Bailey v. United States/Opinion of the Court

'It is understood that the circuit court sustained the     demurrer under the pressure of the strong language of the      opinion in Spofford v. Kirk. We do not think, however, that     the circumstances of the present case bring it within the one      then under consideration, or the principles there laid down. That was a case of the transfer or assignment of a part of a     disputed claim, then in controversy, and it was clearly      within all the mischiefs designed to be remedied by the      statute. Those mischiefs, as laid down in that opinion, and     in the others referred to, are mainly two: (1) The danger      that the rights of the government might be embarrassed by      having to deal with several persons instead of one, and by      the introduction of a party who was a stranger to the      original transaction; (2) that by a transfer of such a claim      against the government to one or more persons not originally      interested in it, the way might be conveniently opened to      such improper influences in prosecuting the claim before the      departments, the courts, or the congress, as desperate cases,      where the reward is contingent on success, so often suggest.'

'But these considerations,' the court proceeded to say, 'as well as a careful examination of the statute, leave no doubt that its sole purpose was to protect the government and not the parties to the assignment.'

These cases show that the statutes in question are not to be interpreted according to the literal acceptation of the words used. They show that there may be assignments or transfers of claims against the government which are not forbidden.

In the case before us no question arises as to the transfer or assignment of a claim against the government. The question is whether payment to one, who has been authorized to receive it, by the power of attorney executed before the allowance of the claim by the act of congress, was good as between the government and the claimant, where, at the time of payment, such power of attorney was unrevoked. If, in respect of transfers or assignments of claims, the purpose of the statute, as ruled in Goodman v. Niblack, was to protect the government, not the claimant in his dealings with the government, it is difficult to perceive upon what ground it could be held that the statutory inhibition upon powers of attorney in advance of the allowance of the claim and the issuing of the warrant, can be used to compel a second payment after the amount thereof has been paid to the person authorized by the claimant to receive it. A mere power of attorney given before the warrant is issued-so long, at least, as it is unexecuted-may undoubtedly be treated by the claimant as absolutely null and void in any contest between him and his attorney in fact. And it may be so regarded by the officers of the government whose duty it is to adjust the claim and issue a warrant for its amount. But if those officers chose to make payment to the person whom the claimant, by formal power of attorney, has accredited to them, as authorized to receive payment, the claimant cannot be permitted to make his own disregard of the statute the basis for impeaching the settlement had with his agent. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the ruling heretofore made-and with which, upon consideration, we are entirely satisfied-that the purpose of congress, by the enactments in question, was to protect the government against frauds upon the part of claimants and those who might become interested with them in the prosecution of claims, whether before congress or the several departments.

The title of the act of 1853 suggests this purpose. It is to prevent frauds upon the treasury. An effectual means to that end was to authorize the officers of the government to disregard any assignment or transfer of a claim, or any power of attorney to collect it, unless made or executed after the allowance of the claim, the ascertainment of the amount due thereon, and the issuing of the warrant for the payment thereof. Other sections of the statute-those forbidding officers of the government and members of congress from prosecuting or becoming interested in claims against the government, and those punishing the bribery or undue influencing of such officers or members-sustain the view that what was in the mind of congress was to protect the government in the matter of claims against it. But if the protection of claimants was at all in the mind of congress when passing the acts of 1846 and 1853, it is quite certain that the courts should not, to the injury of the government, extend that protection to those who elected not to avail themselves of the provisions of those statutes. Here it is not denied that the power of attorney executed in 1869 embraces and was intended to embrace the claims arising out of the decree of 1868, from whatever source the money in satisfaction of it might be derived. Nor is it pretended that such power of attorney had been revoked prior to the adjustment and payment of the claims in question.

It seems to us-looking at the mischiefs intended to be remedied by these statutes and giving the words of congress a reasonable interpretation-that the officers of the treasury were at liberty, as between the government and the claimants, to recognize the unrevoked authority which the latter had given to Godeffroy, without restriction as to time, to receive from any one whom it might concern to pay all sums of money due or to become due and payable on account of the seizure of the vessel Labuna.

The judgment must therefore be affirmed. It is so ordered.