Bachman v. Lawson/Opinion of the Court

'The right to indemnity for an unjust capture, whether     against the captors or the sovereign, whether remediable in      his own courts, or by his own extraordinary interposition and      grants upon private petition, or upon public negotiation, is      a right attached to the ownership of the property itself. * *      * The very ground of the treaty is that the municipal remedy      is inadequate; and that the party has a right to compensation      for illegal captures, by an appeal to the justice of the      government. * *  * The right to compensation, in the eye of      the treaty, was just as perfect, though the remedy was merely      by petition, as the right to compensation for an illegal      conversion of property, in a municipal court of justice. * *      * It recognized an existing right to compensation in the      aggrieved parties, and did not, in the most remote degree,      turn upon the notion of a donation or gratuity. It was     demanded by our government as matter of right, and as such it      was granted by Spain.' Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193, 215-217.

The claim established before the court of commissioners of Alabama claims was manifestly the very claim contemplated by the agreement in suit. It is described in that agreement as a 'claim arising out of the capture of the ship Commonwealth and her cargo by the armed rebel cruiser the Florida.' The agreement bears date only a fortnight before the treaty of Washington was made and concluded, by which it was agreed between the United States and Great Britain that all claims growing out of acts committed by the Alabama and other vessels should be referred to a tribunal of arbitration. The Florida was one of the vessels which were determined by the Geneva award to have put out from British ports through neglect of international duty on the part of Great Britain, and compensation for the wrongs done by which to these defendants and others was included in the sum awarded in favor of the United States. The claim of the defendants was one for which compensation was justly due to them from Great Britain; was demanded by the United States from Great Britain as a matter of right; as such was awarded to be paid and was paid by Great Britain to the United States, in accordan e with the provisions of the treaty between the two nations, and with the determination of the tribunal of arbitration created by that treaty; and was paid by the United States to the defendants, out of the money received from Great Britain, pursuant to the directions of the act of congress, and to the decision of the court of commissioners established by that act. The defendants were the original owners of the claim, and the money was granted and paid by the United States to them as such. The money so demanded and received by the United States from Great Britain, and paid by the United States to the defendants, was money collected on the claim described in the agreement. Comegys v. Vasse, supra; Phelps v. McDonald, 99 U.S. 298; Leonard v. Nye, 125 Mass. 455.

The other points relied on in support of the writ of error, so far as they present any foderal question, are based upon the following provisions of the act of 1874:

'Sec. 18. In case any judgment is rendered by said court for     indemnity for any loss or claim hereinbefore mentioned      against the United States, at the time of the giving of the      judgment the court shall, upon motion of the attorney or      counsel for the claimant, allow, out of the amount thereby      awarded, such reasonable counsel and attorney fees, to the      counsel and attorney employed by the claimant or claimants      respectively, as the court shall determine is just and reasonable, as compensation for the      services rendered the claimant in prosecuting such claims,      which allowance shall be entered as part of the judgment in      such case, and shall be made specifically payable as a part      of said judgment for indemnification to the attorney or      counsel, or both, to whom the same shall be adjudged; and a      warrant shall issue from the treasury in favor of the person      to whom such allowance shall be made, respectively, which      shall be in full compensation to the counsel or attorney for      prosecuting such claims and all other liens upon, or      assignments, sales, transfers, either absolute or      conditional, for services rendered or to be rendered about      any claim or part or parcel thereof provided for in this      bill, heretofore or hereafter made or done before such      judgment is awarded and the warrant issued therefor, shall be      absolutely null and void and of none effect.' 18 St. 249.

It was argued that the act, by prescribing a mode of proceeding for collecting the claim which required the services of attorneys at law, rendered the agreement in question inoperative, because the plamtiffs, not being such attorneys, were incapable of performing it. But the power of attorney executed at the same time as the agreement, and referred to therein, authorized the plaintiffs to use all such lawful means and proceedings, and to employ such attorneys, as they might think fit, for the prosecution of the claim. It was further contended that the section above quoted rendered illegal and void all agreements, made before judgment, to pay compensation for services about any such claim. But the prohibition is clearly limited to liens, sales, or assignments, which create a right of property in the claim itself, and does not extend to a mere personal agreement to pay as compensation for such services a sum of money equal to a certain proportion of the amount which may be recovered.

The other points made in argument present no federal question, and therefore afford no ground upon which this court can revise the judgment of the state court. Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590.

Judgment affirmed.