1922 Encyclopædia Britannica/Arabia

ARABIA (see ). The political frontier of Arabia on the N. was indeterminate in 1921 except in so far as the boundaries between Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, as laid down in the

Franco-British Convention of Dec. 23 1920, affect it (see ). The limits of the various independent states of the peninsula, with the exception of the N. boundary of the Aden protectorate, all remain equally undefined. A natural frontier on the N. runs in an irregular curve from Akaba (‛Aqaba) first N.E. and then S.E. to the Persian Gulf, following the fringe of cultivation, which fluctuates according as the nomadic or sedentary population is the stronger. This line excludes Kerak, but leaves the transition area of the Hamad or Syrian Desert within Arabia, to which, both physically and ethnographically, it seems to belong.

Topography.&mdash;Up to 1914, even the best knowledge of Arabia was sketchy, but considerable advance has since been made by the discoveries of recent travellers and as a result, direct or indirect, of war operations. The progress to be noted falls under three main heads: new light has been thrown on the drainage of the peninsula; the positions of a number of places, previously very imperfectly known or only guessed at, have been accurately fixed; and a vast amount of topographic and ethnographic detail has been accumulated.

The compilation of the map of Arabia on the million scale has kept pace with discovery. For this purpose, the route traverse in northern and central Arabia from Huber's Journal, extending over 3,000 m., was replotted on a large scale and formed a groundwork on which to place the more hurried surveys of Wallin, Palgrave, Doughty, etc. All the labours of recent travellers, starting with Leachman (1910), and ending with Bell (1914), were reconsidered from the originals and adjusted with due regard to the proportionate value of each, while the information collected by Col. Lawrence during the World War and the surveys of Philby were incorporated. The work of compilation was undertaken by D. Carruthers in 1914 and in 1921 was still in progress. Provisional sheets covering the northern half of the country had already been issued.



Exploration.&mdash;The journeys of recent travellers have been mostly confined to the central and northern parts of Arabia; but a little new ground has also been broken in the W. and S.W. Some of these explorers, notably Philby, Shakespear and Bell, made route traverses by prismatic compass, checked at intervals by determinations of lat. and long, which greatly enhanced the value of their work (see Map).

Political History.&mdash;Before the World War, the Porte claimed control of Arabia in its entirety as rightfully part of the Ottoman Empire in virtue of the Sultan's authority as caliph. In actual fact, most of the peninsula was under a number of independent native rulers, only some of whom acknowledged Ottoman influence, and that to a limited degree, while others were under British protection. Effectual Turkish jurisdiction was confined, in the Hejaz, to the two Holy Cities, their ports, and the line of railway; in Asir, to one or two small ports and the inland districts of Ibha and Muhail; and, in Yemen, to certain garrisoned towns in the interior and to the ports of Hodeida and Mocha and connecting roads. The Hejaz railway, built nominally for the benefit of pilgrims to Mecca but in reality to increase the Ottoman hold on Arabia, did not fulfil political hopes, partly because it served not more than a third of the territory that the Turks claimed and partly because of the immense difficulties of its maintenance and working; and it brought about little or no economic development in the peninsula.

The World War marked the passing of Turkish control from the whole of Arabia and, at the opening of 1921, there existed the following principal autonomous elements: the kingdom of Hejaz; the emirate of Nejd and El Hasa; the emirate of Jebel Shammar; the principality of Sabia in Asir; the imamate of Yemen; the sheikhdoms of Kuwait, of Bahrien Is., and of El Qatar; the Trucial Oman; the sultanate of Muscat in Oman; the Ka‛aiti and Kathiri sultanates of Hadhramaut; and the autonomous tribes under treaty with Aden. But this list does not exhaust the autonomies, for there are many tribal communities—settled, half-settled and nomadic—which owe allegiance to none but their own local chiefs, such as certain sections of the Anaza and Muntefiq in the N. and the Zaranik and Yam in the S. The parcelling of the peninsula among so many separate communities is largely the result of peculiar geographical conditions which hardly admit of homogeneous settled life except in certain favoured districts, or in oases or wadis; and it is only by virtue of some peculiar source of wealth, some common spiritual ideal or some external support that larger territorial dominions have been established.

