Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians/Front Matter

Union Calendar No. 395

104th Congress                                                   REPORT HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

2nd Session                                                    104-749

INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIVITIES OF FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES TOWARD THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS

THIRTEENTH REPORT

by the

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

prepared in conjunction with the

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

together with

additional and dissenting views

August 2, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

--

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1996 26-167 CC

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr., Pennsylvania, Chairman BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York       CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois DAN BURTON, Indiana                HENRY A. WAXMAN, California J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois        TOM LANTOS, California CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland     ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut     MAJOR R. OWENS, New York STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico          EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida       JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, Jr., New        LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York Hampshire                      PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania JOHN M. McHUGH, New York           GARY A. CONDIT, California STEPHEN HORN, California           COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota JOHN L. MICA, Florida              KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida PETER BLUTE, Massachusetts         CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia          THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana         BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS, Michigan RANDY TATE, Washington             ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of DICK CHRYSLER, Michigan             Columbia GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota           JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana            GENE GREEN, Texas WILLIAM J. MARTINI, New Jersey     CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida           CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona           BILL BREWSTER, Oklahoma MICHAEL PATRICK FLANAGAN, Illinois TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire     ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio                     -- MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South   BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont Carolina                       (Independent) ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland SCOTT L. KLUG, Wisconsin James L. Clarke, Staff Director Kevin Sabo, General Counsel Robert Shea, Professional Staff Member Jeff Wilmot, Professional Staff Member Judith McCoy, Chief Clerk Bud Myers, Minority Staff Director --

Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice

WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, Jr., New Hampshire, Chairman ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland   KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico          ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida       TOM LANTOS, California JOHN L. MICA, Florida              LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York PETER BLUTE, Massachusetts         GARY A. CONDIT, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana            BILL BREWSTER, Oklahoma JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona           ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland

Ex Officio

WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr.,           CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois Pennsylvania Robert Charles, Staff Director and Chief Counsel Michele Lang, Special Counsel Sean Littlefield, Professional Staff Member Cherri Branson, Minority Professional Staff Member

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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman CARLOS J. MOORHEAD, California     JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,       PATRICIA SCHROEDER, Colorado Wisconsin                      BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts BILL McCOLLUM, Florida             CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania      HOWARD L. BERMAN, California HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina       RICK BOUCHER, Virginia LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas              JOHN BRYANT, Texas STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico          JACK REED, Rhode Island ELTON GALLEGLY, California         JERROLD NADLER, New York CHARLES T. CANADY, Florida         ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia BOB INGLIS, South Carolina         MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia            XAVIER BECERRA, California STEPHEN E. BUYER, Indiana          ZOE LOFGREN, California MARTIN R. HOKE, Ohio               SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas SONNY BONO, California             MAXINE WATERS, California FRED HEINEMAN, North Carolina ED BRYANT, Tennessee STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MICHAEL PATRICK FLANAGAN, Illinois BOB BARR, Georgia

Alan F. Coffey, Jr., General Counsel/Staff Director Julian Epstein, Minority Staff Director --

Subcommittee on Crime

BILL McCOLLUM, Florida, Chairman STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico          CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York STEPHEN E. BUYER, Indiana          ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina       ZOE LOFGREN, California FRED HEINEMAN, North Carolina      SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas ED BRYANT, Tennessee               MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BOB BARR, Georgia

Paul J. McNulty, Chief Counsel Glenn R. Schmitt, Counsel Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Counsel Tom Diaz, Minority Counsel

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

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House of Representatives, Washington, DC, August 2, 1996.

Hon. Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on        Government Reform and Oversight and on behalf of Mr. Hyde and Mr. McCollum of the Committee on the Judiciary, I herewith submit the committee's thirteenth report to        the 104th Congress. The report is based on a joint investigation conducted by the Judiciary's Subcommittee on Crime, and the Government Reform and Oversight Committee's Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice. Sincerely,

William F. Clinger, Jr., Chairman.

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C O N T E N T S

--                                                                   Page Executive summary................................................. 1               A. A brief summary of the Government's actions toward the Branch Davidians............... 1               B. Findings of the subcommittees.................. 3               C. Recommendations................................ 5   I.     Introduction........................................... 6               A. The need for the Waco inquiry.................. 6               B. Opposition to the inquiry...................... 7               C. The nature of the inquiry...................... 8                           1. Document requests and review....... 8                           2. Investigation and interviews....... 8                           3. Hearings........................... 9                           4. Post-hearing investigation......... 9               D. The structure and scope of the report.......... 9               E. Additional comments............................ 10  II. The ATF investigation.................................. 10               A. The McMahon compliance visit................... 10               B. The investigation continued.................... 10               C. Undercover operation........................... 11               D. Failure to comply with ``sensitive- significant'' procedures.................. 12               E. The affidavit in support of the warrants....... 12               F. Findings concerning the ATF investigation...... 13               G. Recommendations................................ 14 III. Planning and approval of the raid...................... 14               A. Was ``show time'' even necessary?.............. 14               B. Was the violent outburst predictable?.......... 15               C. The predisposition to dynamic entry............ 15                           1. The source of the predisposition... 15                           2. Raid approval and lack of Treasury Department oversight of ATF... 16               D. Failure to comply with ``sensitive- significant'' procedures.................. 17               E. Findings concerning the planning and approval of the raid............................... 17  IV. Raid execution......................................... 17               A. Rodriguez and the ``element of surprise''...... 18                           1. How the Davidians knew the ATF was coming........................ 18                           2. The undercover agent............... 18               B. Who bears the responsibility for the failure of                         the raid?................................. 21               C. Other ways in which the plan selected was bungled................................... 23                           1. Command and control issues......... 23                           2. The lack of a written raid plan.... 24                           3. Lack of depth in the raid plan..... 24                           4. Tactical teams trained together for only 3 days before the raid... 25                           5. True National Guard role only made clear 24 hours prior to                                    theraid....................... 25               D. Service of the warrant......................... 26               E. Unresolved allegations......................... 26                           1. Who shot first?.................... 26                           2. Were shots fired from the helicopters?.................. 27               F. The firing and rehiring of Chojnacki and Sarabyn................................... 28               G. Findings concerning the raid execution......... 28               H. Recommendations................................ 29

