Bloom v. Illinois/Opinion of the Court

Petitioner was convicted in an Illinois state court of criminal contempt and sentenced to imprisonment for 24 months for willfully petitioning to admit to probate a will falsely prepared and executed after the death of the putative testator. Petitioner made a timely demand for jury trial which was refused. Since in Duncan v. State of Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, the Constitution was held to guarantee the right to jury trial in serious criminal cases in state courts, we must now decide whether it also guarantees the right to jury trial for a criminal contempt punished by a two-year prison term.

Whether federal and state courts may try criminal contempt cases without a jury has been a recurring question in this Court. Article III, § 2, of the Constitution provides that '(t)he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury * *  * .' The Sixth Amendment states that '(i)n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury *  *  * .' The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid both the Federal Government and the States from depriving any person of 'life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.' Notwithstanding these provisions, until United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 84 S.Ct. 984, 12 L.Ed.2d 23, rehearing denied, 377 U.S. 973, 84 S.Ct. 1642, 12 L.Ed.2d 742 (1964), the Court consistently upheld the constitutional power of the state and federal courts to punish any criminal contempt without a jury trial. Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31, 36-39, 10 S.Ct. 424, 426-427, 33 L.Ed. 801 (1890); I.C.C. v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 488-489, 14 S.Ct. 1125, 1137-1138, 38 L.Ed. 1047 (1894); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594-596, 15 S.Ct. 900, 910-911, 39 L.Ed. 1092 (1895); Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610-611, 34 S.Ct. 693, 695-696, 58 L.Ed. 1115 (1914); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183-187, 78 S.Ct. 632, 642-645, 2 L.Ed.2d 672 (1958). These cases construed the Due Process Clause and the otherwise inclusive language of Article III and the Sixth Amendment as permitting summary trials in contempt cases because at common law contempt was tried without a jury and because the power of courts to punish for contempt without the intervention of any other agency was considered essential to the proper and effective functioning of the courts and to the administration of justice.

United States v. Barnett, supra, signaled a possible change of view. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified to this Court the question whether there was a right to jury trial in an impending contempt proceeding. Following prior cases, a five-man majority held that there was no constitutional right to jury trial in all contempt cases. Criminal contempt, intrinsically and aside from the particular penalty imposed, was not deemed a serious offense requiring the protection of the constitutional guarantees of the right to jury trial. However, the Court put aside as not raised in the certification or firmly settled by prior cases, the issue whether a severe punishment would itself trigger the right to jury trial and indicated, without explication, that some members of the Court were of the view that the Constitution limited the punishment which could be imposed where the contempt was tried without a jury. 376 U.S., at 694-695 and n. 12, 84 S.Ct. at 991-992.

Two years later, in Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 86 S.Ct. 1523, 16 L.Ed.2d 629 (1966), which involved a prison term of six months for contempt of a federal court, the Court rejected the claim that the Constitution guaranteed a right to jury trial in all criminal contempt cases. Contempt did not 'of itself' warrant treatment as other than a petty offense; the six months' punishment imposed permitted dealing with the case as a prosecution for 'a petty offense, which under our decisions does not require a jury trial.' 384 U.S. 373, 379-380, 86 S.Ct. 1523, 1525 (1966). See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 88 S.Ct. 1301, 32 L.Ed. 223 (1888); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 24 S.Ct. 826, 49 L.Ed. 99 (1904); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 57 S.Ct. 660, 81 L.Ed. 843 (1937). It was not necessary in Cheff to consider whether the constitutional guarantees of the right to jury trial applied to a prosecution for a serious contempt. Now, however, because of our holding in Duncan v. State of Louisiana, supra, that the right to jury trial extends to the States, and because of Bloom's demand for a jury in this case, we must once again confront the broad rule that all criminal contempts can be constitutionally tried without a jury. Barnett presaged a re-examination of this doctrine at some later time; that time has now arrived.

In proceeding with this task, we are acutely aware of the responsibility we assume in entertaining challenges to a constitutional principle which is firmly entrenched and which has behind it weighty and ancient authority. Our deliberations have convinced us, however, that serious contempts are so nearly like other serious crimes that they are subject to the jury trial provisions of the Constitution, now binding on the States, and that the traditional rule is constitutionally infirm insofar as it permits other than petty contempts to be tried without honoring a demand for a jury trial. We accept the judgment of Barnett and Cheff that criminal contempt is a petty offense unless the punishment makes it a serious one; but, in our view, dispensing with the jury in the trial of contempts subjected to severe punishment represents an unacceptable construction of the Constitution, 'an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the (courts) which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct.' Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533, 48 S.Ct. 404, 408, 72 L.Ed. 681 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The rule of our prior cases has strong, though sharply challenged, historical support; but neither this circumstance nor the considerations of necessity and efficiency normally offered in defense of the established rule, justify denying a jury trial in serious criminal contempt cases. The Constitution guarantees the right to jury trial in state court prosecutions for contempt just as it does for other crimes.

Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense; it is a violation of the law, a public wrong which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. In the words of Mr. Justice Holmes:

'These contempts are infractions of the law, visited with     punishment as such. If such acts are not criminal, we are in     error as to the most fundamental characteristic of crimes as      that word has been understood in English speech.' Gompers v.      United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610, 34 S.Ct. 693, 695, 58 L.Ed. 1115 (1914).

Criminally contemptuous conduct may violate other provisions of the criminal law; but even when this is not the case convictions for criminal contempt are indistinguishable from ordinary criminal convictions, for their impact on the individual defendant is the same. Indeed, the role of criminal contempt and that of many ordinary criminal laws seem identical-protection of the institutions of our government and enforcement of their mandates.

Given that criminal contempt is a crime in every fundamental respect, the question is whether it is a crime to which the jury trial provisions of the Constitution apply. We hold that it is, primarily because in terms of those considerations which make the right to jury trial fundamental in criminal cases, there is no substantial difference between serious contempts and other serious crimes. Indeed, in contempt cases an even more compelling argument can be made for providing a right to jury trial as a protection against the arbitrary exercise of official power. Contemptuous conduct, though a public wrong, often strikes at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's temperament. Even when the contempt is not a direct insult to the court or the judge, it frequently represents a rejection of judicial authority, or an interference with the judicial process or with the duties of officers of the court.

The court has long recognized the potential for abuse in exercising the summary power to imprison for contempt-it is an 'arbitrary' power which is 'liable to abuse.' Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313, 9 S.Ct. 77, 82, 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888). '(I)ts exercise is a delicate one, and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions.' Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539, 45 S.Ct. 390, 396, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925).

These apprehensions about the unbridled power to punish summarily for contempt are reflected in the march of events in both Congress and the courts since our Constitution was adopted. The federal courts were established by the Judiciary Act of 1789; § 17 of the Act provided that those courts 'shall have power to * *  * punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same *  *  * .' 1 Stat. 83. See Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 227-228, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821). This open-ended authority to deal with contempt, limited only as to mode of punishment, proved unsatisfactory to Congress. Abuses under the 1789 Act culminated in the unsuccessful impeachment proceedings against James Peck, a federal district judge who had imprisoned and disbarred one Lawless for publishing a criticism of one of Peck's opinions in a case which was on appeal. The result was drastic curtailment of the contempt power in the Act of 1831, 4 Stat. 487. Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510-511, 22 L.Ed. 205 (1874); In re Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 275-276, 9 S.Ct. 699, 33 L.Ed. 150 (1889). That Act limited the contempt power to misbehavior in the presence of the court or so near thereto as to obstruct justice; misbehavior of court officers in their official transactions; and disobedience of or resistance to the lawful writ, process, order, or decree of the court. This major revision of the contempt power in the federal sphere, which 'narrowly confined' and 'substantially curtailed' the authority to punish contempt summarily, Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 47-48, 61 S.Ct. 810, 815-816, 85 L.Ed. 1172 (1941), has continued to the present day as the basis for the general power to punish criminal contempt. 62 Stat. 701, 18 U.S.C. § 401.

The courts also proved sensitive to the potential for abuse which resides in the summary power to punish contempt. Before the 19th century was out, a distinction had been carefully drawn between contempts occurring within the view of the court, for which a hearing and formal presentation of evidence were dispensed with, and all other contempts where more normal adversary procedures were required. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888); In re Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 9 S.Ct. 699, 33 L.Ed. 150 (1889). Later, the Court could say 'it is certain that in proceedings for criminal contempt the defendant is presumed to be innocent, he must be proved to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and cannot be compelled to testify against himself.' Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444, 31 S.Ct. 492, 499, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911). See Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & O.R. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 66, 45 S.Ct. 18, 20, 69 L.Ed. 162 (1924). Chief Justice Taft speaking for a unanimous Court in Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537, 45 S.Ct. 390, 395, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925), said:

'Due process of law, therefore, in the prosecution of     contempt, except of that committed in open court, requires      that the accused should be advised of the charges and have a      reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or      explanation. We think this includes the assistance of     counsel, if requested, and the right to call witnesses to      give testimony, relevant either to the issue of complete      exculpation or in extenuation of the offense and in      mitigation of the panalty to be imposed.'

