Bindczyck v. Finucane/Dissent Reed

Mr. Justice REED, with whom Mr. Justice BURTON joins, dissenting.

Upon filing of his petition for naturalization, an order and a certificate of naturalization were issued immediately by the Circuit Court of Frederick County, Maryland, on December 2, 1943, to petitioner Bindczyck, a soldier in the United States Army. Nationality Act of 1940, § 324, 54 Stat. 1149, 8 U.S.C.A. § 724. On the next day he disclaimed loyalty to the United States and stated his desire to leave the country after the war.

Seven days after the naturalization and within the same term of the circuit court, the United States filed in the naturalization proceeding a motion to vacate and set aside the order of naturalization on the ground that newly discovered evidence showed Bindczyck swore falsely concerning his loyalty toward the United States and its defense. Bindczyck in open court admitted the charge. Thereupon the Maryland court directed that the order of citizenship be vacated, the certificate of naturalization voided, and the case restored to the pending calendar for immediate hearing. The record shows no further proceedings in Maryland, either by further hearing or by appeal.

On June 15, 1948, while he was in custody for deportation, Bindczyck filed a complaint in the District Court for the District of Columbia praying a declaration that he was a citizen of the United States. This was based on the contention that the order vacating his admission to citizenship was void because it had been issued without compliance with § 338 of the Nationality Act of 1940, set out in note 1 of the Court's opinion, 72 S.Ct. 131.

The Court upholds Bindczyck's contention. By that judgment the Court in a collateral proceeding determines that the vacation by the Maryland court of its order and the cancellation by that court of the certificate of naturalization are void because the proceedings were not taken in accordance with the above-mentioned § 338. That is, a state court with the alien before it has no power so to act, although it had jurisdiction to hear his application and enter an order for his naturalization. § 301.

The Court's judgment, we think, flows from its disregard of a postulate of statutory construction. This important principle is that new legislation is to be construed in the setting of existing law and practice. Since sound methods of statutory interpretation are important in the administration of justice, it seems worthwhile to state the reasons for disagreement. A dissent may help to avoid another and further departure from normal statutory interpretation.

Even the most comprehensive legislation cannot be considered as though it were the entire body of the law. The continuation of courts and practices is assumed. Congress may give concurrent jurisdiction over federal matters to both state and federal courts. Of course, the jurisdiction of federal courts over federal matters may be made exclusive of all other tribunals by Congress. That body may also, we assume, put limits on state court powers concerning federal rights. When Congress grants concurrent jurisdiction over federal matters, however, such a grant of power is to be exercised in accordance with the normal practices and procedure of the respective courts unless specifically or by necessary implication the federal legislation requires such limitation.

We have had provisions for naturalization since March 26, 1790. They have grown in complexity through the years. Under the Act of 1906, as shown by the Court's opinion, the Congress sought to remedy the evils of fraudulent naturalization and to protect the new citizen against cancellation of his certificate in an inconvenient forum or without proper notice. This purpose has been carried out in the present 1940 Act practically by the same words, so far as the sections here involved are concerned. Power over naturalization has remained in both state and federal courts of general jurisdiction.

There is not a suggestion in the acts or in the legislative history that, by the enactment of § 15 of the earlier Act or § 338 of the present Act, the Congress intended to affect the power which state and federal courts have to grant new trials or rehearings or to set aside orders during a term or within such other limited time as statute or practice may prescribe. Section 338 in providing a method for 'revoking and setting aside' the order and 'canceling the certificate' of naturalization refers to the method of overturning a judgment of naturalization after the judicial procedure required for the grant is at an end. Section 338, in our view, covers only those new cases where circumstances call for the Government, in the words of the section 'to institute proceedings in any court specified in subsection (a) of section 301 (54 Stat. 1140) in the judicial district in which the naturalized citizen may reside at the time of bringing suit'. Under subsection (b) of § 338 the defendant is to 'make answer to the petition of the United States'. This language is aimed at new litigation, not at steps in a pending case. Action on judgments during term time is a step in a pending case.

The certificate of naturalization, as evidence of citizenship, is issued when the judge signs the order. 8 CFR (1949 ed.) § 377.1. A successful appeal by the Government from an order of naturalization would result in cancellation of an issued certificate. It is settled law, however, that appeals are allowable from federal and state courts. Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 575, note 3, 580, 46 S.Ct. 425, 426, 428, 70 L.Ed. 738. This conclusion was reached in the face of the arguments there advanced that 'exclusive jurisdiction' was conferred on the trial courts by the Act and that a means of review was granted to the United States by § 15. The reason which led this Court to allow appeals under the Naturalization Act was the same reason that should guide us here, that is, 'A denial of a review in naturalization cases would engraft an exception upon an otherwise universal rule.' 270 U.S. p. 579 (see pp. 578-580), 46 S.Ct. 427, 428.

The ruling in the Tutun case compels a distinction sought to be made in today's opinion. The Court now holds that '§ 338 is the exclusive procedure for canceling citizenship on the score of fraudulent or illegal procurement based on evidence outside the record.' Since Tutun sustained review that would on appeal set aside naturalization orders and cancel certificates on facts of record, the judgment today differentiates that case by making the existence of facts dehors the record, at least where they amount to fraud or illegal procurement, the decisive incident to bar state action on rehearing for newly discovered evidence. We think today's decision departs from the reasoning of the Tutun case and engrafts 'an exception upon an otherwise universal rule.'

The certainty that naturalization may be revoked by appeal determines another point. There is a suggestion in the Court's opinion, not elaborated, that Congress intended to bar state action for rehearing or vacation during term on facts dehors the record because to do otherwise 'would gratuitously abandon the constitutional mandate to establish 'an uniform Rule of Naturalization." To allow procedure to be determined according to the particular court that the alien might utilize would not violate the principle of uniformity. That is the kind of uniformity that the Tutun case approves by impliedly allowing appeals under state procedure.

Interpretation of a statute by government officials charged with its administration carries weight. A practice under that interpretation increases its importance. Apparently the Government avails itself of the local methods of directly attacking a judgment of naturalization within the term, or within limited periods under appropriate rules. The Government, and in this Bindczyck case the Service, thus makes clear its understanding that § 338 does not limit the power of courts over judgments during term time.

When we consider that Congress was concerned with preventing fraud and illegal practices in naturalization, the Court's conclusion does not seem justified. It disregards well-established principles of statutory construction, without furthering the congressional purpose, and puts a useless burden on the Government without any ultimate benefit to the naturalized citizen. Such a formalistic approach to legal problems is not helpful to the administration of justice.

We think the judgment should be affirmed.