The Hejaz.&mdash;War with Turkey entailed on Great Britain and her Allies certain dangers in Arabia owing to the efforts made by the Central Powers, through the Porte, to arouse Moslems to a jihad or Holy War. Whether this result followed or not, there was every likelihood that the Turks would try to hinder the free use of the sea route to the East and, if left in control in western Arabia, that Aden and the possessions of the Allies in East Africa and the Farther East would be dangerously accessible to the enemy. Great Britain therefore turned to the sherif of Mecca (Husein Ibn ‛Ali), believing that the metropolitan position of the Holy Cities of Islam and the venerated lineage of the sherif would make very effective his refusal to

countenance a jihad, while if he declared against the Turks, the geographical position of the Hejaz would make the materialization of the other dangers improbable. Sherif Husein was known to desire the emancipation of the Meccan emirate.

Under the Ottoman régime, the Hejaz was a vilayet, with a vali resident at Mecca. Nominally, it included all the area S. of Ma‛an to Lith, and was subject to taxation; but the cities of Mecca and Medina were not only tax free but were in receipt of subsidies from the Ottoman treasury, as were also certain Harb sheikhs who were able to interfere with the passage of pilgrims or with the railway track. The whole vilayet was exempt from service in the Turkish army and successfully resisted an attempt to impose conscription in 1914. The Porte maintained forces in the Hejaz, the normal garrison being about 7,000.

Side by side with this foreign government, existed the authority of the sherif or emir of Mecca, enjoying extra-territorial independence at Mecca and Taif with the right to keep official representatives to watch over his interests at Medina, Jidda and elsewhere. The emir was able, at need, to call out considerable levies of Hejazi and other Bedouins and, by so doing, under semblance of helping the Turks, successive emirs not only made interest with the Porte but inspired it with a wholesome respect and, at the same time, kept in touch with a fighting force which could be used some day for their own ends.

Sherif Husein was nominated to the emirate in 1908, as a man of pacific character, likely to serve the Porte's purpose. In 1910 he took up arms for the Turks against the Asiri revolt under Idrisi. In the same year he extended his influence over a part of the territory of the emir of Nejd in central Arabia. But in 1913 he began to pursue an active anti-Ottoman policy, ostensibly opposing the extension to Mecca of the Hejaz railway and supporting the Harb tribesmen in their resistance to this and other Turkish projects; and he organized the Hejaz tribes acknowledging his authority, with a view to insurrection. He reconciled himself with Idrisi and tried (without success) to get the support of the imam of Yemen in his anti-Ottoman aim; and, in 1915, he sent ‛Abdalla, his second son, to bring about a truce between the emirs of Nejd and J. Shammar.

In the summer of 1915, Sherif Husein declared his desire for a revolt to the Allies, who thereupon agreed to support him with money, munitions and supplies. A long period of inaction followed, however, and it was not until June 1916 that the revolt actually broke out. After the loss of Jidda, Mecca and Taif by the Turks, Husein proclaimed himself independent of Ottoman rule June 5 1916. To explain his attitude to the Moslem world, he issued a proclamation (Aug. 1916) setting out a number of indictments against the Committee of Union and Progress; and, finding that the Ottoman Government was unable to spare any large force to oppose his aims, he was formally proclaimed &ldquo;Sultan of the Arabs&rdquo; in Oct., a large number of chiefs assembling in Mecca to support him. He relinquished this title for that of &ldquo;King of the Hejaz&rdquo; in Dec., and was so recognized by the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy. In 1917, Wejh and Akaba being lost by the Turks, the newly established kingdom was able to maintain its separate existence, and the year 1918 witnessed further satisfactory developments. In spite of the Armistice, the Turks refused to surrender Medina until Jan. 1919. The Hejaz was represented at the Peace Conference by the Emir Faisal, King Husein's third son, and the state was admitted a member of the League of Nations in 1920. By the treaty of peace with Turkey, that country renounced all rights and titles to the Arabian peninsula and the King of the Hejaz undertook to ensure free and easy access of all Moslems to the holy places of Mecca and Medina. The treaty had not, however, been ratified by the Hejaz at the beginning of 1921.

