Alpha Portland Cement Company v. Massachusetts/Opinion of the Court

Plaintiff in error claims that the commonwealth illegally exacted of it $800.45 as an excise tax for the year 1921, and $567.57 plus $22.97 interest for 1922. The court below upheld the tax and definitely ruled that it was not repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment or the commerce clause of the federal Constitution (article 1, § 8, cl. 3). 244 Mass. 530, 139 N. E. 158; 248 Mass. 156, 142 N. E. 762. With negligible exceptions the assessments followed the Corporation Tax Law (Gen. Acts 1919, c. 355), now codified in Gen. Laws, c. 63. Chapters 361 and 493, Gen. Acts 1921, are subsidiary and demand no particular notice. Record No. 327 discloses how the assessments were calculated; also the essential facts hereinafter stated. The opinion in No. 103 discusses the fundamental questions of law; the later one is supplementary and explanatory.

The statute (G. L. Mass. c. 63, § 39) provides that 'every foreign corporation shall pay annually, with respect to the carrying on or doing of business by it within the commonwealth, an excise equal to the sum of * *  * five dollars per thousand upon the value of the corporate excess employed by it within the commonwealth' and 'two and one-half per cent. of that part of its net income * *  * which is derived from business carried on within the commonwealth:' Provided that the total tax shall be not less than an amount equal to one-twentieth of 1 per cent. of such proportion of the fair cash value of its capital stock as its assets employed within the state shall bear to the total assets. Annual returns, and additional information when demanded, must be filed with the commissioner. He is empowered to determine, under prescribed rules, the net portion of income from business within the state; but if dissatisfied any corporation may file 'a statement in such detail as the commissioner shall require, showing the amount of its annual net income derived from business carried on within the commonwealth.' Section 42. Credit for 5 per cent. of dividends paid to inhabitants of the state is authorized. Pertinent portions of the general statute (G. L. Mass. c. 63) are in the margin.

We accept the following statements in the opinion below:

'The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws of     New Jersey. Its business is the manufacture and sale of     cement. Its principal office is at Easton, Pa. Its mills are     located in several other states outside of Massachusetts,      from which shipments are made to various parts of the United      States and to foreign countries. It maintains an office in     Boston in charge of a district sales manager, with a clerk,      where its correspondence and other natural business      activities in connection with the receipt of orders and      shipments of goods for the New England states are conducted. The office is used as headquarters for travelling salesmen, who     solicit orders in Massachusetts and the other New England      states. Orders so taken are transmitted at the Boston office     by mail to the principal office at Easton, Pa., where      exclusively they are passed upon, and if accepted, the goods      are shipped and invoices sent directly to the customer. Remittances usually are made to the petitioner at Easton,     though in exceptional instances prepayments or collections      are made by the salesmen and immediately transmitted to      Easton. No samples or other merchandise are kept in this     commonwealth.

The only property of the petitioner in Massachusetts is its     office furniture, valued at $573. It maintains no bank     account here, its salaries and office rent being paid from      its principal office. Incidental expenses are paid from an     account not exceeding $1,000 kept by the district sales      manager in his own name. No corporate books, records, or     meetings are in Massachusetts. There is no controversy as to     the facts, valuations or computation of the tax. The issues     between the parties relate solely to the correct      interpretation of our corporate tax law as to foreign      corporations and to the constitutionality of that law in its application to the petitioner. * *  * It is rightly      conceded by the Attorney General that the petitioner was      engaged in this commonwealth exclusively in interstate      commerce.'

Having ascertained the necessary items, the comptroller made the calculations indicated below. The corporation's total net income returned for federal taxation, after allowances, amounted to $707,577.98; $7,602,090.21 (although not quite accurate) was treated as the total value of intangible assets.

Amount of Tax Measured by Net Income.

