Attorney General v. Federal Street Meeting-House/Opinion of the Court

The writ of error in this case suggests, as a foundation for the jurisdiction of this court, 'that there was drawn in question the validity of a statute of said Commonwealth, to wit, an act of the legislature, passed the 15th day of June, 1805, entitled 'An act declaring and confirming the incorporation of the proprietors of the meeting-house in Federal street,' in the town of Boston, being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and the decision of the court was in favor of the validity of said statute.'

Is this suggestion of the writ supported by the record, either by direct averment, or by any necessary intendment?

We think it is not.

1. The decree of the court is, simply, that the bill be dismissed without any reasons alleged for such dismissal.

2. The bill itself raises no such issue; it refers to the act in question, only as conferring the privilege of a corporation on the defendant. It does not aver that the defendants pretend to have title to the property in question by virtue thereof, and challenge its validity.

The answer alleges that respondents were incorporated by the act of 1805, and that, 'under it, they are the true and sole owners of the premises, and that said act was passed on the application and petition of parties who, prior thereto, were owners of pews, or tenants in common of the land and the house thereon.' It is not alleged that the act proprio vigore divested the plaintiff's title and vested it in the corporation, but that the title was vested in the corporation at the request of the owners.

The only questions, therefore, which could arise on these pleadings were, whether the persons who obtained the act of incorporation were the owners, and whether, after an adverse possession of forty years, a court of equity would interfere to disturb the posession of respondents.

The answer takes issue on the charge of the bill, that Little and his associates had contributed land and money to support a public charity; it averred that, on a proper construction of the original deed of the premises, the meeting-house was not dedicated to a charitable use, but was erected for their common use, and held by them in proportion to the sums severally contributed; and, consequently, if the representatives of these tenants in common had their rights transferred to the corporation, it was only a transfer of their rights by their consent, and for their own convenience-an enabling act, with which the complainants had no concern. The issue, then, was not on the validity of the act, but on the construction of the original deed or agreement of the parties who built the meeting-house. The validity of the act of assembly of Massachusetts was not, therefore, drawn in question directly by any averment of the pleadings by the decree, or by any necessary intendment from other averments in the pleadings, or evidence on the record.

The opinion of the State court to be found in 3 Gray, 1, confirms this conclusion.

The case is, therefore, dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Writ of error dismissed.