King Husein maintained friendly, but formal, relations with the emir of Nejd during the World War; but, in 1919 and the early part of 1920, there was frequent friction between them over the debatable border at Khurma in the neighbourhood of Taif. A battle at Turaba, near Taif, in May 1919, resulted in a loss of 4,500 men to the Hejaz army; but the emir of Nejd did not follow up his advantage. In June 1920, relations between the

were reported to be more friendly; but the frontier still remained undefined in 1921.

The Central Emirates.&mdash;The emirate of Nejd, capital Riyadh, and that of Jebel Shammar to the N., capital Hail, comprise all the country between the main northern and southern deserts of Arabia. Between the two emirates lie the oases of Qasim and Sedeir, the overlordship of which has been in dispute for more than two generations. The two emirs control, more or less effectively, all the peoples both settled and nomadic of central Arabia, and the authority of the emir of Nejd extends to El Hasa on the E. and to certain tribes of the Asir border and Wadi Dawasir on the W. and S. Wahabism, or its more modern manifestation the Akhwan movement, supplies the moral basis of the power of the emirate of Nejd, while the settled nature of the population is its material basis. The emirate of J. Shammar, on the other hand, grew out of the desert power of a great nomadic society accustomed to maintain a group of permanent villages and hamlets around J. Aja and Selma, which served as rallying places and as market centres. The Shammar emirate, while inferior to its rival in wealth and settled population and lacking its religious tie, owes its strength to the unity existing between its oasis folk and the tribes of the surrounding regions, to the patriarchal tie binding them, and to the stimulus of the steppe desert upon its life.

Nejd (see ) comprises all the oasis groups situated about or on the Tuwaiq plateau, extending well over 500 m. from N. to S., and is directly or indirectly under the rule of Ibn Sa‛ud of Riyadh. In addition, the emir lays claim to El Hasa, on the Persian Gulf between lat. 24° and 29° N. He drove the Turks from this district—which they had occupied as a sanjaq of Basra since 1871—in May 1913, and was acknowledged by the Porte as vali of Nejd and El Hasa. He, however, effectively occupies only the Hofuf group of oases, with the ports of Qatif and ‛Oqair. In 1914, Ibn Sa‛ud entered into relations with the British Government—Capt. Shakespear being appointed political officer in Riyadh—and proved an unswerving ally throughout the World War. He declared himself definitely against Ibn Rashid, emir of J. Shammar, who had allied himself with the Turks. He fought a drawn battle with Ibn Rashid at Mejma‛ in 1915, the main point in dispute being the ownership of Qasim with the towns of ‛Aneiza and Boreida; it was in this battle that Captain Shakespear was killed. His attitude towards the Hejaz, while war lasted, was friendly but formal. By 1918, after intermittent and generally successful campaigns against the emir of J. Shammar, Ibn Sa‛ud had established his supremacy in central Arabia, including Qasim and Sedeir. His relations with the King of the Hejaz, in 1910-20, became less cordial, frequent disputes having arisen over the frontier question. He is believed to have steadfastly refused either spiritual or temporal allegiance to King Husein. Early in the summer of 1920, Ibn Sa‛ud turned his attention to E. Arabia and instigated an attack on Kuwait, which port he is said to covet. Several actions took place but without definite result, and subsequently efforts were made on the part of the British Government to bring about a territorial agreement between the emir and the sheikh of Kuwait.

Before the World War, the authority of Ibn Rashid was supreme in the group of oases about J. Aja and J. Selma; in the steppes N. of Qasim, from the Hejaz border (including the oasis of Teima) almost to Kuwait; and in the oasis of Jauf el A‛mr. On the N. and E., the southern Nefudh and the Dahana formed a neutral zone between his territory and the nomad tribes beyond. Ibn Rashid's attitude in the World War was consistently pro-Turkish, though relations between him and the adherents of the Committee of Union and Progress were probably never cordial. The comparative ease with which the Turks could reach Hail, from either the Hejaz railway (at Mu‛adhdham) or from Samawa and Nejef, contributed towards making him sensitive to Ottoman pressure. He was reported to have supplied the Turks with large numbers of camels, especially for the expedition against Egypt in 1915-6. As the World War proceeded, his power diminished, both territorially and economically.

