Bohall v. Dilla

This case comes before us from the supreme court of California. The plaintiff in the court below, the defendant in error here, is the holder of a patent of the United States for certain lands situated in Humboldt county, in that state, issued to him under the pre-emption laws upon proof of settlement and improvement, and the present action is to recover their possession. In his complaint he alleges his ownership in fee of the premises on a day designated, the entry thereon of the defendant without license, and the subsequent withholding of them; also, that the value of the annual rents and profits of the premises is $800, for which sum and the restitution of the premises he prays judgment. The answer of the defendant denies the several allegations of the complaint, and sets up in a special count, by way of cross-complaint, various matters, which, as he insists, constitute in equity a good defense to the action and entitle him to a decree; that he has an equitable right to the premises; that the plaintiff holds the title in trust for him; and that the plaintiff should be required to convery the same to him.

The matters set up as grounds for equitable relief are the previous settlement upon the premises and their improvement by the defendant, and certain proceedings taken by him to acquire the title under the pre-emption laws, which were disregarded and held insufficient by the land department of the government, but which he contends establish his right to the patents.

It appears from the record and findings of the court that in October, 1862, the defendant purchased from his rother William, then in occupation of the land, the possessory right of the latter to the premises and his improvements thereon, received a deed from him, and immediately thereafter went into possession, which was held until March 23, 1865; that on that date, in consideration of $600 partly paid in cash, and partly payable in installments, the defendant contracted to convey the premises and improvements to the plaintiff Dilla, who thereupon was put into possession and continued in possession until the fifth of May, 1868; that he was then evicted under a judgment obtained by the defendant upon the contract of purchase, and the latter was restored to the possession. In July, 1869, the defendant removed to Arcata, about 20 miles distant, and remained there until October, 1871, when his family went back to the land, followed by himself in December. In April, 1872, he moved to Mattole, about 80 miles distant, and there remained until August, 1874, when he again returned. In October following he again moved to Arcata and did not return until March, 1875.

The land was surveyed in 1873, and the plat thereof filed in the land-office in October of that year, On the third of that month the defendant Bohall filed his declaratory statement, alleging settlement on October 22, 1862, and claiming the land. On the twenty-sixth of December following, the plaintiff Dilla filed his declaratory statement, alleging settlement under the pre-emption laws on the twenty-fifth of March, 1865, and claiming the land. A contest thus arose in the local land-office between these parties as to which was entitled to the land under the pre-emption laws. The register and receiver of the land-office differed in their judgment, the receiver holding that the land should be awarded to Dilla, and the register that it should go to Bohall. The contest was thereupon transferred to the general land-office at Washington, and the commissioner sustained the claim of Dilla, holding that, from the time of his settlement in 1865, until ejected in 1868, he had fully complied with the law; that his absence since then was compulsory, as he was unable to make a residence on the land without being in contempt of the court, under whose judgment he was evicted; that his non-residence was for that reason excusable, and should not be allowed to work against him. But as to Bohall, the commissioner held that he residence on the land had not been continuous since his settlement, but had been interrupted by residence elsewhere for several periods; and that the occupation of tenants during such periods did not satisfy the provisions of the pre-emption laws, which required the continuous personal residence of the pre-emptor; and therefore his claim was rejected. The decision of the commissioner was affirmed on appeal by the acting secretary of the interior. It is upon this ruling, charged to be erroneous, that the defendant relies to maintain his claim for equitable relief. The local state court upon these facts, and others not material to the case, adjudged that the defendant was entitled to the decree prayed; but the supreme court of the state held otherwise, and reversed the judgment; and, as there was no finding as to the value of the rents and profits of the premises, ordered a new trial if the plaintiff so elected. Upon the filing of the remittitur in the lower court, the plaintiff waived his privilege of a new trial, and the court thereupon, on the pleadings and previous findings, gave judgment for the plaintiff, which was affirmed by the supreme court of the state; and this judgment is brought here for review.

W. W. Cope, for plaintiff in error.

Walter Van Dyke, for defendant in error.

FIELD, J.