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V.    Military involvement in the Government operations at             WACO.................................................. 30               A. The expansion of military assistance to law enforcement............................... 30                           1. The Posse Comitatus Act............ 30                           2. Interstate use of National Guard by                                     Governors..................... 33               B. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms' request for military assistance and the military assistance actually provided..... 35                           1. Overview........................... 35                           2. Concerns of military legal advisors    39 3. Evidence indicating problems in the approval process.............. 40               C. The alleged drug nexus......................... 43                           1. Methamphetamine laboratories....... 43                           2. Evidence purporting to show the alleged drug nexus............ 45                           3. Evidence refuting ATF's claim of a                                     drug nexus.................... 48               D. Post-raid military assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation................... 50                           1. Military equipment and personnel provided...................... 50                           2. Advice/consultation provided by                                     military officers............. 51                           3. Foreign military personnel......... 51               E. Findings concerning military involvement in the Government operations at Waco............. 52                           1. The Posse Comitatus Act was not violated...................... 52               F. Recommendations................................ 53  VI. Negotiations to end the standoff with the Davidians.... 55               A. The conflict between tactical commanders and negotiators............................... 56                           1. The problem with two teams: one negotiating team and a                                    tactical team................. 56               B. Negotiation opportunities lost................. 58                           1. Why the FBI changed negotiators.... 58                           2. Why the FBI didn't allow others to                                     participate in the negotiations.................. 59               C. Lack of appreciation of outside information.... 60                           1. Why the FBI did not rely more on                                     religious advisors to                                     understand Koresh............. 60                           2. Others who contributed information. 62               D. The FBI's failure to follow its own expert's                         recommendations........................... 64                           1. What the FBI's own experts recommended................... 64               E. The decision to dismiss the surrender plan..... 64                           1. ``Kids lined up with their jackets on''.......................... 64                           2. Breakthrough with Koresh's letter.. 65                           3. The breakthrough communicated to                                     Jamar......................... 65                           4. The failure to communicate this breakthrough up the chain of                                    command....................... 65                           5. Evidence that Koresh was writing his interpretation of the Seven Seals................... 66                           6. Why the FBI disregarded the evidence that the Seven Seals were being written............ 66               F. Findings concerning the negotiations to end the standoff with the Davidians............... 66               G. Recommendations................................ 66     VII. The Attorney General's decision to end the stand-off. 67               A. Overview of the plan to end the standoff....... 67               B. The operation plan for April 19, 1993.......... 67                           1. Overview of the written operation plan to end the standoff...... 67                           2. Acceleration provisions of the operations plan............... 68               C. The way the plan actually unfolded............. 68               D. Overview of the use of CS chemical agent....... 69                           1. Introduction....................... 69                           2. Concerns over use of CS............ 70               E. Clinical effects and toxicity of CS............ 70                           1. Common effects of exposure to CS... 70                           2. Toxicity of CS..................... 71               F. Effect of the CS and methylene chloride in the quantities used on April 19th............. 71                           1. Lethality of CS as used at Waco.... 71                           2. Lethality of methylene chloride used with CS at Waco.......... 73                           3. Other possible effects of methylene chloride used with CS at Waco. 74

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G. Analysis of the Attorney General's decision to                        end the standoff on April 19, 1993........ 75                           1. The decision not to storm the residence..................... 75                           2. The reasons asserted for ending the standoff on day 51............ 75                           3. The decision as to how to implement the plan...................... 79               H. Presidential involvement in the events at Waco, TX........................................ 81               I. Findings concerning the plan to end the standoff.................................. 81               J. Recommendations................................ 83    VIII. The fire............................................. 84               A. Summary of the development of the fire......... 84               B. Other theories concerning the development of                         the fire.................................. 85                           1. Whether the methylene chloride in                                     the CS riot control agent used by the FBI caused the fire.... 85                           2. Whether the irritant chemical in                                     the CS riot control agent used by the FBI caused or                                    contributed to the spread of                                     the fire...................... 86                           3. Whether the combat engineering vehicles used by the FBI on                                    April 19 started the fire..... 86               C. Whether the Davidians could have left their residence after the fire began............ 87               D. The FBI's planning for the fire................ 87               E. Findings concerning the fire................... 88

VIEWS

Additional views of Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen...................... 91 Additional views of Hon. William H. Zeliff, Jr.................... 92 The submission by Hon. Steven Schiff, of the Subcommittee on    National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, of    extraneous material provided to him by Hon. Bob Barr, of the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary....... 93 Additional views of Hon. Tom Lantos............................... 97 Dissenting views of Hon. Cardiss Collins, Hon. Karen L. Thurman, Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Hon. Tom Lantos, Hon. Robert E. Wise, Jr., Hon. Major R. Owens, Hon. Edolphus Towns, Hon. Louise M.    Slaughter, Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski, Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Hon. Thomas M. Barrett, Hon. Barbara-Rose Collins, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Hon. James P. Moran, Hon. Carrie P.    Meek, Hon. Chaka Fattah, and Hon. Elijah E. Cummings.......... 98

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