While Ibn Sa‛ud was fighting the Turks in El Hasa (1913), Ibn Rashid was able to maintain his position; but, in 1915, an attempt on his part to overrun Qasim and Sedeir resulted in the loss of the towns of ‛Aneiza and Boreida, and they were placed under tribute to Ibn Sa‛ud. The oasis of Jauf, on the caravan road from Damascus to Hail, was seized in 1910 by the Ruweila tribe of the Anaza under Nuri esh Sha‛lan, one of the most powerful and anti-Turkish of the nomad chiefs. Nuri had shown himself a successful rival of Ibn Rashid, for, in spite of determined attempts on the part of the latter to regain the oasis (notably in 1914), he was not able to reëstablish his authority in Jauf. The important oasis of Teima, also, reverted to the Hejaz in 1917. In the same year Ibn Rashid went to reside at Medain Salih and, for a year, did not set foot in his capital. In May 1920, his murder was reported.

Asir.&mdash;The limits of this district are indeterminate, but broadly it comprises the country lying between the territory under the jurisdiction of the King of the Hejaz—who claims control of the Tihama down to Qunfuda—and that of the imam of Yemen. Its eastern limit is contiguous with Nejd. There is a strong political and social distinction between the people of the Tihama lowlands and those of the highlands which constitute Asir proper; and there is no part of Arabia where the tribal elements are so sharply defined and their boundaries less changeable. Settled tribes are the predominant element in Asir, as the physical conditions favour the pursuit of agriculture sufficiently to render nomadism unnecessary. In religion, practically all the tribes are Shafei Sunnites; Wahabism has a few adherents and its tenets are regarded sympathetically all over the district; but everywhere there is a strong antipathy to Zeidism.

Asir cannot be regarded as a political entity. In 1914, it fell into four parts—sections acknowledging the Turks, the Idrisi of Abu ‛Arish, and the sherif of Mecca respectively, and small groups of nomad tribes on the E. who recognized no authority. The Turks claimed the whole of Asir as the northern section of the vilayet of Yemen, but never succeeded in subduing the country and, in reality, they only precariously held the inland towns and immediate surroundings of Ibha and Muhail and the port of Qunfuda, all of which they garrisoned. The authority of the Idrisi was restricted to a strip of the Tihama some 80 m. long and extending about 40 m. inland to the scarp of highland Asir, with Sabia as capital and Jeizan and Midi as ports. The influence of the sherif of Mecca was mostly confined to the Ghamid and Beni Shihir tribes on the inland side of the ridge.

Interest in Asir, during the World War, was centred on the Idrisi, Seyyid Mohammed. His aim throughout was to rid the district of Turkish control and to extend his own influence. By 1910, he had much reduced the Ottoman hold and, in 1911-2, subsidized and supplied by the Italians during their war with Turkey, he consolidated his position. In 1914, failing to obtain sufficient recognition of his power from the Turks, he declared himself definitely against them. He concluded an agreement with the British resident at Aden in May 1915, and was supplied by the Allies with material. He raised part of the Zaranik tribe and took the field, ostensibly against the Turks, with a nominal following of some 12,000 men and overran the Tihama of Yemen, but failed to capture Loheia, one of his main objectives.

In reality, his support of the Allies was not of a very positive character, as he was in constant fear of attack by the imam of Yemen; and the Turks held Ibha and Muhail, their strongholds in the interior, until the Armistice. He kept on good terms all the time with the King of the Hejaz. The actual extent of the Idrisi's control of Asir, at the beginning of 1921, still remained a matter of doubt; but his attitude towards the imam of Yemen continued to be hostile, though there had been short periods of truce between them. In Feb., information reached England that Idrisi forces had occupied Hodeida.

