Bogle v. Magone/Opinion of the Court

The word 'sauce,' as commonly used, designates a condiment, generally but not always of liquid form, eaten as an addition to and together with a dish of food, to give it flavor and make it more palatable, and is not applied to anything which is eaten alone, or with a bit of bread, either for its own sake, only, or to stimulate the appetite for other food to be eaten afterwards. For instance, cheese eaten with bread, or ham or chicken eaten in a sandwich, or anchovies or herrings, caviare, or shreds of salt fish, eaten, whether with or without bread, as an appetizer before a meal, would hardly be called a sauce.

In the dictionary of Webster, referred to at the trial, the primary definition of 'sauce' is accordingly given as 'a mixture or composition to be eaten with food, for improving its relish; a relishing condiment; appetizing addition to the principal material of a dish.' In a later edition, there is given, by way of additional definition, 'Stewed or preserved fruit, eaten with other food as a relish, as apple sauce, cranberry sauce, etc.'

In the tariff act of 1883, the clause relating to 'sauces of all kinds' (unless affected by other clauses in the act, or by commercial usage) may well be held to include all substances, whether solid or liquid, fairly coming within either of these two definitions. But the second definition has no application to the present case.

The three clauses mentioned in argument as possibly applicable to the goods in question are arranged in the act in a natural order, beginning with the most specific and restrictive, and ending with the most general: First, 'anchovies' 'imported in any other form' than 'packed in oil or otherwise,' in small tin boxes, 40 per cent. ad valorem; then, 'all other fish, prepared or preserved,' 'not specially enumerated or provided for in this act,' 25 per cent. ad valorem; and, lastly, 'sauces, of all kinds, not otherwise specially enumerated or provided for in this act,' 35 per cent. ad valorem. 22 Stat. 503, 504. Any article which comes within two or more of these descriptions must therefore be assigned to the earlier one. Homer v. Brown, 1 Wall. 486; Reiche v. Smythe, 13 Wall. 162; Seeberger v. Cahn, 137 U.S. 95, 11 Sup. Ct. 28; Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U.S. 468, 12 Sup. Ct. 55.

At the trial, the plaintiffs introduced evidence that the goods in question were manufactured out of anchovies or bloaters ground up and spiced; were used as food, in a distinct form, or as an appetizer, principally in a sandwich, or sometimes with a cracker, and not as a condiment; and were specifically known as 'anchovy paste' and 'bloater paste;' and that in trade and commerce in 1883, and previously, the word 'sauces' was applied to liquids, only, and not to these pastes.

The circuit court, in directing a verdict for the defendant, ruled, in substance, that as matter of law, and without regard to commercial usage, these articles came within the words 'sauces of all kinds' in the tariff act. We are unable to concur in that view, or to say, either of our judicial knowledge, or in view of the evidence introduced, that these articles are necessarily 'sauces' of any kind; still less, that this is so clear as to exclude the usual test of commercial designation. Cadwalader v. Zeh, 151 U.S. 171, 176, 14 Sup. Ct. 288.

On the contrary, we are of opinion that the evidence of the nature and the use of these articles, and of their commercial designation, would have warranted a jury in finding that they were not 'sauces,' and were 'fish, preserved or prepared.' If that fact were proved, it would follow that, as such, the bloater paste, at least, was subject to the duty of only 25 per cent. ad valorem; but a question might arise, which does not appear to have been considered at the trial, whether the anchovy paste was not subject to a duty of 40 per cent. ad valorem, under the earlier and more specific clause of the act, as 'anchovies' 'imported in any other form' than packed, in oil or otherwise, in small tin boxes.

Judgment reversed, and case remanded to the circuit court, with directions to set aside the verdict and to order a new trial.

Mr. Justice JACKSON did not hear the argument, and took no part in the decision of this case.