Cf. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 440, 52 S.Ct. 252, 255, 76 L.Ed. 375 (1932). It has also been recognized that the defendant in criminal contempt proceedings is entitled to a public trial before an unbiased judge, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 75 S.Ct. 11, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954); see Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964); but cf. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038, 4 L.Ed.2d 989 (1960). In the federal system many of the procedural protections available to criminal contemnors are set forth in Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 42.

Judicial concern has not been limited to procedure. In Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 38 S.Ct. 560, 62 L.Ed. 1186 (1918), the Court endorsed a broad construction of the language of the Act of 1831 permitting summary trial of contempts 'so near (to the court) as to obstruct the administration of justice.' It required only that the conduct have a 'tendency to prevent and obstruct the discharge of judicial duty * *  * .' Id., at 419, 38 S.Ct. at 564. See Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 277, 44 S.Ct. 103, 106, 68 L.Ed. 293 (1923). This view proved aberrational and was overruled in Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 47-52, 61 S.Ct. 810, 815-817, 85 L.Ed. 1172 (1941), which narrowly limited the conduct proscribed by the 1831 Act to 'misbehavior in the vicinity of the court disrupting to quiet and order or actually interrupting the court in the conduct of its business.' Id., at 52, 61 S.Ct., at 1817. Cf. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, supra, 247 U.S. at 422, 38 S.Ct. at 565 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The congressional purpose to fence in the power of the federal courts to punish contempt summarily was further implemented in Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 407-408, 76 S.Ct. 456, 460-461, 100 L.Ed. 474 (1956). A lawyer, the Court held, 'is not the kind of 'officer' who can be summarily tried for contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401(2).' In another development, the First Amendment was invoked to ban punishment for a broad category of arguably contemptuous out-of-court conduct. Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192 (1941); Pennekamp v. State of Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 66 S.Ct. 1029, 90 L.Ed. 1295 (1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 91 L.Ed. 1546 (1947). Finally, over the years in the federal system there has been a recurring necessity to set aside punishments for criminal contempt as either unauthorized by statute or too harsh. E.g., Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 22 L.Ed. 205 (1874); United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947); Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 78 S.Ct. 128, 2 L.Ed.2d 95 (1957).

This course of events demonstrates the unwisdom of vesting the judiciary with completely untrammeled power to punish contempt, and makes clear the need for effective safeguards against that power's abuse. Prosecutions for contempt play a significant role in the proper functioning of our judicial system; but despite the important values which the contempt power protects, courts and legislatures have gradually eroded the power of judges to try contempts of their own authority. In modern times, procedures in criminal contempt cases have come to mirror those used in ordinary criminal cases. Our experience teaches that convictions for criminal contempt, not infrequently resulting in extremely serious penalties, see United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 751, 84 S.Ct. 984, 1018 (Goldberg, J., dissenting), are indistinguishable from those obtained under ordinary criminal laws. If the right to jury trial is a fundamental matter in other criminal cases, which we think it is, it must also be extended to criminal contempt cases.

Nor are there compelling reasons for a contrary result. As we read the earlier cases in this Court upholding the power to try contempts without a jury, it was not doubted that the summary power was subject to abuse or that the right to jury trial would be an effective check. Rather, it seems to have been thought that summary power was necessary to preserve the dignity, independence, and effectiveness of the judicial process-'To submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal, be it a jury or another court, would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency.' In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 595, 15 S.Ct. 900, 910, 39 L.Ed. 1092 (1895). It is at this point that we do not agree: in our judgment, when serious punishment for contempt is contemplated, rejecting a demand for jury trial cannot be squared with the Constitution or justified by considerations of efficiency or the desirability of vindicating the authority of the court.

We cannot say that the need to further respect for judges and courts is entitled to more consideration than the interest of the individual not to be subjected to serious criminal punishment without the benefit of all the procedural protections worked out carefully over the years and deemed fundamental to our system of justice. Genuine respect, which alone can lend true dignity to our judicial establishment, will be engendered, not by the fear of unlimited authority, but by the firm administration of the law through those institutionalized procedures which have been worked out over the centuries.