Yemen.&mdash;As in Asir, the social contrast between the highlands and lowlands is very marked, being the outcome of religious and racial differences reinforced by strongly contrasted geographical conditions. Broadly speaking, the central highland population is Zeidite (Shiah) and accepts the authority of the imam, whereas

the population of the Tihama and the extreme N. and S. is predominantly Shafei and is strongly opposed to him. In consequence there has hardly ever been any semblance of administrative unity in the province. It is difficult to state the imam's territorial title as distinct from what he claims. While the Turks were in Yemen, there were districts or tribal groups (e.g. in the Yemen interior) who repudiated them, but were not unwilling to accept an imam wholly independent of them; there were others who accepted the Turks, but would have nothing to do with the imam except under pressure (e.g. the Isma‛iliya, the Daudiya sect along the Hodeida-San‛a road, and most of the northern Tihama tribes); and there were others again, such as the Zaranik, between the coast and hills S. of the Hodeida-San‛a road, and the Beni Yam in the interior, who accepted neither Turk nor imam.

The imam Yahya Ibn Mohammed came into power in 1904. After his revolt against the Turks (see ), a patched-up peace was made between them, but in 1911 his forces again beleaguered San‛a. The city was eventually relieved by ‛Izzet Pasha, who became military governor and succeeded, after some difficulty, in establishing an entente with the imam, &ldquo;for the sake of peace among Moslems.&rdquo; An imperial firman, read at San‛a on Sept. 22 1913, proclaimed a &ldquo;mediatized status&rdquo; or condominium, by the terms of which the imam secured the religious and social control of all the Zeidites (roughly all the highlands from the Asir border to the Aden frontier) together with part of the central Yemen Tihama, but he received no sanction to impose taxation.

On the outbreak of the World War, the imam refused to enter into relations with Aden, and was strongly opposed to the Idrisi. In 1915, he showed his leaning towards the Turks, by writing a letter to Enver, &ldquo;praying for the success of the Ottoman armies.&rdquo; He refused to be drawn into any alliance with the sherif of Mecca. Details of the actual happenings in Yemen during hostilities are somewhat obscure, but the imam's chief activity lay in attempts to tamper with the loyalty of the tribes of the Aden protectorate and Hadhramaut, in which he met with partial success. Later, he sought a closer understanding with the King of the Hejaz and, at one time, an alliance seemed possible, but did not materialize. The Turkish garrisons were withdrawn from Yemen at the end of 1918 and a small British-Indian force occupied Hodeida; but there was evidence that Turkish influence did not wholly disappear at the same time. In Aug. 1919, a British mission, sent from Hodeida in the hope of negotiating with the imam at San‛a, was captured by Quhra tribesmen at Bajil about 25 m. inland, and was detained until Dec., when it returned to the coast without having accomplished its purpose. In March 1920, the garrison of Hodeida was temporarily increased owing to the uncertainty of the attitude of the imam and some of the Tihama tribes. In Jan. 1921, the forces of the imam, commanded by Mahmud Nedim Bey, the former vali of Yemen, were reported to be attacking the Tihama regions the conquest of which appeared to be his main objective and were threatening Hodeida. In Feb., the occupation of Hodeida by Idrisi troops was reported.

Persian Gulf States.&mdash;The sultanates and sheikhdoms, which extend along the Arabian shores of the Persian Gulf, have all come under British influence, in one form or another. Their rulers are controlled in matters of external relations, and maintain their authority internally by grace of their alliance with Great Britain. None rule effectively over territory more than about a day's march from the coast. The states are as follow:&mdash;

On March 1 1921, it was stated in Parliament that matters of policy and administration affecting Arab areas within the British sphere of influence and Aden were transferred to the Colonial Office; but questions regarding the Hejaz remained under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The tendency was for the British Government to rely considerably on officers of the Sudan Civil Service.

Trade.&mdash;Arabia produces little for export except pearls, dates, coffee, hides and skins; imports consist almost wholly of manufactured fabrics (cotton in particular) and food-stuffs (rice, cereals, flour, sugar and tea). Besides Aden only Muscat, Manama and Kuwait carry on any considerable direct and regular trade with the outer world the first named with Europe mainly, and the others almost exclusively with India and the East; and Arabian trade in general commodities tends to focus more and more on Aden and Manama. The trade of Jidda—depending largely on the pilgrimages, and seasonal in consequence—though considerable, is of a more local nature and is mainly with Egypt, the near African coast and the Persian Gulf, and India at farthest. The trade of Hodeida, Jeizan, Mocha, Makalla, and the other still smaller ports is almost entirely carried on by sailing craft, though before the World War, Hodeida was also a port of call, at regular intervals, for certain smaller lines of steamers. Commercial enterprise at Arabian ports is mainly in the hands of Indians, especially in Oman, Kuwait, Hadhramaut and even at Aden; second to them come Italians, commercially predominant in many of the Red Sea ports (notably Hodeida), Italian Somaliland and Eritrea offering a convenient base of operations. Prior to the World War, British and Turkish interests were political rather than commercial: neither power had any strong hold on the economic activities of the country, the trade relations between Turkey and the Holy Cities excepted.

