Barrett v. Holmes/Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court of Iowa has, by several decisions, construed the five years' Statute of Limitations, which is set up as a defence in this case, to apply to an action brought by one claiming under a tax deed, as well as to one brought by the original owner of the land. Brown v. Painter, 38 Iowa, 456; Laverty v. Sexton, 41 id. 435. And the court so ruled in this case. See Barrett v. Love, 48 id. 103.

By these decisions the Supreme Court of the State has established a rule of property in the State of Iowa which is inding on this and other courts of the United States. Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153; Beauregard v. New Orleans, 18 How. 497; Suydam v. Williamson, 24 id. 427; Nichols v. Levy, 5 Wall. 433; Williams v. Kirtland, 13 id. 306.

So far, therefore, as this point is concerned, it must be considered as settled.

But the court further held that the limitation began to run at the time of the execution and recording of the tax deed, irrespective of the question of adverse possession, so that, if at any time during the period of five years, no matter how near its close, the former owner takes actual possession, and holds until the expiration of the five years from the date of the execution and recording of the tax deed, the right of the purchaser at the tax sale is completely barred.

The plaintiff in error claims that when thus construed the statute is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States: first, because it deprives the purchaser at a tax sale of his property without due process of law; and, second, because it impairs the obligation of the contract of purchase, of which the statute in force when it was made forms a part. Art. 5, Amendments to the Constitution, and sect. 10, art. 1.

The argument of the plaintiff in error is that the purchaser at a tax sale cannot bring suit to recover the land purchased by him until the former owner, or some one else, takes adverse possession; and as no such possession may be taken until just before, or even after, the expiration of the five years, his right to the land is cut off without giving him his day in court, and the obligation of the contract contained in his deed, and the law under which it was executed, is impaired.

We do not think that the premise from which this conclusion is drawn is true in point of fact, nor, if it were, that the conclusion would follow.

The Iowa statute (Rev. 3601; Code, 3273) declares that 'an action to determine and quiet the title of real property may be brought by any one having or claiming an interest therein, whether in or out of possession of the same, against any person claiming title thereto though not in possession.'

The Supreme Court of Iowa, in this case, held that the bringing of an action under the section first quoted would be an action for the recovery of the property, and would interrupt the running of the five years' Statute of Limitation. Barrett v. Love, 48 Iowa, 103.

The fact, therefore, that the lands are unoccupied during the five years succeeding the execution and recording of the tax deed is no obstacle to the bringing of a suit which would interrupt the running of the limitation.

But even if no such action could be brought, we think that the purchaser at a tax sale is not deprived of any of the rights conferred on him by his purchase and deed, by reason of the construction put upon the five years' Statute of Limitation.

The right of the legislature to prescribe what shall be the effect of a tax sale and deed cannot be questioned. The legislature of Iowa, in the enactments brought to our notice in this case, has exercised that right with great liberality to the purchaser at the tax sale. It has made his deed presumptive evidence of certain facts and conclusive evidence of others; it has declared that it shall vest in him all the estate of the former owner and of the county and State in the premises. But it has also declared, in effect, that the deed shall not support an action for the recovery of the land unless the suit therefor is brought within five years after the treasurer's deed is executed and recorded. When, therefore, the purchaser at a tax sale receives the treasurer's deed, he takes it with all the advantages and disadvantages incident thereto. He knows precisely its effect, and what he must do to protect his title under it, for all this is plainly written in the law. If there should turn out to be an insuperable obstacle to his establishing his title to unoccupied lands, he cannot complain, for the whole subject was under the legislative control, the rules affecting his title were proclaimed in advance, and he bought with his eyes open. He took the risk of being able to make his deed effectual under the rule prescribed by the legislature. He gets all he bargained for. So that when the Statute of Limitation cuts him off, he having, as he imagined, been unable to bring his suit for want of a party in adverse possession, he has been deprived of no right which he ever possessed.

The legislature might have declared that the title of the purchaser at the tax sale should be divested without his consent by the repayment to him within a prescribed period, by the former owner, of the amount of his bid, or the tax and the interest and penalty thereon. The right to redeem the title of lands sold for taxes is one commonly reserved, and the right is favored by the policy of the law. Dubois v. Hepburn, 10 Pet. 1; Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464; Gault's Appeal, 33 Pa. St. 94; Rice v. Nelson, 27 Iowa, 148; Schenk v. Peay, 1 Dill. 267; Masterson v. Beasley, 3 Ohio, 301; Jones v. Collins, 16 Wis. 594; Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall. 68. But it would scarcely be contended that such statute deprived the purchaser of his property without due process of law, or impaired the obligation of his contract of purchase.

But under the Iowa law the purchaser at a tax sale, who can find no one in possession against whom to bring his suit, has a plain way to make his title indefeasible, and that is by taking possession himself.

When the section prescribing the effect of the treasurer's deed and that prescribing the five years' limitation are considered together, the policy of the law is plain, and no cause of complaint is left the purchaser at tax sale. The effect of the two sections is this, that the party holding under the tax deed must within five years either himself take actual possession of the property, or within the same period bring a suit to recover possession; and, upon his failure to do either, his action upon his deed shall be barred.

When thus considered, the law violates no contract and deprives the purchaser at the tax sale of no estate or property to which he had a right. He bought subject to a condition, with explicit warning that if he did not comply with it, his deed should become ineffectual to support an action. Failing to perform the condition, he is left without remedy, but also without just ground for complaint.

We see no error in the record.

Judgment affirmed.