Average value of tangible property in Massachusetts, $573. Divide this by average value all tangible property $16,992,355.22; multiply resulting fraction by $235,859.33 (one-third of $707,577.98, supra)........................... equals. $ 8. Wages, salaries, etc., assignable to Massachusetts, $11,493.38. Divide this by amount of all wages, salaries, etc., $1,650,614.73: multiply resulting fraction by $235,859. (one-third of $707,577.98, supra)........................................ equals. 1,642. Gross receipts assignable to Massachusetts, $343,204.60. Divide this by gross receipts from all business, $10,717,546.43; multiply resulting fraction by $235,859. (one-third of$707,577.98, supra).............. equals. 7,552.     - Net income............................................  $9,202. 2 1/2 per cent. of $9,202.53. $230.    Less 5 per cent. of dividends paid Massachusetts inhabitants................................. 42. -- Total according to income............................... $187.

Amount of Tax Measured by Corporate Excess.

Amount of Tax Measured by Corporate Excess.

Income assigned to Massachusetts, as above shown $9,202.53. Divide this by $707,577.98 (entire apportionable net income);     multiply resulting fraction by $7,602,090.21 (used for total      intangible assets). This yields $98,827.17, which was taken     as the value of intangible assets assignable to      Massachusetts. The tangible assets, $573, were added and     $99,400 became the total accepted value of assets assignable      to the state.

Cash value of the company's capital stock was fixed at     $16,352,162; all assets, $21,406,098. Divide $99,400 by $21,406,098; multiply resulting fraction by $16,352,162; the     result is $75,932.08-the 'corporate excess.' Five dollars per      thousand upon this is $379.66.

Total assessment for 1922 ($187.91 plus $379.66), $567.57.

In the course of its opinion the court below said:

'This tax law, placing as it does both domestic and foreign     corporations on common ground as to taxation except so far as      essential differences require different treatment in details,      follows the policy established in this commonwealth for many      years of levying an excise instead of a property tax on      corporate franchises and corporate transaction of business. Eaton, Crane & Pike Co. v. Commonwealth, 237 Mass. 523.

'The general scheme of this tax law is that an excise is     levied on both domestic and foreign business corporations      doing business in this commonwealth. Real estate and     machinery used in manufacture by such corporations alone are      subject to a local property tax in the city or town where      situated. All other personal property, whether tangible or     intangible, is exempt from direct or local taxation. The     amount of the excise tax is measured as to a foreign      corporation (section 39) by the sum of 'an amount equal to      five dollars per thousand upon the value of the corporate      excess employed by it within the commonwealth,' and 'an      amount equal to 2 1/2 per cent. of that part of its net     income, as defined in section thirty and in this section,      which is derived from business carried on within this      commonwealth,' with a further provision that a minimum tax of      not less than one-twentieth of 1 per cent. of such proportion     of the fair cash value of its shares of capital stock as its      assets employed in business in this commonwealth bear to its      total assets employed in business. * *  * 'The statute is an attempt to measure the excise on   foreign corporations solely by the property and net   income fairly attributable to the business done within   this commonwealth. This excise tax is in place of any  other tax on personal property within the commonwealth   from which, except as to machinery used in manufacture   or in supplying and distributing water, foreign   corporations (and also domestic corporations) are   expressly exempted by G. L. c. 59, § 5, cl. 16. * *  *

'The present tax act imposes the excise with respect to the     carrying on of business by foreign corporations within the      commonwealth. It is an excise for the privilege of having a     place of business under the protection of our laws and with      the financial, commercial and other advantages flowing      therefrom, measured solely by the property and net income      fairly attributable to the business done here by a foreign      corporation. The excise is measured by two factors: (1) The     value of the corporate excess employed within the      commonwealth; and (2) the net income derived from business      within the commonwealth.