The following comparative table gives approximate trade figures (including specie), in thousands of pounds sterling, of the chief ports, in the years just anterior to the World War:&mdash;

Communications.&mdash;With the exception of the Hejaz line, Arabia was still without railways at the end of 1920. Two extensions of the Hejaz line were projected: (1) Medina-Mecca; (2) Ma‛an-Akaba. The first formed part of the original plan—the distance direct being 280 m. and the estimated cost just under £1,000,000. An alternative route, via Rabugh, was also considered and construction was begun at both Medina and Rabugh, but was abandoned. The Ma‛an-Akaba scheme did not go beyond the preliminary survey stage. In 1911, a survey of a railway from Mecca to Jidda was made by the Turks, but construction was postponed. In 1909, French engineers surveyed for a railway which the Turkish Government proposed to build from Hodeida to San‛a and ‛Amran. Alternative routes were considered one direct via Bajil and Hajla, and the other making a detour through Zebid, Ta‛izz and Yerim. As a preliminary, a French syndicate constructed 5.6 m. of metre-gauge track, between Hodeida and a proposed new harbour at Khor el Kethib, about 10 m. to the north. The work and all material and plant (including several locomotives) were destroyed in the Italian bombardment of Hodeida, in 1912. In 1918-9 a metre-gauge military line was extended from Sheikh ‛Othman to a few miles beyond Lahej, a total distance of 25 m. from Aden; when not required for military purposes it is available for ordinary transport.

There are no made roads of any considerable length in Arabia, except one of 173 m. from Hodeida to San‛a; but sections of certain of the caravan tracks were adapted, during the World War, for rough motor service, e.g. the road from Jidda to Mecca and from Akaba to Ma‛an. For purposes of trade, the old caravan routes have still to serve. The only route of trans-peninsular character is that from Zobeir to Boreida (379 m.), Mecca (479 m.) and Jidda (55 m.); total, 913 m. For the passage of trade as well as pilgrims, no other caravan route in Arabia compares with it in importance.

The lines of telegraph are: Jidda - Mecca; Jidda - Rabugh - Medina; Hodeida- San‛a; Hodeida - Mocha - Sheikh Sa‛id; Hodeida - Loheia - Midi; and Mocha - Ta‛izz - Yerim - San‛a.

Industries.&mdash;Camel-rearing is mostly in the hands of the Anaza in the N., the Qahtan and Shammar in the centre, and the ‛Ajman and Muteir in the E.; but the herds of the first-named tribe far outnumber those of any other. The centre of the camel trade is in Damascus (where almost all the capital is supplied) and to a less extent in Bagdad. In normal times, the chief tribes are said to possess 720,000 head, but during the World War herds were much depleted. Only the surplus, possibly numbering 45,000 per ann., and those not the best, are sold. A little horse-breeding is carried on by the emir of Nejd and by the Shahran tribes and there is a small export to Mesopotamia and Syria. Considerable numbers of the white, large-boned breeds of asses of El Hasa are sent to Egypt. The fisheries of Arabia, other than pearl, are valuable for the supply of local needs and are capable of development. The salting of fish is an industry at most coast towns, but more particularly those of the Red Sea and Oman; considerable quantities are sent into the interior. During the war operations, some attention was paid incidentally to the study of the Farsan pearl industry and to the possibilities of its development. The rock salt quarries of Salif, opposite Kamaran I., were worked under the control of the Ottoman debt and 105,000 tons of salt were exported to India and the Straits Settlements in 1908. Just prior to the World War an English company was working the quarries; in 1920, operations had ceased for the time being.

(H. W. M.)