign to overthrow the forces of Germany. There was a continuance in the trial to get certain witnesses. Before that date was reached, there were further advances toward the enemy. The Army needed the officers participating in the trial for tactical purposes, and the court-martial was dissolved. In the Thompson case, after the jury was sworn and a witness testified, a member of the jury was found to be disqualified because he was a member of the Grand Jury which filed the indictment. The jury was discharged, and a plea of jeopardy was interposed at the second trial. Nothing was called to the attention of the prosecutor or the court that such a condition obtained or might have obtained. The plea of former jeopardy was overruled with cases cited. The Court said:

'Those cases clearly establish the law of this court that     courts of justice are invested with the authority to      discharge a jury from giving any verdict whenever, in their      opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration,      there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of      public justice would otherwise be defeated, and to order a      trial by another jury; and that the defendant is not thereby      twice put in jeopardy, within the meaning of the fifth      amendment to the constitution of the United States.'

I submit there was no manifest necessity to discharge this jury after the State had proceeded to trial and offered all its evidence, and I submit that the ordering of a mistrial here for the convenience of the State does not promote the ends of public justice.