'1. The value of the corporate excess employed in the     commonwealth as a factor of the tax is not measured by the      capital stock of the corporation. If it were, it would be     invalid. International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S.     135. It is measured by the value of the property of the     foreign corporation, including its franchise, employed in the      commonwealth, after certain deductions are made. It seems to     us that this factor of the tax stands under the protection of      several decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. * *  *

'It is manifest as matter of common business knowledge that     commerce within this commonwealth yielding to the petitioner      annual gross receipts of $424,982.70 must have involved      credits, bills receivable and obligations to it of      considerable amounts. No contention to the contrary has been urged by the petitioner. Such credits, bills     receivable and obligations might be made subject to direct      taxation within the commonwealth by appropriate legislation      under numerous decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Such credits, bills receivable and obligations constitute a     part of 'the value of the assets' of the petitioner 'employed      in *  *  * [its] business within the commonwealth' used as the      basis of ascertaining 'the corporate excess' of the      petitioner 'employed within the commonwealth' upon which this      factor of the excise is calculated. * *  *

'2. The tax, as measured by the net income from business     transacted in Massachusetts as a factor, is dependent upon      net profits derived solely from interstate commerce. But     there is no discrimination in the statute against interstate      commerce. This net income is used as a measure applicable to     all corporations alike. While not an income tax according to     strict definition, in substance it affects net income alone,      is measured by net income alone, is reasonable in amount and      incidence, and is payable out of net income. * *  *

'The tax considered as a whole with both its main factors is     general in nature and reasonable in amount. The tax upon the     petitioner in substance and effect, so far as concerns the      factor of its corporate excess employed within the      commonwealth, is levied upon its tangible personal property      within the commonwealth, upon the credits due it from debtors      within this commonwealth, and upon the exercise of its      franchise within this commonwealth, and, so far as concerns      the factor of its income, upon the net income derived from      business in this commonwealth after all losses and expenses      have been paid. It is not directed against interstate     commerce or property outside the state but is confined to      business done, property located, capital employed and net      income earned within the commonwealth. It affects interstate commerce indirectly and is not an immediate burden upon it. It affords to the state only a fair and reasonable revenue     for the maintenance of the government, the benefits from the      protection of which the petitioner enjoys. Our conclusion is     that the law thus construed, as applying to a foreign      corporation using a part of its property exclusively for      interstate commerce within the commonwealth, violates no      guaranty established by the Constitution of the United      States. The tax statute, therefore, is interpreted as     applying to a corporation engaged in business within the      commonwealth as is the petitioner.'

'The present tax law imposes an excise on foreign     corporations for the privilege of doing business in      Massachusetts under the protection of its laws and with the      financial, commercial and other advantages flowing therefrom,      measured solely by the property and net income fairly      attributable to the business done within the state. Payment     of the tax is not made a condition precedent to the doing of      business. Collection of the tax is to be made by ordinary     methods. There is no discrimination either against foreign     corporations or against interstate commerce.' 'The taxes      complained of were excises and not property taxes.' 'Being      excises these taxes are not taxes on property or net income,      but taxes measured by property and net income, used in or      derived from business done in Massachusetts.'

See Judson Freight Forwarding Co. v. Commonwealth, 242 Mass. 47, 136 N. E. 375, 27 A. L. R. 1131.

This view of the nature of the exaction was adopted by the court below, and we think it is the correct one. The right to lay taxes on tangible property or on income is not involved; and the inquiry comes to this: May a state impose upon a foreign corporation which transacts only interstate business within her borders an excise tax measured by a combination of two factors-the proportion of the total value of capital shares attributed to transactions therein, and the proportion of net income attributed to such transactions?

Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147, 153, 154, 38 S.C.t. 295, 62 L. Ed. 632, necessitates a negative reply. Under St. 1909, c. 490, pt. 3, § 56, the state demanded an excise of a foreign corporation which transacted therein only interstate business. The excise was laid upon the corporation and the basis of it the same as in the present cause. This court said:

'We think the tax on this company was essentially a tax on     doing an interstate business and therefore repugnant to the      commerce clause.'