We place little credence in the notion that the independence of the judiciary hangs on the power to try contempts summarily and are not persuaded that the additional time and expense possibly involved in submitting serious contempts to juries will seriously handicap the effective functioning of the courts. We do not deny that serious punishment must sometimes be imposed for contempt, but we reject the contention that such punishment must be imposed without the right to jury trial. The goals of dispatch, economy, and efficiency are important, but they are amply served by preserving the power to commit for civil contempt and by recognizing that many contempts are not serious crimes but petty offenses not within the jury trial provisions of the Constitution. When a serious contempt is at issue, considerations of efficiency must give way to the more fundamental interest of ensuring the even-handed exercise of judicial power. In isolated instances recalcitrant or irrational juries may acquit rather than apply the law to the case before them. Our system has wrestled with this problem for hundreds of years, however, and important safeguards have been devised to minimize miscarriages of justice through the malfunctioning of the jury system. Perhaps to some extent we sacrifice efficiency, expedition, and economy, but the choice in favor of jury trial has been made, and retained, in the Constitution. We see no sound reason in logic or policy not to apply it in the area of criminal contempt.

Some special mention of contempts in the presence of the judge is warranted. Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that '(a) criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court.' This rule reflects the common-law rule which is widely if not uniformly followed in the States. Although Rule 42(a) is based in part on the premise that it is not necessary specially to present the facts of a contempt which occurred in the very presence of the judge, it also rests on the need to maintain order and a deliberative atmosphere in the courtroom. The power of a judge to quell disturbance cannot attend upon the impaneling of a jury. There is, therefore, a strong temptation to make exception to the rule we establish today for disorders in the courtroom. We are convinced, however, that no special rule is needed. It is old law that the guarantees of jury trial found in Article III and the Sixth Amendment do not apply to petty offenses. Only today we have reaffirmed that position. Duncan v. State of Louisiana, supra, 391 U.S., at 159-162, 88 S.Ct., at 1452-1454, 20 L.Ed.2d 491. By deciding to treat criminal contempt like other crimes insofar as the right to jury trial is concerned, we similarly place it under the rule that petty crimes need not be tried to a jury.

Petitioner Bloom was held in contempt of court for filing a spurious will for probate. At his trial it was established that the putative testator died on July 6, 1964, and that after that date Pauline Owens, a practical nurse for the decedent, engaged Bloom to draw and execute a will in the decedent's name. The will was dated June 21, 1964. Bloom knew the will was false when he presented it for admission in the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County. The State's Attorney of that county filed a complaint charging Bloom with contempt of court. At trial petitioner's timely motion for a jury trial was denied. Petitioner was found guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced to imprisonment for 24 months. On direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, his conviction was affirmed. That court held that neither state law nor the Federal Constitution provided a right to jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings. 35 Ill.2d 255, 220 N.E.2d 475 (1966). We granted certiorari, 386 U.S. 1003, 87 S.Ct. 1346, 18 L.Ed.2d 431 (1967).

Petitioner Bloom contends that the conduct for which he was convicted of criminal contempt constituted the crime of forgery under Ill.Rev.Stat. c. 38, § 17-3. Defendants tried under that statute enjoy a right to jury trial and face a possible sentence of one to 14 years, a fine not to exceed $1,000, or both. Petitioner was not tried under this statute, but rather was convicted of criminal contempt. Under Illinois law no maximum punishment is provided for convictions for criminal contempt. People v. Stollar, 31 Ill.2d 154, 201 N.E.2d 97 (1964). In Duncan we have said that we need not settle 'the exact location of the line between petty offenses and serious crimes' but that 'a crime punishable by two years in prison is * *  * a serious crime and not a petty offense.' 391 U.S., at 161, 162, 88 S.Ct., at 1454. Bloom was sentenced to imprisonment for two years. Our analysis of Barnett, supra, and Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 387 U.S. 373, 86 S.Ct. 1523, 16 L.Ed. 629, makes it clear that criminal contempt is not a crime of the sort that requires the right to jury trial regardless of the penalty involved. Under the rule in Cheff, when the legislature has not expressed a judgment as to the seriousness of an offense by fixing a maximum penalty which may be imposed, we are to look to the penalty actually imposed as the best evidence of the seriousness of the offense. See Duncan, supra, 391 U.S., at 162, n. 35, 88 S.Ct., at 1454. Under this rule it is clear that Bloom was entitled to the right to trial by jury, and it was constitutional error to deny him that right. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

For concurring opinion of Mr. Justice FORTAS, see 88 S.Ct. 1459.