Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp./Concurrence Reed

Mr. Justice REED, concurring.

My analysis of this case leads me to concur on grounds stated later without the extensive comment and broad treatment given by the opinion of Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER.

What is there said as to the substantive law to be applied in § 301 actions will be pertinent in cases which are deemed to have been properly brought under that section-that is, where there is set forth the violation of a collective bargaining agreement based on the failure of either the employer or the union to carry out its undertakings with the other. It is appropriate therefore for me to state my views as to the law which will be applied in those actions and in so doing to express my disagreement with the constitutional doubts raised by the opinion of Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER.

Assuming that the purpose of § 301 was to make unions suable as if corporations, with provisions for venue and service, it also gave jurisdiction to federal district courts over certain matters related to interstate commerce and thus within the legislative powers of Congress. Labor Board Cases (National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.), 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893. The Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, is directed primarily to federal regulation of labor relations affecting commerce through the means of collective bargaining. While all contract questions that may arise in § 301 actions are not covered by the federal statute, the Act furnishes some substantive law which will be applied in those cases. It sets forth guiding principles which will bear on contracts made under it, and it also controls the machinery for reaching those agreements. It points out many things the parties may or may not do in commerce, just as other Acts, such as the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq., do. Thus the contracts sued upon in § 301 actions will have been entered into in accordance with federal law; and although federal law does not set forth explicitly just what constitutes a breach, § 301, by granting federal jurisdiction over actions between employers and unions on collective bargaining contracts, does make breaches of them by either of those parties actionable. The fact that unions may make contracts under state law does not bar the Federal Government from legislation in its field. In case of conflict, federal law prevails. It is as true in federal laws as it is in state laws that the power to enact gives power to interpret. Jones v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 273 U.S. 195, at page 200, 47 S.Ct. 338, at page 339, 71 L.Ed. 602.

It may be that in proper litigation under § 301 it will be necessary for federal courts to draw largely on state law for the solution of issues. In such instances state law is relied upon because its application is not contrary to federal policy, but supplements and fulfills it. Board of Com'rs of Jackson County v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351, 60 S.Ct. 285, 288, 84 L.Ed. 313. It has been held that a suit in equity on a federal right in a federal court does not necessarily follow a state statute of limitation. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743. The general rule is that federal interpretation controls a federal act. Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104, 63 S.Ct. 483, 485, 87 L.Ed. 640.

The fact that a considerable amount of state law may be applied in suits under § 301 should not affect the validity of the statute. This Court sustained the jurisdictional grant of § 23, sub. a of the Bankruptcy Act, 44 Stat. 664, 11 U.S.C.A. § 46, sub. a, despite the fact that causes of action brought thereunder were created and governed solely by state law. Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 55 S.Ct. 230, 79 L.Ed. 433; Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 67 S.Ct. 1443, 91 L.Ed. 1718. See also Osborn v. President, Directors and Company of the Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. Ed. 204; and Pacific Railroad Removal Cases (Union Pac. R. Co. v. Myers), 115 U.S. 1, 11, 5 S.Ct. 1113, 1117, 29 L.Ed. 319. Cf. The Federal Tort Claims Act. Since Congress has legislative power over labor matters affecting interstate commerce, it may grant jurisdiction to the federal courts to try incidents of that activity that raise legal issues, and dictate what law should be applied. The application of federal law raises no constitutional problem. If state law is to be applied, it is state law operating at the direction of and by the permission of Congress. State law is, in effect, incorporated by reference. Since the contract entered into through provisions of the Labor Act creates rights over which Congress has legislative authority, a breach of the contract is likewise within its power. Congress by § 301 has manifested its purpose to vest jurisdiction over breaches, to a certain extent, in the federal courts. Whether the rules of substantive law applied by the federal courts are derived from federal or state sources is immaterial. The rules are truly federal, not state. The cause of action for breach of contract is thus a cause of action arising under federal law, the source of federal judicial power under Art. III of the Constitution.

From the recognition of the power of Congress to regulate matters affecting commerce in Houston, East & West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States (The Shreveport Doctrine), 1914, 234 U.S. 342, 351, 34 S.Ct. 833, 836, 58 L.Ed. 1341, to Labor Board Cases, 1937, 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, questions as to the power of Congress over local incidents of national commerce plagued advocates of legal changes with doubts as to the constitutional power of Congress to regulate labor relations effectually. With the full recognition of the integration of the local with the national, the power to use national authority in commerce, when needed, was established. I see no occasion, at this late date, to allow the fog of another day to obscure the national interest in these problems-this time by reason of Article III of the Constitution. Cf. subdivison 2 of Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER's opinion.

The reason, I think, that this union cannot recover from the employer in this suit under § 301 is that the claim for wages for the employees arises from separate hiring contracts between the employer and each employee. The union does not undertake to do work for the employer or even to furnish workers. The duty, if any there be, to pay wages to an employee arises from the individual contract between the employer and employee, not from the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore there is set out no violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organization as is required to confer jurisdiction under § 301. The facts show an alleged violation of a contract between an employer and an employee-a situation that is not covered by the statute.

The interpretation contained in the preceding paragraph conforms to the words of the section and avoids suggesting constitutional limitations that would cripple the creation of a national system for the enforcement of statutes concerning labor relations.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK concurs, dissenting.