Here also the excise was demanded on account of interstate business. A new method for measuring the tax had been prescribed, but that cannot save the exaction. Any such excise burdens interstate commerce and is therefore invalid without regard to measure or amount. Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S. 178, 190, 38 S.C.t. 85, 62 L. Ed. 230; International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 135, 142, 38 S.C.t. 292, 62 L. Ed. 624, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 617; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 259, 43 S.C.t. 83, 67 L. Ed. 237; Texas Transport & Terminal Co. v. New Orleans, 264 U.S. 150, 44 S.C.t. 242, 68 L. Ed. 611, 34 A. L. R. 907.

International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts considered an excise upon a corporation doing both local and interstate business, measured by its capital stock. St. 1909, c. 490; St. 1914, c. 724. Pertinent cases were cited and discussed and the tax declared 'unconstitutional and void as placing a prohibited burden on interstate commerce and laid on property of a foreign corporation located and used beyond the jurisdiction of the state.' Payment as a condition precedent to the doing of any business was not a controlling circumstance. The opinion recognizes the state's right to demand excises of foreign corporations in respect of intrastate business unless the exaction is really as tax on interstate business or property beyond the state. Under this principle certain of the complaining corporations in Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, supra, were properly taxed. Plaintiff in error did no local business, and there was no proper foundation for the excise.

It must now be regarded as settled that a state may not burden interstate commerce or tax property beyond her borders under the guise of regulating or taxing intrastate business. So to burden interstate commerce is prohibited by the commerce clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit taxation of property beyond the state's jurisdiction. The amount demanded is unimportant when there is no legitimate basis for the tax. So far as the language of Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68, 87, 34 S.C.t. 15, 58 L. Ed. 127, tends to support a different view it conflicts with conclusions reached in later opinions and is now definitely disapproved.

Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275, 282, et seq., 39 S.C.t. 276, 63 L. Ed. 602, pointed out the limitations which must be observed when property used in interstate commerce is valued for purposes of taxation by a state. We there declined to follow the rule applied in Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 26, 11 S.C.t. 876, 35 L. Ed. 613, and held that determination of real value with fair accuracy is essential. Many methods adapted to that end have been accepted, but this does not tend to support an excise laid upon a foreign corporation on account of interstate transactions.

The local business of a foreign corporation may support an excise measured in any reasonable way, if neither interstate commerce nor property beyond the state is taxed. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 41 S.C.t. 45, 65 L. Ed. 165, approved such an excise measured by income reasonably attributed to intrastate business; but nothing there said was intended to modify well-established principles. It must be read with the essential facts in mind. Local business was a sufficient basis for the excise, and there was no taxation of interstate commerce or property beyond the state. Of course, the opinion does not support the suggestion that the present statute is free from the fatal objections, to the former one because payment of the tax is no longer a condition precedent to carrying on any business. It cites approvingly St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350, 364, 35 S.C.t. 99, 59, L. Ed. 265, and there this court said:

'So far as the commerce clause is concerned, it seems to us     that the principles upon whose application the present      decision must depend are those set forth in Postal Tel. Cable      Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S. 688, 695, where the court, by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, said: 'It is settled that where by way     of duties laid on the transportation of the subjects of      interstate commerce, or on the receipts derived therefrom, or      on the occupation or business of carrying it on, a tax is      levied by a state on interstate commerce, such taxation      amounts to a regulation of such commerce and cannot be      sustained. But property in a state belonging to a     corporation, whether foreign or domestic, engaged in foreign      or interstate commerce, may be taxed, or a tax may be imposed      on the corporation on account of its property within a state,      and may take the form of a tax for the privilege of      exercising its franchises within the state, if the      ascertainment of the amount is made dependent in fact on the      value of its property situated within the state (the      exaction, therefore, not being susceptible of exceeding the      sum which might be leviable directly thereon), and if payment      be not made a condition precedent to the right to carry on      the business, but its enforcement left to the ordinary means      devised for the collection of taxes."

The excise challenged by plaintiff in error is not materially different from the one declared unconstitutional in Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, and cannot be enforced against a foreign corporation which does nothing but interstate business within the state. The introduction of an extremely complicated method for calculating the amount of the exaction does not change its nature or mitigate the burden.

The decrees of the court below must be reversed and the causes remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS dissents.